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Vlithin the past decade the emphasis in school finance 
research has been toward formulating financing models to 
solve the inequities in educational opportunity. School 
finance research has concentrated, generally, on structuring 
school finance alternatives based on school district fiscal 
behavior. However, these studies did not analyze in detail 
2 
the school fina"1ce al ternati''!6s f imp;'3.cts on the indi-
vidual taxpaye:r.-s. Tile };roblem rmnains J,.- t '.I!:a , vlhile yarious 
school finance alterr:atives :nay attai:l equal educational 
oppor-tuni ty by f3quaJ.izing the level of eJo..,,})enditures 8.L-nong 
school districts, they could e~~and the tax burden dis-
tribu:tion inequities. 
Policy analysis allm\fs one to develop a rational 
policy procedure on empirical evaluation of policy 8.1-
·t(n,:na~;i'res designed to achieve a set of objectives~ 
:C~::.e 2.2.1alytic2.1 ~ethods employed by policy a.11alysis pro-
cedures are'the, found.ation of this research's conceptual 
fr2.I:18·V!o::'k. This research is oriented toward decision-
IDa}~ing a..."1d. intends to be a guide to policy action. 
::?olicy- suggestions for reform concentrate on th:r'ee 
cru~i2.1 areas: (1) to cb.ange the content 2-11d tho e:sr;>2n'~3 
of t.ne sts.t:e equaliztJ..tior,'. fOr::l!ule.;::; (2) to increase tns 
c:!: public ed'Qcation finance. TheSe policy suggestic:L.s 
i'00'..1,8 on t~le reven:;.e forr.::.a-:::ion and revenue distributio;l 
functions. 
This d_i :~se:::'+Ja'c oj on ':>na.L~ iT'7e'"' 'tho oD€;"atin ~ '--chool ~ ~,,~ 'J u';;;' v..... -0';;' ~ 
i'ina..'YJ.ce system from ~? school district fiscal p::'oiile 
y2::'sp8cti'7e" It also con:;i;r' ... lcts ~31;' s.nal:;-tic:ll mod.el and 
tests the sabael f''; .,.., :::l n r> E' "," t. (:t ','''', ,-;, .,- ,; ~ .;::: ,,,. f .; m'~'\ " ,.. t '" _ ...... .l.J.c.._ '- . __ .. :..,~' .. " .. _J._ .... ,,,tJ._~ ... ",; ........ j.;:'c .. 1.- 0 on -·.::119 
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The fifteen ~U1ified school districts in the Portl~~d 
metropolitan area of Oregon ''1ere chosen as the test gro~"1d 
for this research c The procedures for this policy research 
study are as follm'/s: (1) the social objectives, equal 
opportu.L'1.i ty and equity in ta:·: buxden distribution are 
defined as the basis by '''hich the school finance policy 
alternatives are analyzed; (2) alternative school finance 
policies are identified and selected according to a 
criterion of political feasibility; (3) the necessary 
data is collected and sL~ulated according to the speci-
fications of the policy alternatives; (4) the resultant 
tBJ": burden redistributionE of policy alternatives are 
identified; (5) results are analyzed to deter~ine the 
comparative advantages of alternative school fina~ce 
policies. 
Analysis of the school district fiscal profiles 
under the 1975-1976 ocncol final1ce sY'stem indicates con-
siderable differences in scnool district :fiscal capacities. 
Horeover, state aid distribution based. cn the property 
wealth of school districts is not sufficient to equalize 
these differences. It is evident that the state of Ore-
gon t s share in iina.."1.cing public 8c~ool '3 is inoufficient 
to override the ho::-l.zontal a:::1d -;re~tical ta~~ burden dis-
tribution inequities. 
This research indicates th2ht, changil'lg the state 
aid. distri1:mtio.n f:>rm'..llas wiJ.;nout increasinG the levs-l 
4 
of state support, may reduce disparities in fiscal cap-
acities among school districts. However, it is evide:n~ 
that s"J.ch ~c8form alternatives are not effective measu.:res 
to redace t~le existing tax burden distribution inequities 
a.'TIong individ.ual taxpayers. 
This study concludes that centralization of revenue 
formation functions, b;y~ increasinG the level of state 
S'J_ppo::'t to gublic schoo:::'s, ',-,ill red~ce ~Cll'2 c:~ist L'li; 
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FI:J.ANGING PUBL:::U SCHCCLS 
CHAPTER I 
THE PROBLBM AND SCOPE 
The disparities of financial resources and inequalities 
in educational opportwlity among school districts have been 
major problems of American publio education for many decades. 
The past several years especially have been a period of 
dynamic change in the types of public education finance. 
Many reforms and chw!ges in the level of state support and 
in state aid distributi.on formulas have been made. Yet, 
cha."'1.ges that 'V!ere initiated since 1972 have affected the 
school finance reform in t\'10 important ways. First, many 
of these reforms have been directed toward increasing the 
level of state support. For example. the levels of state 
support increased from 31 to over 50 percent in Colorado~ 
from 35 to over 60 percent in I1aine and from 20 to over 40 
percent in Oregon within the last six years. Secondly, 
many state legislatures have changed their state aid dis-
tribution from flat w"'1.d fo~~dation grant combinations to 
either percent equalizL~g or variable matching grant for-
mulas. (Grubb, "1974, po172) In many states, however, 
poor school districts still expend more tax effort in 
proportion to their financial ability than school districts 
with relatively more property \'/ealth. Evidently property-
poor school districts are not significantly affected by 
the recent school fina~ce reforms 4 
A co:n:.::iderably large portion of the revenues raised 
for public education comes from the local property tax. 
Tb.is form of funding used by school districts dr..d some 
states bas certain problems in providing revenues from the 
verspectives of equity a~d efficiency in taxation. For 
example, between 1960 and 1970 expenditures for primary 
and secondary education in the United States have risen 
at an average rate of 10.1 percent. (National Education 
Association Research, 1969, R-15) Bet"reen 1961 a.'1d 1969 
the average annual increase i!l loca12y-assessed property 
values was only 4.6 percent~ 
TaxabJe Property Values, 1969) The difference between the 
2 
cost of education and. the rate of E:x:parlsion in the property 
tax base has resulted in increased tax rates for financing 
public education. Such considerable increases in property 
tax rates for financing public schools and otr..er public 
goods and services, especially in urban areas, is a majo.r 
factor in the g:;:oo'tJ"ing pressaye to reform the financing 
of public education. 
The basic defects of the presently-operating edu-
cational finar:ce systems are: (1) a considerable arr:ount 
of variation in the property vlealth among school districts 
results in ilT.!Ir.ense differences in revenue capacities; (2) 
urbanized r:.reas' need for relati'l7ely more noneducational 
public ser7ices, such as law enforcement a."'lcl fire pro-
tection, r(;,q:'.:tires sItialler portions of the ta.."{ base to sup-
port public education (municipal overburden);( 3) state aid 
for public education is inadequate in sending funds to 
school districts with the greatest need; (4) state grants 
and aids for public education in the urban areas tends to 
be replacive; the amount of state aid allows the urban 
localities to allocate the same amount of local education 
funds to other municipal public services; (5) in contrast, 
the state grants ruld aid to local school districts in the 
suburban areas becomes additive; the state aid that is dis-
tributed will be added to the locally-raised public edu-
cation revenues. (Campbell, 1972, pp.128-131) 
Traditionally public school financing has combined 
revenue formation functions and expenditure decisions in-
to one inseparable unit. The legitimacy of the traditional 
concept of individual school districts operating inde-
pendently as fiscal units can be challenged by the fol-
lowing questions: (1) should school districts, through 
3 
a state aid system, subsidize one another? If so, to what 
extent?; (2) should individuals and families, equally-
circumstanced economically, pay different amounts of taxes?; 
(3) should the less wealthy individuals and families pay 
a higher percentage of their income for financing public 
education than the relatively wealthy?; (4) should property 
wealth or the level of income generated by the individual 
school districts determine the level and the type of pub-
lic education services offered in the communities?; and 
(5) should the socio-economic characteristics and the edu-
cational needs of the student population of individual 
4 
communities determine the level and type of public edu-
cational services? These questions are forcing state and 
local-level political structures to face additional de-
cisions and initiate policles tO'IIard reforming public 
education financing. 
Policy suggestions for reform concentrate on three 
crucial areas: (1) to change the content and the elements 
of the state equalization formulas; (2) to increase the 
level of state support; (3) to adopt a full state aSSUmption 
of public education finance. These policy suggest~ons are 
directed toward the revenue formation and revenue distri-
bution functions. The alternative systems of financing pub-
lic education and their revenue formation functions, there-
fore, will alter the cost-allocative structure in operation.* 
Based on this rationale, the primary purpose cf this research 
is twofold: to inv83tigate the existing disparities in 
cost-burden distribv..tion in public school finance and to 
~~alyze the alternative fOrffis of public school financing and 
their i::::nacts on the leyel 8.i.ld distribution of ta..x burdens in 
the st':".:te of Oregon. The analysis \'1il1 contribute to the de-
sign of an analytical framework from which decision-mru(ers 
can study, from a tax burden redistribution perspective, the 
impacts of various public school finance alternatives. 
*There ~xists no scientific rationalization that modi-
fications in ~ost-benefit allocation will alter educational 
achievement 18vels. The difficv..lty in empirically investi-
gating this L5sue is, I: ••• the fact that 'l;le have yet to estab-
lish the links bet"''1een success and the characteristics of the 
program ::,oT.J."G3nt and resources. '1 (Cresswell, 1974, p .49) 
5 
The Court s and the Law 
Basic problems in school finance have developed be-
cause state governments, while delegating substantive 
responsibilities to school districts, have allowed the dis-
tricts to be differen.tiated by locations wi'tih enormous 
wealth variations. Local governmental application of 
certain political and economic regulations, through such 
measures as zoning laws, enforces the general situation 
which allows wealthier parents to reside in school districts 
vli th relatively high taxable property weal til and the rel-
atively less wealthy to live in districts with moderate 
or low property wealth. "Regarding local school tax rates 
as a price for educational services, it follows that rich 
households are likely to receive expensive services at 
low tax rates while, at the same time, poor households are 
taxed heavily to provide themselves ",ith meager serrices. 1I 
(Bensen, 1970, Pe127) 
Des~ite the fact that financial disparities exist 
among school districts '·lithi.l'1 and between states, there is 
a general lack of consensus among scholars about the 
effects of interdistrict revenue variations on the equality 
of educational opportunity. (Bowles and Levin, 1967; Cole-
m~~, 1968) The report prepared by the Presidential Com-
mission headed b~r Dr. James Coleman concluded that per 
pupil expenditur~ levels and the level of student achieve-
ment are unrelat~i. (Coleman, 1966) This has been inter-
preted to mean that variations in fi.nancial resources have 
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very little effect on educational opportunity. Yet Cole-
nan's report also concl~ded that the student achievement 
scores were directly related to teachers' level of edu-
cation and experien~e. Thus it is difficult to accept the 
opinion that variations in school district fina~cial re-
sources have little relationship to educational oppor-
tur...i.ty when teachers' salaries a::'e generally the largest 
school expenditure '-!-l\,em. (B,...·; 1 O~T 
.-k ..... - 41·, 1971, pp.49-50) 
Eegardless of the argument in. legal circles 
about '.vhether money has any effect upon eqaali ty 
0 -'" pd",:~~a""l'o""" ( ... ,.,......,p c"''''') or.a---d +1--1:::'-. -f"'tl· .. l ........ CCJ """0-; C"_ ... _ .--'.'-' '01 ~~, .,. .... _ o.J.... r~Q _ \J •• ~ _ 1:;. .... ~ ... ~Q_,-, 
tance b~r rich districts to reform as adequate 
testi:nony to the relevance of mO~ley. (H01,vever, 
av,:;:::;.) if mo:r..ey is inadequ.3.te to improve education, 
the residents of poor districts should at least 
have an 9qual opportunity to be equa12.y dis-
appoiY"~ted by its fai.lure. (Coone,197C,po)O) 
Despite legal and academic di.sagreements, eg:.l.alization 
of. education-a:!. opportunity has been 8.."l irnportant objective 
pursued by scholars concerned with the financing of public 
schools. Yet, theore~ical disagreements regardin.g the de-
finition of equality of educational opportu~ity are great 
among these scnola:::'s. The Dost a;reed-upon definition 
of aq'J.ality of educational opportunity :has been con.structed 
by Jobns-Alexander-Stollar. (Johns, et 0.1, 1971) They 
have defined the ccncept of equality in educational op-
pcrtunity as the provision of t:he financial resources 
necessary to pTovioe adequate educational opportunities 
for all childl"2n and j'o::t.th of the r..ation. 3::t.ch financial 
equalization is most nearly accompl1.Ghed ~.vrheYl the fol-
lowing til/O criterion are met: "( 1) the varying educational 
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needs of the student population are taken into consideration 
before the allocations are made, and (2) the variations 
in the ability of the local school districts to support 
education are reduced or eliminated through the utilization 
of state resources." (Johns, 1971, p.122) 
The California State Supreme Court, in the case of 
"Serrano vs Priest," found it distressing that school dis-
tricts with poor communitles had to accept the burden of 
high tax rates for public schools to maj.ntain relatiYely 
low-quality educational progra~s for their students. On 
the other hand, school districts within wealthy communities 
enjoyed both the low ta~ rates and high standard educational 
programs. (California Supreme Court, 1971) The California 
Supreme Court held that a school district's property wealth 
as a determina~t of the level of education provided vio-
lates the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth P~end­
ment of the United States Constitution and equivalent pro-
visions in state constitutions. 
Following the Serrano Case in California, five other 
states followed suit--in I,Iinnesota (Van Dusartz vs Hatfield, 
1971); in Texas (Rodriguez vs San Antonio, 1973); in New 
Jersey (Robinson vs Cahill, 1972); in Wyoming (Hollins vs 
Shofstall, 1972); and in Arizona (Sweet\'later County -vs 
Hinkle, 1972). However, the Texas case (Rodriguez, 1973) 
and the Arizona case (Sweet'T,'later County, 1972) were re-
versed. The United States Supreme Court's majority opinion 
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held that the right of education is not a fundamental 
right because it is neither explicitly nor implicitly g1.l.a-
ranteed oy the United States Constitution. 
Because of the lack of agree~ent over the meaning 
of educationaJ. opportunity, the United States Supreme Court 
has refrained from taki~lg a definite po si tion on school 
fina"Ylce issues a.Yld has d.ecided to let the states settle the 
matter. By a five-to-four vote in the case of Rodriguez 
YS San .Antonio Independent School Board (1973), the Supreme 
Court ruled that disparities in pro~gerty valu.es between 
jurisdictions relying on p::'operty taxes to fina::.lce educa.tion 
did not violate the equal protection clause of the 14th 
Amendnent. Re?res8n-ti::lg the majority opinion, Justice 
Lewis F. Powell stated~ 
We are urged to abrogate systems of fina..'1cing 
public education presently in existence in vir-
tually every state. • • (to declare unconstitu-
t ional) what many ecli.,cators for half a century 
have thought was an erJ.lightened approach to a 
nroblem. for ':lhich there is no Derfect solution. 
~ie are unwilling to aSSU .. il1e for- ourse:':"yes a 
level of wisdom superior to that of legislators, 
scholars, and educational authorities in 49 
states, especial:i..y when tbe alternatives pro-
posed a:::-e only recently conceived and nm·,here 
yet tested. (Dye, 1975, p.159) 
~he Supreme Court has also decided that individual 
states should be responsible for reform even though it 
recognized financial and educational inequities among 
school districts do existv 
The Ccnstitutions in all states contain lan-
gJage to the effect that IC6islature has the res?on-
sibili ty for maintaining a thorough a,.Y).d efficient 
systen of public education free to all young people 
within certain age limits. In fulfilling this 
obligation, legisla.tures r..ave generally en-
acted statutes to permit the formation and 
reorganization of local school units. While 
most of the responsibility for operating the 
schools has been delegated to those local units, 
legally public education remains a function of 
the state. 
state provisions for education generally 
fall short of this goal. Scarce state 
resources and faulty state aid distribution 
systems account for much of the observed dis-
~arity in educational opportunity within states. 
tHooker, 1971, p.403) 
Hany of the states' courts have declared that a state 
aid system is urlconstitutional if it causes the quality 
of public education to become a function of the wealth 
of the locality. In the Ue\." Jersey case (Robinson ys Ca-
hill, 1973) the state court supported, in principle, the 
concept that the public education system vias too important 
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to be left to the moods and aspirations of local school 
district taxpayers. In the "Robinsonll case the New Jersey 
court went further by supporting the concept of differential 
educational costs for socio-economically differentiated 
students and endorsing a uniform state support system 
with cost differentials. (Jofu"1S, 1972, pp.72-73) tiThe 
Robinson decision demonstrated that the momentum for re-
form begun by Serrano was not stopped by the Rodriguez 
decision (though it may haV'e been slm'led), and that the 
action had shifted from federal to state COtlxts." (S\v'an-
son, 1976, p.153) 
In subsequent court cases, the Su.preme Courts of 
Idaho (Thompson vs Engelking, 1975), \'lashington (Northshire 
School District vs Kinner, 1974) and Oregon (Olson vs 
Oregon, 1975) have upheld the school finance la'l,'1s of 
their states. (S\'lanson, 1976, p.153) 
In a Florida court case (Hargrave vs Kirk, 1970) 
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the plaintiffs won the decision that the state's local 
property tax rate limits for school support imposed a legal 
barrier to school districts with low property cash value 
per pupil. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the 10\'Ier 
court's decision on certain judicial tec~~icalities without 
a complete analysis of the merits of the case. However, 
even though there are apparent benefits to stUdents in 
terms of increased expenditures, these court cases against 
property tax limits do nothing to eliminate tax burden 
inequities caused by the property tax. "This results from 
the fact that increasing the school tax rate in tax-poor 
districts could dra~atically increase the burdens on the 
districts f ta..."'q)ayers 'I,'1i th little to show in terms of in-
creased per pupil e~~enditu:t'es.1f (Long~ 1973, p.97) 
The achievement of equal educational opportunity 
across the United states is likely not to hap~en in the 
near future o The judiCial process is e:~ensive and t~me­
consumL~g. H~~dreds of districts currently may be vio-
lating equal educational oPfortunity. District-by-dis-
trict complaints £ust be filed with the courts ag~inst the 
o~f8nding district. Howe~er, in many districts where some 
students have been denied equal eclucational opport1.IDities, 
no judicial action has been takeno (Brown, 1976, Po148) 
In response to existing state and federal-level 
litigations, many state legislatures introduced reforms 
with increased state support level aided by "power-equal-
izing" formulas. However, urban centers are disadvantaged 
when state equalization formulas are based on property 
cash value per pupil rather than on measures based on 
income and/or cost differentials for special programs and 
compensatory education. Where the state legislators have 
expanded the court definition of equality of educational 
opportunity to include the criterion of cost equity, the 
reforms have resulted in property tax relief which has 
included provisions of cost of living corrections and 
income measures of wealth. 
ftThe most promising route to school finance reform 
acceptable to cities appears to be through legislation 
rather than litigation." (Swanson, 1976, p.165) However, 
it appears at this time that many legislative attempts 
to construct a substantive reform policy for financing 
public education are hampered by political and economic 
conflicts in the states' legislatures. Such legislative 
stagnation has been supported by public indifference. 
Dye has reported that public support for education has 
declined over the past decade. The proportion of bond 
referendum for financing schools that were approved by the 
voter has declined from 89 percent in the early 1960's 
to 48 percent in the early 1970's. (Dye, 1975, p.156) 
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Politics and Education 
One of the basic problematic causes inherent to the 
politics of education lies within the states' structure 
of educational governance and policy-making. This legal 
structure has created a situation of dual sovereignty be-
tween the state and the school districts. 
Since that dual sovereignty (between the state 
and the local school districts) enhances the in-
fluence of the organizations led by professional 
school (persons), it does not result in the maxi-
mization of either state or local government in 
education to the exclusion of the other. In other 
words, the dual sovereignty ~roduces dominant in-
fluence by organized school {persons), which in 
turn functions to prevent the breakdown of the 
competing state and local governments. (Ian-
naccone, 1974, p827) 
The ultimate legal authority over providing public 
education resides with the state governments, not with 
the local school districts. The state governments are 
involved in administering and financing public education 
by controlling local tax rates and debts, and by standard-
izing the overall quality of public education. "Histori-
cally, school matters have provided little political 
mileage for ambitious legislators. As a result, the 
major influence over state education policy has fallen 
to state boards of education, state superintendents of 
education and state departments of education." (r-Jeranto, 
1970, p.88) 
Presently traditional public education policy pro-
cesses are changing from nonpolitical, professional 
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elitist group operations to relatively political pluralistic 
procedures. Whenever these changes occur, they force 
the professional educator to lobby for fiscal independence 
in order to regain the lost influence over the educational 
core group. (Sacks, 1972, p.133) Many professional edu-
cators have staunchly argued that any reform contralizing 
public education functions will remove people from the 
decision-making processes, resulting in a lower quality 
of educational services. On the other hand, many social 
scientists argue that no substantive rationale warrants 
a special levy of government for public education. Pub-
lic education should belong to state and/or local govern-
ment operations. Supporting the premise of the centralist 
argument, Sacks has concluded that public resources cannot 
be efficiently allocated, nor competitive demands on the 
public sector effectively weighed, without a central auth-
ority which would consider local demands on a given tax 
base. "Those who argue against independence for the 
schools also contend that the presence of independent 
school systems fractures local governmental authority, 
makes financial planning at the local level impossible, 
and. menaces municipal budgets." (Sacks, 1972, pp.116-117) 
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It is one of the primary contentions of centralists 
that most policy suggestions to resolve problems inherent to 
public education are handicapped by the political and socio-
economic fragmentation of the urban area. Due to the 
process of dispersion and suburbanization, the urban central 
city, with an unbalanced social situation and fiscal 
position, finds itself sealed in with its problems. 
This multi-dimensional socio-economic segregation pro-
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cesses will compel the urban central school districts to seek 
support and guidance from the state and federal govern-
ments. (Minar, 1967, p.318) 
The distribution of socioeconomic character-
istics between the city. and its suburbs, which 
has been generated by the continuing trend of de-
centralization, has a strong influence on the 
level of education expenditures and on the ability 
of the central city to pay for educational ser-
vices. Second, the differential impact of state 
aid and retirement system policies also has a 
major influence on educational finance. This 
metropolitanization is producing a fragmented 
metropolitan governmental system which is, 
will continue to be, an important political var-
iable in explaining educational fiscal behavior. 
(Sacks, 1972, p.126) 
In many states public education interest groups are 
becoming more and more formally structured. Most of the 
public education interest groups are under the influence 
of professional educators representing local school bur-
eaucracies. The majority of the policy information flowing 
in and out of the states' departments of education origi-
nates with this well-organized alignment of local pro-
fessional educators. This suggests that the structure of 
educational policy-making at the state level, as well as 
at the local level, " ••• has been controlled by the pro-
fessional educator who is most closely associated with 
local school bureaucracies." (Sacks, 1972, p.132) How-
ever, such association between school boards and school 
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bureaucracies has indirect political ra~ifications on the 
operation of state ruld local politics. It nay be that, 
" ••• the occupational background of senool board members 
suggests that they are sensitive to tax burdens placed 
upon businessmen and property owners." (Dye, 1975, p.157) 
It is a well-accepted fact that goverTh~ental pro-
cedures arid policy processes are not neutral operations. 
The govel'!11TIental process is al\·rays biased toward tne iL-
terest of ce:rtain private a'1d/ or public entities. (Lowi, 
1969) '!The irl-;;s::-ests tnat currer:tly gain freT"} such -oiases 
may not nave been the C!1es that developed. the political 
system. In i'act f they may have once been the ve::-j'· in-
tel"ests against "lhier.. the political sy-stem was designed 
to discriminate in some previcpJ.s period. II (Ian...'1occone, 
1974, p.45) Sacks, et aI, clearly illustrated that the 
presen-: infe::-ior fiscal situation of the urban ed"~1.Co.-:ion 
system is a reflection of its superiority in the past& 
It is 0 bvio .... l.s t~t1at past goveTI!::nen tal polic ie s, fo:rmed to 
help rural education, are now being applied to the s'Uburb~ 
education system. Such policy application appears to 
operate against the interests of the urban central edu-
cation system. Apparently nany 
:?olicy decisions which nay hav8 been ap:Dropriate in the 
,ast a='8 quite often obsolete today. T:~e re2.1ization 
ryf this ;-::::..y sene:::-ate a fiscal and peli tical enviror"-..!l8:lt 
to sti:nulat2 a rethi:lking of the appropriate relationship 
between the state governments ruld local school districts. 
The Local Property Tax 
The property tax occupies a very important position 
in financing public education as the main source of re-
venue for local governments and for most of the state 
governments. Yet as a local revenue source, the property 
tax has been heavily criticized as the primary cause for 
existing inequities in educational opportunity among 
localities. This criticism is based on local assessment 
functions. Depending on the effectiveness of the county 
assessor's office, wide variations C8...'l1 exist bet'1.'leen the 
assessed and market value of properties in a jurisdiction. 
Some evidence supports the premise that properties with 
high market valu.e are less highly assessed than properties 
with low market values. Consequently, the effective tax 
rate on low market value property becomes higher than the 
effective rate on high market value property. Thus ver-
tical tax burden inequities among ta~ayers are created. 
(Ladd, 1974, p.78) 
In. addition to its in..."lerent inequities in cost burden 
distribution, the local property tax has contributed to 
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the expansion of many urban problems such as central city 
decay, slum formations and suburban sprm'll. In the past 
decade it has become evident that, " ••• suburbanization by 
draining the hither income families and much economic 
activity from the cities, produced more serious educational 
and political problems fer city school districts than it 
did for suburba...'1 districts. If (Heranto, 1970, P .25) 
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The local property tax affects the use and improvement 
of the land. Issues of local property taxes and land use 
are closely related. For example, the level of local 
property ta.x may affect the formation of slum housir..g "I1hen 
it is more profitable to rent than. to replace or to re-
habilitate. Consequently, this results in hig~8r demand 
for noneducational services in urban areas, making it very 
difficult for the urban school districts to adequately 
finance the educational needs of the residents without an 
Differences in tax rates across the metropolitan 
area may be a result of the interaction between conSUl'Iler 
p:r-efere:':.ce s and/or needs for public goods a..."1d service s 
and the taxable property \'leal th of the jurisdiction. 
The differences in taxable property wealth are one of the 
wajor determinant s of local pro:9~rt:,'" taz :::::,ates '.'Ii thin a 
:o.etropoli tan area. It may be the case, t}'1e:cefore, that 
tee more ta:~able propert~f ",'leal th a co:r.u.J.u..11i ty has, the 
lower the property ta.x rate needed to finance a local pub-
lie good. "Hence, an inverse relationship between the 
size of the tax base and the tax rate across commlmi ties 
is to be e}..-:pected." (Ladd, 1974, 9.71) Urban school 
districts 'tlhich appear wealthy in te::::T.1S of per pupil pro-
perty cash values, are facing conditions of Dunicipal 07er-
burden and .re:_ative pove:.'ty in alTailable resources. Con-
'lersely, sUDur-ban school district s with relati yely greater 
p~blic education fin~~ce resources are receiving greater 
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amounts of state aid. Among the three types of localities, 
suburbs have the least educational need, the greatest 
capacity to finance education, the lowest municipal over-
burden and, ironically, proportionally greater state aid 
for public education. (Berke, 1974,p.88) 
Based on their socio-economic characteristics, re-
sidents of c"ertai:n school districts ''1ould have relatively 
higher aspirations for their children than in some other 
school districts. "The districts that have a higher aspir-
ation level, it is hypothesized, also have a higher socio-
economic and cultural level. tI (Briley, 1971, p.115) 
Conse~uently, within the limits of their taxable proper.ty 
base, they will make a higher I00al tax effort fo~ schools. 
They may also receive relatively more state supporto 
State grants and aid to local public education have been 
designed to entice the local t~~ayer into making extra 
effort to fina~ce the public schools. The irony of this 
situation is that the existence of municipal overburden 
in urban central areas se:rves as a hind.erance to the pos-
sibility of raising the level of property taxes. This, in 
return, causes the urban central school districts to be 
L~ the low tax effort category and consequently results in 
relatively lower levels of state aid. 
The educational output _f the financially-strained, 
poor school district can dilute the quality of the re-
latively \-Irell-prepared educational output of the more 
highly-organized, wealthy school district. This 
phenomenon is an important correlate of externality as 
well as of locational acceptability. The residents of the 
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wealthy school districts accept only families with relatively 
similar social status and behavior, coupled with the eco-
nomic ability to purchase high value-assessed properties. 
Such segratory practices functionally o~erate through the 
local political process by excluding the lower socio-eco-
nomic classes vis-a-vis discriminatory residential zoning. 
As a result, a large portion of ·the lower socia-economic 
classes is ezcluded froT!l the benefits of aC'luirj.TI.g a better 
education for their children with relatiV'el~r lower eosts. 
Simultaneou.sly, middle and high income families often 
leave urban areas (with high tax rates and low educational 
expenditUJ?es) L."'l. favor of suburban commU11ities "lith low 
tax rates and high educational expenditures. 
Hence, families that are immobile either be-
cause of their limited employment opportunities 
or because of discriminatory policies against 
them by other cornmuni ties are not able to pu.=-
chase a higher level of public services tha.ll 
that provided by the community in which they 
liV'e, even if their tastes and ability to pay 
differ from those of the majority. (Ladd, 
1974, p.74) 
Due to sheer magnitude the financDlg of elementary 
and secondary education has become ~"'l. important policy 
parameter to be investigated for its ir~erent cost distri-
butive inequitL~;3. Huch research has ShOW.i.l that indi-
viduals and far.ilies, e1ually-c.ircumstanced in terms of 
income and wealth but lccated in different communities, 
are treated tL~equally by their res~9ctive local public 
sectors, especially the school districts. (Ladd, 1973, 
p.74) tlIt is somewhat ironic to note that not only the 
children of the poor have less money spent for their 
schooling (and consequently unequal and less adequate 
school services) but, also that relative to their income, 
thed .. r parents pay more for those unequal services." 
(Guthrie, 1971, p.124) 
Rl'3cent research has sho'Wn that "I;he level of govern-
ment (rather than the t;y-pe of tax) financin.g 2~ public 
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good creates differences in t~~ bases and service level 
inequalities across jurisdictions. (Ladd, 1974 ~~d Aaron, 
1975) Thus the basic cause of cost-benefit inequities 
among school districts may be local financing of certain 
public goods and not the property tax per see The de-
centra.lized provision of a public good, local in character, 
is more efficient than the centralized provision. Even 
though there exists inequality of educational opportunity 
costs resulting from local autonomy in fin&~cing public 
education, the general public appears to support; the de-
centralist contention that the benefits of the local 
autonomy are important and sufficient enough to overcome 
the effects of inequality of educational opportunity. 
However, because of its very nature (the high level of cost 
and benefit spillovers), the effects of public education 
goods and se~~vices reach beyond the boundaries of local 
communities. For that reason the resulting inequalities 
in educational opportunity among school districts within 
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metropolitan areas have statewideand national repercussions. 
Dependence on the property tax to finance the local 
public goods and services is likely to continue. Because 
of the inequities in cost-bene~it distributions, the re-
sponsibility to finance public education may shift to state 
governments in the future. vllien this occurs, the state 
governments will have to find additional sources of re-
venue to replace the foregone local revenues. (Ladd, 
1974, pp.76-81) Under these circumstances, to eliminate 
local financing of public education, state governments 
will have to construct a replacive financing system ap-
propriate to current revenue structures. Varying from 
state to state, such a replacive financing system may be 
based on the state income tax, on sales tax, on state-
",ide property tax or on any combination thereof. (Dye, 
"1975 and Thorson, 1974) 
The Financing of Public Schools in Oregon 
The state of Oregon imposes many different taxes to 
raise revenues. Oregon's revenue system is characterized 
by a progressive personal income tax and a business tax 
which is partially shifted to residents of other states. 
Oregon is one of the few states which does not use sales 
tax. Other taxes, according to their importance, are the 
gasoline tax, the cigarette tax, the inheritance tax, the 
insurance companies' tax and the alcoholic beverages tax. 
A general outline of the Oregon revenue system, with yields 
of principal t~ces for the fiscal year 1974, is presented 
in Table I. 
In Oregon reform efforts to change or modify its 
school financing system and its dependence on the local 
property taxation have been slow in developing and are 
usually politically unsuccessful. Many reform proposals 
have been debated in state legislatures. When approved, 
with amendments to satisfy contending interests t only 
minimal adjustments to the operating fina..'1.cing system ''lere 
introduced. During the 1950's the Oregon Legislature and 
the state Tax Commission demonstrated extensive efforts 
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in ''larking with individual counties to construct a system 
to equalize the property as,sessmen.ts so that all taxpayers 
\'I"ould pay only a just and eQ.ui table share of the tax bur-
den.. These efforts by the state Tax Commission hairs re-
formed the property assessment functions of the county 
governments. Oregon is one of the few state governments 
that has raised its level of assessments for property 
taxation from 25 to -100 percent of the market 'talue within 
the last several decades. This sharp increase in the level 
of assessment has been received with little public com-
plaint and no judicial challenge o 
In the State of Oregon during the school year 1975-
1976, the elementary a..l1d secondary public schools \tIere 
financed by three basic sourceD: federal, 8 percent; 
state, 30 percent; and the local school district, 62 per-
cent. (Oregon Department of Edt:cati.on) ':ehe state's 
TABLE I 
S:'.A.Ii3 OF C~?~~:}C'lT J.I~~~( 
RE\T3:';U~ SC:tTR.C~3 
Car~cr~~ion ?ranchisa 
i-;1,....V 
..!.. c...41. 
C:~rporate IncoLl8 
Fersonal IncoDe 
T8.:{ 
Alcho1ic Be7era;cs 
G:?solin"=? 
Tax 
rimber 
Tax 
Vehicle 2egistratio~ 
Fees 
2ub1ic Utilities 
Tax 
In s::ra:lC "=? Ci)~rF) 2.;"l.2. e s 
.~,.... ... -
.!- C'~ ... .. 
1n .. '1 er i t 8.2:;.C e 
'1:2.7.: 
Yield (1°71:)1 , j •. ' • ~ I 
384,000 
1,473,000 
9(,,903,OCO 
4-27,002,000 
4,530,000 
81,696,oeo 
') ~ A \." (nee L,,-,.,J,~j 
31,230,000 
2,918,000 
25,275,000 
21 ,932-,000 
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?ercert of ~otal 
C::L n6? / , • ,,-. I-
.57') 
.333 
3.953 
3.201 
2.72.1 
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share in supporting public schools in Oregon is one of 
the Im'lest in the nation. 
Oregon relies heavily on the personal income t~~ as 
a financing source. Consequently, it appears that Oregon's 
revenue structure is relatively progressive when compared 
to other states. Despite its relatively progressive tax 
s·tructure, the low level of public education support by 
the state does not do much to correct the vertical and hori-
zontal tax burden distribution in.equities resulting from 
the financi~g of Oregon's public schools. Consequently, 
the differences in the property \\Tealth of local school 
districts determines the level of tax burden distributed 
to the residents. 
The local application of the property tax, more than 
the t~~ itself, appears to be a major factor contributlllg 
to the inequities in tax burden distribution. In Oregon 
properi;y wealth variations among school districts are con-
siderably large. In 1974 the wealthiest school district, 
in terms of taxable property, was the Brothers school 
district ",ith a total property cash value of $437,761 .00 
a property wealth of only $16,119.00 per student., This 
is a ratio of 35 to 1. In comparing distric·ts in the 
90th a...'l1d 10th percentiles of wealth per student, it was 
found that Helix School District had $132,126.00 per 
student ",hile Orient School Distri.ct had $27,907.00 per 
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student. This is a ratio of 5 to 1. (Pierce, 1975, p.18) 
"With the same effort, the district in the 90th wealth 
percentile is able to raise nearly five times as much 
revenue as the district in the 10th percentile. u (Pierce, 
1975, p.18) The differences in property wealth magnifies 
the inequity situation whereby the wealthy school dis-
tricts are able to spend more per student with 10\'1er tax 
rates than the relatively less wealthy school districts. 
The state support system to aid the financing of 
public schools is designed to equalize some of the cost-
benefit disparities among local school districts. The 
state's public education funds are distributed to school 
districts primarily through the Basic School Support ~~d 
(BSSF). This fund const5.tutes more than 95 percdnt of the 
total state support in Oregon. The Basic School Support 
Fund in Oregon has three major categories: Transportation 
Grants; Equalization Grants; ~~d Flat Grants.* (The actual 
a~d the relative composition of the BSSF in Oregon and its 
history is illustrated L~ Tables II and III.) 
The basic distri"butive criterion for Oregon's BSSF 
is that the state guarantees individual school districts 
*In Oregon, state gove~~ent involvement into the fin-
ancing of public schools dates back to 1946 when the Legis-
lature created the Basic School Support Fund. After 30 
years the pro}?ortions of the BSSF formula which allocate 
funds to the 1;11.1:'ee basic criteria are approximately the 
same. (Table II) Since 1947 th8 level of' state aid to 
public education has fluctuated. 'rhe state aid in 1951-1952 
reached more than 40 percent of the total expenditures for 
public education. In 1970-1971 this figure was barely over 
22 percent. (Table II) 
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to raise a minimum standardized per pupil revenue at a 
state-regulated tax rate. If the revenues raised by an 
individual school district are insufficient at the state-
designated tax rate, the state supplements the district 
revenue with state funds to the extent necessary to raise 
the district revenue ~o the level guaranteed by the state. 
(Pierce, 1975, pp.90-22) 
TABLE III 
THE COMPOSITION OF THE :bASIC 
SCHOOL SUPPORT Fu~D 
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Title of 1947-1948 % 1973-1974 Amount 1973-1974 % 
Fund of Total BSSF (Hillions of $1 of Total BSSF 
Transportation 
Gr~~ts 8 9.5 6.6 
Equalization 
Grants 17 26.8 18.7 
Flat 
Grants 75 107.2 
Source: Pierce, 1975, p.21 and Legislative Revenue 
Office Research Report 24, 1976, p.1. 
74.7 
However, instead of determining this minimum 
expenditure level by an a..."'1a17lSis of program needs, 
the statutes require that the basic prograo be 
computed by a fornula based on the relationship 
of cur::. ... ent educational costs to 1955-1956 costs ••• 
In 1973-1974 this com:lUtation nroduced a 1;)asic 
progran level of t~682:23 per pupil, ';'Iell belo\'! 
the statewide a:vera-?e expendituJ:'e of ;~~1 ,058.00. 
(?ierce, 1975, p.20) 
If the local school district tax effort is insuf-
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ficient to raise the state basic prog~am level, the school 
district may receive state equalization support, depending 
on the level of state flat grants for wl:ich the district 
qualified.* 
It is imlJortant to note, hm·/ever, that 
the state equalization 9rogr~~ neither in-
sures t~at all djstricts raise the basic 
prog~a~ amount nor that all districts tax 
themselves at the designated required tax. 
Property-poor districts which ta.."'{ them-
selVeS at less than the suggested rate will 
not raise the basic proGram amount eV'en 
~/Jith state eoualization aid. At tl:e sar:Je 
time, wealth; districts may raise consid-
erable more than the basic program a~ov~t 
at the tax rates vrell below the suggested 
ratE:' ~ (Pierce, 1975, p. 22) 
In 1972 the suocomnittee on state revenue decided 
that Oregon's basic revenue problems are twofold. First, 
Oregon's revenue structure relies n.eavily on local pro-
perty tax. Almost 80 percent of Oregon's local juris-
dictions ~ave legal authority to use prope:rty tax. In 
*The state equalizatio::1 suppo:rt is d.istributed accord-
ing to the follovring for::n.lla: Basic :I?rogra.I:l a"7lOu ... 'Yl t per 
student X .A'·';'2rage Da.ily ?,1embership -l'Ieig1::.ted .-- LS"tate Flat 
Gra..."lts + Fe(~,eral forest fees ar..d COTIlI1l0n school ::u.nd re-
ceipts + (State cor!:::-;::mted ta:c rate X district true cash 
yalue17= state eq'1.alization support to the school district. 
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1971 over 72 percent of all gen9ral revenue raised by 
local jurisdictions VIas supplied by the property tax. 
Seco:::'~dly, the instaoili ty 2..nd inadequacy 
state's revenue strJ.cture to finance l)uol:.c schools equi-
tably creates bases for judicial argui7:.ents as to wh,:;tcer 
or not the system of financing )ublic schools mests the 
state's constitutional requireme~ts. Article I, section 
10 of Oregon's Constit:"ltion states t:::'at, III·To lc;.vi sha::Ll 
be ~assGd ;ranting to Wly citiz0~ or C12GS of 8itizens 
:;>rivileges or im."::n;.nities vihic1:<..:.yO.::1 tr.:.e f5al1l8 ""cer:ns Sllall 
l'wt eque,lly belong to a}.l citizeEs. II Also, A::'ticI2 VIII, 
Constitution clearly inc.:Lca tes ti:.at, 
II • '1 
••• "t.:~e legisl.srt: i ve assembly she_II 9rovidc by }.:?_w for the 
establisf'_--:J.ent of a ~11.iform 2 .. IlG. ,C8l1er2_l system of COf.1P..on 
scnools. 1I 
~eQeaterl ap'pear?Jlces of CO'J.l't c2.ses, and -:J:loL.c un-
easiness in general tC'dard the J..ocal prop.e:cty tax, l:..ave 
clearly indicated tha"'c reforf.2s '.vill tal;:e place in fir~-
ancing public education. Tl'le dissatisfaction '.'lith local 
pro?erty ta:;:ation has p~oduced three :::!ajo::' policy iui t-
iatives ii'l OreGon during thl? late 1S60's and the e2.rly 
1970's. Two of t~ese policy initiatives dealt witi limit-
i:ng t!18 use of 10c&l property taxes to fina:1.ce :9ublic 
sc~ocls. Tte third policy initiative proposed to constr~ct 
a state sales Voters rejected all three of these 
policy initiatives. 
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Despite the fact that all of the proposals were 
defeated at the polls, public denand for reform continued. 
One najor response to the public I s demand for reior::J. vias 
introduced by Governor Tom ~cCall in 19730 His reform 
proposal was a radical attempt to shift the public cdu-
cation revenue fornation functions to the state govern-
n:ent. Gove:r'nor 1':lc8all 1 s plan soug:ht to eliIninate resi-
dential property taxation for !)ublic scr_ools and to provide 
elementary CL.'1d second.ar:.r :;nloJ.ic edt;catioD. liThe propo sal 
iJould :::'ave cha.'1.ged the percent of state Sl-;'PPO:::-t of public 
education in grades ='=~12 :'1"08 the 23 pel"'cs-r:.t in 1972-1973 
to 90 :percent in 1973-1971;.·. II (Legislative ?evenue Office 
Research Report J24, 1076, p.2) 
JJu.ril:g tl:e the Yote:::'s of Cregon 
decisively turned dm',rn Governor ?·~oC2.l1' s plan tl) refor;:} 
tr..e financing of p~blic ec.ncati;)l1 in Oregon. ~his public 
rejection of McCall's refarn proposal put the decicion-
r.lal:ers i-n CL."';, a\'l~-:ward position. 
Witho~t additional state revenues the state's 
reliCL.'1ce on local property t~~es for school sup-
port ",,!QuId have to conti:i.1ue. And with rising 
sc~ool costs, there would be nore budget elec-
tio~s a.'1.d more defeats •••• ~r~e need for reform 
was ~till present. (Pierce, et aI, 1975, )p.2-3) 
To find a solution to these problecs, the 1975 legis-
latu::::'e s~3.rcLed :for feas:'blE: alternatives to e:::ist:'nz 
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state public school finance system.* At that time there 
were three basic substantive policy alternatives available 
for the Oregon Legislature to consider: adjustments within 
the present fina.."l1.cil'lg system; increasing the· state share 
of support for public schools; and shifting of the public 
school finance functions totally to the state. All of these 
~olicy alternatives have definite inplicaticns concerning 
public education tax redistributi0110 
The first policy al ternativ-e, d.eveloped (-)jT the Ul:i-
versi ty of OreGon Sebool £'ir~an.ce Pro ject (?ierce, et 
1975), suggests changes in the level ~~d cri tel'ia equali-
zation grfu~t ~istributed to individual school districts, 
"'Ihieh may result in changes in the local property tax rates. 
Tllis alternative is based cn the cri.terion of local fiscal 
autoncmy.. It contai.ns four pri!:lary options: (1) ?o1..l.ndat ion 
Phase-In; (2) Local G~aranteed Yield; (3) Total ~ax Effort 
.,." 1· ,. d (A) ~ .. , 1-,1 - r ., ..... -, 1· ..... t;qua ~zal;~on; a...v:. '+ .hval..!.a..; e ilea.Lvll ~Q.ua_lzavlon. 
second policy alternative involves increasing the level 
of state share coupled with changes in BSSF distribution 
forr::.ulas. I·~ is bas~d on the t\V'o-tier financing criterion. 
The third policy alternative, total state financing 0:: pub-
lie schools, ~as three basic options: (1) income and state-
'J'iide :?ropert~/ taxation; (2) i:acorne and state\'lide l1onresi-
denti.al property taxation; and (3) inco2e taxatior.. only. 
*A resea:-::'c:h pro ject was funded in 1973 by the Ford Eound-
atio:'l and di:reeted by the U::1iYersity of Oregonls ~ducational 
DO' ~ e,r 'Oll';..:l 'l·'·-v..a~cneYlt "'+'af'.t:" (n1.. erc o et al 1 07r-) 
_ ...J...J.. • .] ~ .... ~ '.-:.1...LJ. \~\..,. ... _ ... _ ~~ ___ ..L. .:..- _,. , .,/? 
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From 1973 until 1977 the Orego~ Legislature st~uggled 
to enact poli-I;ically feasible reforms, O'J.t without S11C-
cess. During 1977 the Lezislature produced an education 
finance reform in ",·rhich the state t s share in supporting 
public schools increased from 30 to 40 :gercent. (Oregon 
~:.rouse Bill 5059, 1977) This state shaJ.'e increase was 
coupled i'li th an i!lcreased level 0:: equalization g~ants, 
from 20 to 33 parcent of total state aid. (Orego~ House 
Bill 3209, 1977) This reform enactment does not become 
effective u::'1ti:!.. t~e 1973-1979 80:-;'001 year:. J·W.':. analysis of 
its im~act will not be available until after its complete 
inplementation. It apyears t~at the next Legislature 
(1979) is likely to consider further increases of the 
state's share in SD.PJ?o~ting public schools up to 50 percent, 
coupled with. :furtbel" adjustI1ents in the BS:~F distrio'...ltion 
formulas. Jurthermore, dependi~g upon the politica:!.. cli-
::late and the mag!li tude of the taxpayers' revo:!.. t, the Saj119 
Legislature may be forced to introduce refor~ ~odels based 
on total state assu.rr.r:)tion of ::inancing public schools. 
If the reform is ineYitable, a.r..d 1Tarious public education 
fin~':.cing alternatives may be considered by the Legislature, 
the ta::: burden distribution and resul "'cant imDlications 
of public education fina.YJ.ce al ternati ves, from. a basic 
1 - , .l-.. ../",...t-.' • .. :po lCY reser3rcn perspec ul.ve, lS open ~0"1:' l:rl.Vesvlga-clon ana 
ana::.ysis. 
CHAPTER II 
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND AND RELA.TED LITERATURE 
The socio-economic and political implications of alter-
native policies to finance publicly-provided goods and ser-
vices, especially of public education, has been a major area 
of inquiry for many decades. Much research time and effort 
has been devoted to determining the causes of inequality in 
educational opportunity and tax burden distribution~ r·1any 
alternative public education policies have been constructed 
to reduce and eliminate them. The primary ern~hasis of this 
research is to analyze the tax burden distribution equity 
aspects of several alternative school finance ~olicies. Ac-
cordingly, the equity a.">1.d incidence criterion of ta.xation as 
well as lJublic school finance theories will -oe explored in 
this cha~ter. Furthermore, research ~">1.d literature related 
to the area of interest will be comprehensively e:'::-.amined. 
Taxation 
Taxation, as a major element of public policy, is the 
means by which a government implements policies to reallocate 
resources from the private to the public sector. Theoreti-
cally a general taxation policy should have t~."o broad ob-
jectives. First, it should distribute the cost of public 
sector operations fairly by income classes (vertical equity) 
and equally ~~ong the t~~ayers with the srune economic cir-
cumstances (horizontal equity). Secondly, it should 
promote economic grO\'rth, stability 8..."'ld efficiency. 
(Pechman, 1974, p~5) There are two basic components of 
a tax system: its criterion of equity and its economic 
effects. Theoretically an ideal tax system will maximize 
both of these components. However, in reality any attempt 
to achieve an optimal position in one component may inter-
fere with the achievement of the other. 
Each tax consists of two primary components: a base 
and a rate applied to the base. The most commonly used 
and revenue-productive tax bases are income (personal, 
corporate, etc.), property (personal, real estate, etc.) 
and consumption (sales). The tax rate structure for a 
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given tax base may be regressive, proportional or progres-
sive, relative to certain taA~ayer criteria such as income 
or wealth. The overall burden of a tax is its effective 
impact on the taA~ayers' economic well-being to the extent 
that it absorbs substantial amounts of income and/or wealth. 
Progressive taxes are those which require wealthier income 
groups to contribute relatively greater percentages of their 
incomes in taxes than the poorer income groups. Conversely, 
regressive taxes impose relatively large~ tax burdens on 
the poorer income groups than on the wealthier ones. 
If progressiveness in taxation is approached as a 
means to reduce economic inequality, personal income 
appears superior to either personal property or consump-
tion as a tax base. The taxation of personal income may 
inhibit the accumulation of economic power, and also 
form barriers to the concentration of political power. 
(Bartlett, 1973) 
As a revenue producer, the income tax responds to 
the short-run fluctuations of the economy. Because of 
its elasticity, the level of income tax revenues may be 
unpredictable from year to year. It is the suggestion 
of many economists that the public sector should maintain 
a variety of tax bases. (Musgrave, 1959 and Eckstein, 
1967) 
The basis for analyzing the aspects 0= t~: policies 
has two primary principles: social equity and economic 
efficiency. (Shoup, 1969, pp.21-44) Both of these cri-
teria are more useful and relevant to understanding tax-
ation policies and financing alternatives than to under-
standing e:~enditure policies. The social equity cri-
terion tl1eoretically argues that taxes should be dis-
tributed to equalize the sacrificed utility required 
of all ta~ayers. (Nusgrave, 1959, pp.99-113) This 
is regarded as an equitable means of tax burden distri-
bution since people are taxes according to their respec-
tive utility of money based on income and/or wealth. 
This assumption has its foundation in the economic theory 
of marginal utility as it applies to money: each mar-
ginal increase in money income has relatively less value 
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to the in~ividual thrul the ~revious one.* 
Actually, the ability-to-pay principle has 
"t;\vo separate parts. It states not only that 
the rich should pay Dore, but also that those 
who aj:'e si~ilarl~:- situated (e. g. have tile sar.le 
income) should pay the same taxes. This Se-
cond idea, that "equals be treated. equally,tl 
is called horizontal equity while the ?roper 
division of the taxburde2-1 among :;;eo,le of 
different ability to "']ay is called ve::::-tical 
equity. (3c£stein, 1967,31.60) 
The i::lterdependency bet\'ieen the ITe:::.'tical and horizontal 
equity concepts in taxation has oeen e:Ql2.ined by ~'Ius-
grave. 'I'li -+;hout an atte:npt at vertical equity in tax-
ation, tt:e horizontal eqlJ.it~T oecor::.es a preventive s=rs~em 
against discriw.ination. ~.\iit11in this I~e:CS:gective, " •• • ti'.e 
yrinciple of t.orizonta1 equity ElUst be seen against the 
backdrop of an ex-)lici t vie':! of vertical equity 0 II 
-~~vo 1a~q ~ 1cC' ().:. ~ ~, _' ,/::', 1.'. l.J' / 
Lite:::.'at'J.:ce al;,~, ;:;tu.dies o:n taxation basical:::'y focus 
two seneral princip~es used burdens: 
ti:.e "bene::its receiveci.:I aBc.. the "a"Jili ty-to-pay. I: (I.~us-
gra7e, 1959) ':L:11e Wc(:mefits receiYed" :principle states 
tl:at taxes sh::mld be levied upon individuals who gai:'l 
from t:!.le ?rovisicI'. of a '91.folic gooci. or service in pro-
porti::n: to their net 6aill. 'l'his method of taxa-cioYl. r.Jay 
be res&rded as aI.!. ef'ficie~t ~...,ay to deternine tax Du::'c12ns 
*Eowever, t~sre are two Dajor pr~blems to t~e eaual 
sacrifice crite~ion based on ~h9 ~ersinal utility concept. 
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It must be cas('!d on an objecti"""'-8 index of abili t~~-to-pa:/ tl:at 
can De r::easu,red, and. it must be o[~2sd on assl:.'::lotions r8i!:ard-
ing the slo~e of t~e income utility curve so t~at iLdivId~al 
s8.c::-':'i'ice caIl -~c; calcu1 ated.. (~~l'<~'.;;'7'a\ro -IC'r.;o ." eLl \) 
,,- .1. .... ~. ~ :.:;).J- "-, .... "',...1, ,;). ~ . 
since it is based on simultaneous determination of both 
expenditures and taxes. The problem with this principle 
of tax burden distribution is that its application may 
be unfeasible because it may not be possible to identify 
the level of specific public activity benefits that are 
accrued to individuals. Also, on many occasions it may 
not be possible to identify the beneficiaries of public 
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activities. Many public goods and services, such as public 
safety and education, may provide individuals with dif-
ferent degrees of benefits either immediate or long-term 
based. Primarily because of the aforementioned reasons, 
the "benefits received" principle may be used only under 
circumstances where benefits accrued from public act-
ivities could be calculated. 
In the "ability-to-pay" approach, the payments for 
the public goods and services are treated as a separate 
phenomenon from the benefits received. Taxes are treated 
as compulsory payments. On the other hand, the expenditure 
criterion is seen as a planning phenomenon not responsive 
to the functionings of the market. 
The view that taxes must be imposed in ac-
cordance with some socially acceptable rules 
implies a planning view of the public house-
hold. The ability-to-pay idea, moreover, 
points beyond progressive taxation for the 
financing of public services towards the more 
general problem of income redistribution. 
O·1usgrave, 1959, p.92) 
To determine the equity of a certain tax, it is 
necessary to determine where the burden of the tax fall. 
The bu.rden of a tax eften. does not fall. 011 the entity 
U:;J0l1 vThich it is levied as it Call be shift ed to all0ther 
entity. ConseQ.ue11tl:l, the ella res:l.lts of an:y· attempt 
to determine the distribution of tax: burdens vrill vary 
according to the set of tax shifting ass~~ptions used 
in ca2..c1J..lating the final incidence. (Seli~TIan, 1959, 
pp. 212-213 a'-rId ~-lie s zlwVv's~-:i, 1967, p. 2 6C) Such re suIt s 
of tax burdell distribution may also vary dependiI;.g en 
whether partial tax.: i~cide::lce (:particular tax or taxes) 
or total tax incidence approac}1 haG been er;lployed. 
In deali:::lg vri t11 ta..x burden distribut ion issues, 
one r S concl-0.sions \vill depend on whether one is concer-
ned wi tll specific t2.X incidence (the Ctlange in incidence 
tl'lat \'10"'J_1d happen vrhen a certaill tax is ad.ded or dro;)-
ped) or concerned -Ivith t:te differs.c.tial tax incidence 
(the chan6e in d.istribution of incici.er~ce that would han-
pen when a certain' taz is subst'i tut<.:;d for anoti18r). 
All ra'"!1ifications of a tax levy can be 
traced only ';'Thell recognition is given to 
every adjust8ent that is elicited in re-
sponse to a tax. -Hhen certain assumptions 
are :made, e.g. concerning marlcet structure, 
and e'V'erything eJ.se is held llnder ceteris 
paribus, the incidence of a tax cal1 -ae de-
termj.ned. (?hare s, 1973, ? 7) 
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The Incidence of Property Tax 
Two basic schools of thought deal with incidence 
aspects of the property tax: the traditional and the pure 
market approaches. The differences between the two ap-
proaches are based first on different income concepts 
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and, secondly, on different tax incidence-tax shift assump-
tions. "The different sources of property-tax revenue 
complicate the issue of incidence because for each source, 
different assumptions must be made about whether the tax 
is shifted forward to consumers or backward to other 
factors of production or is borne by the payers of the 
tax." (Ladd, 1974, p.46) 
The traditional approach was based on the agreement 
depicting the property tax as regressive relative to 
level of income. Followers of the traditional approach 
assume that tax on land is not shifted, and tax on struct-
ures and improvements is paid by the owner if it is owner-
occupied or shifted to the tenant if it is renter-occupied. 
It is also assumed that the tax on commercial and industrial 
goods and services is shifted to the consumer. 
Many stUdies conducted within the past two decades 
used the traditional approach. The most comprehensive 
research efforts were those of Netzer (1966) using 1957 
data, Musgrave (1973) using 1968 data, ACIR (1973) using 
1970 data, and Pechman and Okner (1974) using 1966 data. 
In varying degrees and strengths, all four of these studies 
agreed on the regressivity of the property tax with respect 
to the level of income. However, Dick Netzer shifted his 
position toward the pure market approach by stating that, 
in general, the property tax may be progressive. (Netzer, 
1973, pp.32-35) 
These traditional approach studies have generally 
concluded that owners of property and the means of pro-
duction can shift the burden to the consumer of the goods 
and services which are produced by the taxed property. 
(Aaron. 1975. p.38) Modifying this conclusion marginally, 
studies by Muth (1962) and Reid (1962) argued that the 
property tax is basically a tax on land and capital. 
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Within that perspective, this modified traditional approach 
indicates that, "o •• the tax on commercial and industrial 
property should be distributed in line with income from 
capital rather than on the basis of consumption expend-
itures; whereas taxes on residential structures should be 
distributed in line with housing expenditures. 1f (Ladd, 
1974, p.49) The major finding of the modified traditional 
approach studies is that overall property tax burden is 
regressive for low income groups and progressive as in-
come increases. 
The pure market approach accepts the premise that the 
owners of the property and the means of production pay the 
property taxa This approach is best exemplified in studies 
by Gaffney (1972), Mieszkowski (1967 and 1972), 
Ladd (1974) and Aaron (1975). Mason Gaffneyfs study, 
"The Property Tax Is a Progressive Tax," has brought to 
the public t s attention the pure market perspective, which 
'!,vas developed by earlier Hieszkowski studies o Helen 
Ladd constructed a well-developed and highly comprehen-
sive study of the property tax from both traditional and 
pure market theoretical perspectives. Ladd's st-u.dy also 
investigated the public policy implications of the pro-
perty tax impacts on the state and local financing of 
public goods and services. The most comprehensive and 
c!.':?tailed re search of the pure market approach vIas pub-
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lished. by Henry Aaron in 1975. III his study Aaron employed 
three primary analytical procedures to support basic as-
Slw~tions of pure market approach. 
The first considers the distribution of 
burdens from a Itpropertyll ta."'{ imp 0 sed uniformly 
on all property-land and capital goods alilre to 
The second considers the redistribution of bur-
d.ens ariSing frotl de"lliations i:!:l tax rates arou.."ld 
the average by locatio!l EL"ld industry.. The 
tbi=d considers the L~pact on the aggregate 
su:pply by lar..d 2nd capital of changes in after-
tax rents and profits. (Aaron, 1975, p.38) 
Through ~hese a~alytical procedures Aaron attempts 
to prov'3 the basic premise of the pure market approach 
theorists, primarily Mieszko .... rski. As accepted by the author 
himself, the primary limitation of this reseaxch is the 
pure market assumption \-lhereby all property ov-mers in 
their profit maximation efforts are free from all ex-
ternal constr3.ints. (Aaron, 1975, p.53) It appears that 
..... mder the cordi'tions of ma:::-ket imperfections or controlled 
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market situations, the traditional nodel or tbe modified 
traditional nodel may become more relevant to tl:e in-
vestigation of t~e incidence as)ects of the property 
tax. 
Ladd (1974) aptly expressed that as long as the 
pro?erty ta:;.:: applied uni.formly to all l&"'ld and capital 
ru-:d, Ii .... as long as the assufJption of perfect r.:lal~J:ets 
approximates the real vlOrld, the burden of tlle proyerty 
tax is essenti.ally progressive.!1 (Ladd, 1S'74, ~.:)J) 
LInder cetx-ai.l'1 cirC;1I.1s-:ffi1.CeS, relative to tl:eir theore-
tical -paradizms, boti: the t:.."acii tional and t~le pure market 
a?p::ooac11 Day empirically prove their poirlt s, leaving 
the ?olic~r r:akers in confusion. 
One clea::- example of this si tuatio::l is the dis'J'"lte 
between the two schools of thought over the elasticity 
o.f e:Ayencu.ture for hO~J.sing .. tli th ras:fect to 'Jer':::lanent in-
cor;re (a statistical tecrillique used i21 measu:::'ing t:J.8 re-
lativ8 re C'Y>'=' S": "tTl.' +~l-~""-""C :J'~'" C' Co'l' .,rl.· .L..,_ ccn+': ""u"""") 0 ..... - l~..L.V v'" ~J __ c.l-vel"..., V VJ ... V-LJ..!. ,1,,;U.j.L • Accordi~g 
to t1:e stUdies by deLeew'/ (1 ';71) 8.l:C: h.aI·cn (1972), hOLJ.si:ng 
eL~.gencli ture s are a.pproxiffiat ely proportional to pe:rr.:ax.ent 
income (e..rl ex-pendi ture elasticity of 1 .. C). Cl: the other 
hand, a study by CarliY'.:.9r (1 S'?3) concluded tha.t housir..g 
e::{'pe:'1ditures, relative to peI':J.anent income, are slightlJ-
regressivS' for tl:·,,; owner::; (a:1. expendit'.::::-e elasticity of 
0.7) and strol1;l:;,r regressive for the ronters (a..'Yl 3xpen-
ditare elasticity of 0.5). (?eclll::lan, 1974, p!J.32-33) 
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One may find the property tax from the deLeeu'tl-Aaron 
perspective to De a proportional tax relative to perm~~ent 
income, \,lhile another person ma::,r find it to be a highly 
regressive tax if he or she employs Carliner's approach. 
This situation is clearly indicative of the usage 0= dif-
ferent sets of theoretical assumptions to construct the 
relevant methodologies. f1oreover, such disputes illustrate 
that the theory of t~~ incidence may be in its early stages 
O '~ oiL deve l c:;mer~:t • 
The Tax Burden Distribution 
--_._ .. - ..... 
Several research projects concerning the distributive 
iL'1pact of taxatio:r: were conducted during the 1930' s pri-
marily by Yaple, 1936 and l'Te\'ICOmer, 1937. I'·:axine Yaple's 
research (1936) dealt with the general burden of direct 
taxation. In her study the analysis '\'las based on the as-
surnption that the tax burden i::.lpact and the tax incidence 
were the S~ile. This assQ~ption of not recognizin8 the 
tax incidence theory limited the scope of her research. 
In 1937 I-label He:lcomer studied tl:e i!1lpact of tax 
burden distribution on ti:lenty hTl)othetical faJ:lilies in 
the states of };s"'j York and Illinois with yarious socio-
economic ba.::!k3rou.J."1ds. Because of its limited perspective, 
the concll~s2.::ms of this study ':/ere a.::1enable only to a 
broad defini -r.ion of tax burden distribut ion at the national 
le·rel. "While this study coped with nUJnerous theoretical 
problems, relevant to shifting and incidence, p~ovided 
estimates using alternative assumptions, and utilized the 
most refined data available (on income, consumption pat-
terns, taxes, etc.) the results were extremely vulnerable 
due to its limited scope. 1I (Phares, 1973, p.8) 
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Following Yaple and Newcomer's studies, Helen Tarasov, 
in 1942, published her research document, "Who Does Pay the 
Ta.."'{es?1t This study examined the overall tax burden distri-
bution by constructing a model that analyzed the relation-
ship between the tax shifting-tax incidence theory and 
the data on aggregate income and consumption patterns. 
The primary contribution of Tarasov's study is the metho-
dological procedures used in refining the tax allocation 
techniques and aggregate income data. Compared to the 
Yaple and Newcomer studies, Tarasov's research exemplified 
a considerable advancement in scope and methodology. 
One of the most comprehensive and thorough tax burden 
distribution investigations was undertaken by r·1usgrave 
and associates in 1948. (Musgrave, 1951) The study, 
If Distribution of Tax Payments by Income Groups: A Case 
Study for 1948" provided a basic paradigm and conceptual 
frame of reference for much future research. vii thin riJ:us-
gravefs study effective tax estimates were considered 
for all levels of government. The study concluded that, 
If ••• the overall tax structure is b:r no mea..."'lS as progressive 
as is generally surmised." (I1usgrave, 1951, p.28) Ac-
cording to the results of this research, state and local 
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taxes as a whole were considerably regressiYe throughout 
the tax system, and federal taxes were slightly progressive 
in general& The study concluded that the entire t~~ system 
is highly regressive at the low income level, proportionate 
at the middle income level, and relatively progressive at 
the high income level. 
In reanalyzing Musgrave's data, Rufus Tucker added 
to his analysis certain income components which were non-
monetary and imputed. (Tucker, 1952) Tuckerls adjustments 
did not significantly alter the findings of r'ln s grave ' s 
study. Hmvever, his contribution to forming a conceptual 
basis for calculating income was greatly used and de-
veloped by later studies, especially by George Bishop.* 
There are several tax burden distribution studies 
dealing specifically "<lith state and local systems. Dif-
fering from the aggregate public sector taxation analyses, 
these studies are concentrated at.the state and local 
levels and deal particularly with the structure of the 
revenue system and its politico-economic implications. 
There are three major works of research that have 
explicitly concentrated on the ta~ burden distribution 
aspects of the state and local revenue system. The first 
of these studies was conducted by Musgrave and Daicoff 
in 1958 for the state of Hichigan. (rlIusgrave, 1958) 
*Bishop ~xamined the subject matter in detail in his 
study, "Income Redistribution Lll the Frame\'/ork of the 
rJational Income Accounts." (Bishop, 1966) 
The uniqueness of this research is that it was a pioneer 
attempt to study the combined tax and expenditure inci-
dence within a particular state. (Phares, 1973, p.14 
and Pechman, 1974, p.16) 
The following year Harold Groves directed a similar 
research project for the state of ·V'lisconsin. (Groves, 
1959) The major difference between the two studies was 
the concept of open versus closed economy. While the 
Michigan study assumed the state to be an open economic 
system, the Wisconsin study accepted the opposite, a 
relatively closed economic system relating only to the 
surrounding states. The most important contribution of 
the 'i'lisconsin study is its usage of the concepts of ex-
portation and ioportation of taxes. 
A third study was completed for the State of Hinne-
sota by O.H. Brm'ffilee in 1960. (Brovmlee, "1960) This 
study investigated the taA burden and. expenditure-benefit 
disparities in..rl.erent to the state' s public sector. The 
major weakness of this study was its light treatment of 
tax importation and exportation phenomenon. 
The most recent and comprehensive studies in the 
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area of t~~ burden distribution were done by Phares, 
State-Local Tax Eauity, 1973 and Pechman, Who Bears t~e T~x 
Burden?, 1974. The Pechm~~ and Okner research was con-
cerned with only the tax burden distrio:'ltion aspects of 
public sector operatiQns. Their primary limitation was 
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that the study did not consider the impacts of the 
distribution of benefits from public sector investments that 
are supported by taxes. Their major purpose was to compare 
the relative tax burden of several population subgroups 
as well as the traditional income subgroups. Their pri-
mary conclusion was that very little income redistribution 
is accomplished by the present level of taxation. 
The Phares study examined the level and distribution 
of tax burdens of public goods for each of the fifty states. 
This resea=ch realized its purpose by str~cturing a model 
to estimate the claims of governments over private re-
scurces. \vithin the limitations and assumptions of his 
model, Phares estimated effective -tax rates for ea'!h type 
of tax and computed for each tax the degree of rate vax-
iations across states. 
When the mean (level cf tax burden) and 
coefficient of variation (across systems) 
for each tax by income class are computed 
for those states actually using the tax, 
it is found that there are substantial 
differences across systems in both the level 
and variation of burden for specific taxes 
and comparatively across various types of 
taxation. (Phares, 1973, p.3) 
Phares' study (1973) is a pioneer research in its 
attempt to e~amine in detail the state and local ta~ in-
cidence-tax burden. He employed statistical techni~ues 
(factor an2.ly;.~is and Gini Ratio of Concentration) that 
had not been ;reviously applied to -:"ax incidence-tax b"ll'-
den analysis. The major findings of this study are three-
fold. ~irst, the L~cid8nce of specific taxes varies 
considerably among states. Secondly, specific state-
local taxes appear regressive. However, this does not 
necessarily hold true for systems of t~{es. 
The regression ~~alysis reveals eleven inci-
dence patterns that are proportional rather than 
regressive. Closer examination shows these to 
be states with individual income taxes of suf-
ficient relative importance to exert a signifi-
cant progressive-proportional impact. (Phares, 
1973, p.90) 
Thirdly, Phares' study indicates that the most regressive 
influence on state-local systems is an outcome of local 
sector policy. Ifl1en the regressivity of the local sector 
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is excluded, 1I ••• it is found that many systems are actually 
progressive or proportional, except for the effect of the 
local property tax. 1I (Phares, 1973, p.91) 
Theoretical Basis of Public School Finance* 
The development of a theoretical basis for analyzing 
public school fin~~ce C&~ be traced to the begL~ning of 
this century. The theoretical paradigm that has developed 
since then has had considerable influence on public edu-
cation financing policy formation. For example, se ..... eral 
important Q.uestions that ,'rere analyzed by school fin~""lCe 
theorists were: what is the extent of control the state 
gove~ents should have over local school districts? Is 
the property tax the main cause of inequities in tax bur-
den distribution? ~'y'llat is the most appropriate govern-
*This section is based on Roe Lo Johns, Full state, 
1972 and "Some Critical," 1973. 
mental level to finance public education? 
Within the basic school finance theory, the criterion 
of state support to local school districts was initially 
developed by Ellwood F. Cubberly. He constructed the 
basic criterion of state aid distribution based on the 
minimum foundation level and local tax effort. As ex= 
pressed by Cubberly (1905): 
••• the duty of the state is to secure for 
all as high a minimum of good instruction as 
is possible, but not to reduce all to this 
minimum; to equalize the advantages to all 
as nearly as can be done ' .... ith the resources 
at hand; to place a premium on those local 
efforts ''1hich will enable communities to 
rise above the legal minimum as far as pos-
sible; and to encourage communities to ex-
tend their educational energies to new and 
desirable undertakings. (Cubberly, 1905,p.17) 
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Even though Cubberly's t~~ effort criterion may not 
be acceptable to some contemporary school finance analysts, 
he was a leader in constructL~g many current concepts in 
school financing. The following findings and suggestions 
exemp lify thi s : (1) as the re suIt 0 f une qual ' .... e al th di s-
tribution, the educational standards set by the states 
may cause inequities in tax burden distributions; (2) the 
states should equalize the resultant excessive tax burden 
on communities; (3) a statev;ide tax for financing public 
schools is the most appropriate tool to equalize excessive 
tax burdens; (4) without a fair state aid distribution 
system~ ~~y t~~e of statewide t~ces for financing public 
schools will ~ot accomplish its objectives. (Johns, Full 
state, 1973, p.17) 
Another important school finance theorist, Harlan 
Updegraff, refined the local tax ef£ort criterion init-
iated by Cubberly. Updegraff (1922) concluded that state 
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aid to public education should be distributed inversely 
according to school districts' property cash value and 
directly according to school districts' tax effort in 
proportion to its taxpaying ability. This approach to 
state support, "pm'ler equalizing, n* was updated and refined 
by Coons, et aI, in 1970. 
~upporting the state support concepts of Cubberly 
and Updegraff, but disagreeing with their local tax effort 
criterion, George D. strayer and Robert Haig, in their 
1923 study, indicated that state aid distribution based 
on the local tax effort is contradictory to the prin-
ciples of equal educational opportunity. 
The state should insure equal educational 
facilities to every child within its borders 
at a uniform effort throughout the state in 
terms of the burden of taxation; the tax bur-
de!). of education should throughout the state 
be uniform in relation to taxpaying ability, 
and the provision for schools should be uni-
form in relation to the educable population 
desiring education. (Strayer, 1923, p.173) 
Strayer and flaig's school finance concept was further 
developed by Paul Mort in his study Measurement of ~­
cational Need. (1924) Theoretically he refined and ad-
vanced the Strayer-Haig concept by developing a criterion 
upon which the state basic foundation program could decide 
*See Appendix A for the definition of "District Power 
Equalisation. " 
what should and should not be included. For example, he 
suggested that circumstantial expenditures which result 
from causes over which school district communities have 
no control should be included in the foundation. (Nort, 
1924, p.6) One of Mort's major contributions to school 
finance theory was the standard measure of educational 
need based on ",.,sighted pupil" values. This "\'leighted 
pupil" criterion became the frame\'1ork for the future 
research on unit-cost differentials. 
A rather important, but not "tell-accepted, contri-
bution to school finance theory \'las made by Henry C. Mor-
rison during the 1930's. His criticisms of the school 
finance theories ~~d practices of his day are often ap-
plicable to the school finance problems of today. From 
a legislative perspective, he indicated that public edu-
cation is a state responsibility. Horrison believed that 
the policy suggestions by the previous theorists will 
continually fail to equalize educational opportunity and 
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to provide equity in tax burden distribution. He suggested 
that the state t~~e over the administrating and financing 
o~ public schools. Morrison concluded that the most ef-
ficient and equitable method to finance public education 
would be through a statewide income ta."'{. 01orrison, 1930) 
Morrison's reform suggestions at that time were radical 
in a political environment wherein decentralization and 
home-rule issues were strongly followed. It appears that 
policy suggestions by theorists \"ho stayed in the political 
mainstream of local self-development (Updegraff, strayer, 
Haig and r-lort) were highly acclaimed. (Johns, Full state, 
1973, pp.28-30) Nevertheless, Horrison's contributions 
\'/ere reintroduced by Conant in 1968 and further developed 
and refined by Johns in the early 1970's. 
Litigation and School Finance Research 
The belief that two equally-circumstanced taxpayers 
should not be required to shoulder lUlequal tax burdens 
for equal ievels of public education se:r-rlices ViaS one of 
the primary rationales behind the 1971 Serrano judicial 
decision in California. Research in this area has been 
continuing for several decades. 
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During the 1930's Henry C. l'lorrison, in his study 
School Revenue, expressed concern over the expenditure 
level Luequalities inherent to the operations of public 
school districts in the state of Illinois. (Horrison, 
1930) However, it was not until the 1960's that the issues 
of inequality in public education and its financing \'lere 
investigated in detail. In 1961 James H. Thomas, et aI, 
published a research project entitled "School Revenue 
Systems in Five States lt for Stanford University. (Thomas 1 
1961) The primary focus of this research 'Was exploration 
and confirmation of the existing inequalities in public 
education 8)..'"Pendi tu.res, tax effort levels and fiscal 
capacities among school districts. A prime example of 
stUdies in that aspt'?ct was conducted by Sexton (1961) 
in the Detroit public school system. She concluded that: 
A tj~ical upper income child, then, goes to 
a school that is safer, more suitable and ade-
quate for his needs, more attractive inside 
and out, with much better facilities in most 
subjects, including science, music 9 art and 
library, and also with better lighting, lava-
tory and other facilities than the school at-
tended by the average lO'lrer income child. 
(Sexton, 1961~ p.134) 
\vithin the next few years studies by NcLure (1962 
and 1964) and by Benson (1963 and 1965) widely contributed 
to the conceptualization of the inequity problem inherent 
to public education. The greatest impact L~ this area 
was created by the Coleman study which made the concept 
11 equal educational oppo::-tuni ty" a publicly well-kno'i'm 
criterion. Several references in the Coleman Report were 
made to the weakness of the relationship between the 
level of school expenditures and student achievement scores. 
(Coleman, et aI, 1966) This influenced some to conclude 
that variations in the level of public school expenditures 
have little or no bearing on educational opport~~ity or 
educational output. (Bowles and Levin, 1967 fuLd Coleman, 
-1968) \,/i thin a few years educational opportunity aspects 
of the Colem~~ Report (1966) were restudied and researched 
by mS':'1Y scholars from school finance perspectives. 
Research, especially by Wise (1968), \veiss (1970) 
and Coons (1969 and 1970) exposed the judicial aspects 
of the concept "equal educational opport~~ity.1I In general 
these studies revealed that the school districts within 
each state vary widely in per pu~il property cash values. 
in \veiss' (1970) study evaluating 1,384 school districts 
in six states, he concluded that the evidence obtained 
supported the contention that the property ".'lealth of the 
school districts was the most important ~actor influencing 
the level of expenditures for education. And an earlier 
study by James, et aI, (1966) reached a similar conclusion 
that the level of educational expenditures was directly 
related to per pupil property wealth and median family 
income of the school districts. 
i.'lhile the Serr3l'lo case I'.'as being tried in the Cali-
fornia courts in 1971, several studies proposed a variety 
of alternative plans to solve the existing inequities in 
public school fL~ance. These have generally been based 
on t"l0 research approaches: state aid distribution studies 
and full state assumption studies. The research that has 
concentrated on the criterion of state aid distribution 
formulated two basic strategies: fotmdation (using the 
Strayer-Haig formula) and power equalization.~!- Research 
projects conducted by Benson (1964), JoP~s and Alexander 
(1971), Callahan (1972) and Levin-Huller-Scanlon (1972) 
studied the policy implications of these different state 
aid formulas. Coons i et aI, (1971) also greatly contri-
buted to the construction of district power equalization 
formulas to redistribute the excess f~~ds from rich pro-
perty ta.."1: ba3;,3 to poor property tax base school districts. 
*See Appendix A for the definition of these state aid 
distribution strategies. 
(Coons, 1970, pp.200-243) They concluded that, ft ••• the 
more important consideration is the manipulation of the 
formula rather than the general type of formula that has 
been adopted. II (Hickrod, 1972, p .87) 
A plan for complete state financing of public edu-
cation \'lhich retains local school district level policy-
making and administrative control was advocated by James 
B. Conant at the 1968 meetings of the Educational Com-
mission of the states. He argued that public education in 
the states \'lOuld be greatly impr07ed if educational de-
cisions at the local level could be completely divorced 
from considerations of financing. His proposal was con-
sidered radical, prioarily because of his suggestion to 
eliminate totally the local taxation of public schools. 
Conant recommended full state finru1cing through broad-
based taxes rather than the local property ta..-x:. (Allen, 
1968, 1'.56) 
A number of studies have analyzed this relatively 
radical alternative, the full state assumption of public 
education finance. (Benson, 1971, Johns, 1973, Campbell, 
1972, Rossmiller, 1973 and Berke, 1974) Tb~8e studies 
in general have indicated that there is a strong rationale 
to support full state funding of education as a possible 
solution to the existing inequalities in educational op-
portunity, and the inequities ir~erent in the existing 
allocation of costs of public education. 
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In analyzing the implications of different financing 
models, JOl111S and A1e::aJ::der studied the alternative ;.:lethods 
to distribute tl~e state fl'..nds lmcler increased and I'J.11 
state assu~Dtion models of p~blic school ~in8~cing. 
They er:1~)1:asized tllat lmder full state assumption, dis-
tributing f"i.L."1.G.s on the basis of block grant s per ..... . s vlwen-c 
weighted on the basis of cost differentials would equalize 
the ed'J.catio:nal opportunity. (Johns and Alexander, 1971, 
)9.176-280) Conclusively, they stated t~at, under cen-
essential 
that central governrJ'2nts provid.e ::01' l1ecessarj- yariations 
a~onG sc~ool districts in unit costs 
equaliz;e t~ne educational o::9portul1ities tile:;- are attsnpthlg 
to equalize.1! ~(l) p.cu This 
cri ts:cia vIas aleo e~r..phasiz3d in t~le report :9:::'eparec: b;:" 
"'cl:.e ?leisclmarm 80r.'ll'l1ission (1972) 
st2.te fun.ding of public education ill the St2~te of ::';2Vl Yorl:. 
The CO:::1T.:1ission sug.;ested t:L:.at tlle 
statei,·ride :;>ropel"ty ta::.:2he Co:t:1IJissioll )l"o]osecl that 
a propert7 tax reflUld systen be estab1islled to red'..lce 
the effects of' increas'3d ta::atiol1 on ~)oor fani::'i8s re-
siding in l)rOpertY'-rich scbool dist::rict So ';f:lile I:1.8..:.'1Y 
"'J.nde::r centrali7Gd fi!la:'1cir:.g in order to accomodate the 
concept of local control, the ?leiscl:.:r.1a:r:n COr.'SJJ.ission 
oyposed conce~t because it would recreate fiscal 
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dis?arities between school districts. 
Tlle controversial issue of state assl;L'lption vel~S-"':.S 
local control ViaS heavil:r c.ebated oetwecm Cha::::,l-2s 3e!lsor.:. 
and Earve:.r Brazer at the :l:Tational S:ax Association Con-
fereEce i~1. 1971. In 1Q'7? .... ,~ 
troversy by splitting the issues, fl ••• it is qui-;;e :9os-
sible to r':'cwe financing at one level and :policy nal::in,; 
and other l:incis of control at anotr.:.er.1I (CaIJ1poell, 1972, 
1 ~ ... ) - . .. ~., d S l ( 1 ~ ,..,,., ) t ., d .J-•• ,. p.)b lJeVln, .'~1.Ll . ..:.er an ca11 ..... 011 'j {c.. 8 J UG.l8 "l.!.lS laea 
lic ed'..:.cation in tile state ..... -T •• ..t..., 02: .t~a\,lall, Lile o~l:r state 
f1..1.11:; financing it S :;rublic schools. This report s~yported 
the conclusion that administrative decentralization is 
p08siole 1.U1der a centralized final1ci::lg s:rstem. ( -;-,;"''1"ri '1 . -~ . -- , 
~axation fo= P~blic Schools 
-_ .. - --.. ...--..--.--..... 
studies within the decades 
evidenced tl:3 e:ciste~lce of wide va:riaticn.s in fiscal cap-
aci ty and t~'r effort ar:~cng . l ., , , .1.. sc~oo ..... ~lST-rlCLS. ( CI 0 .... S'~ l' lIe Y' \.1. .. 0:...1.- ...... _, 
1971, LCIR, 1971 and 3:::-iley, 1971) These studies ::~ave 
indicated that ta:';: !Ji_lrdens 1::.1 financing educatiDY:. are l:ot 
being shared eCIui tabl::. Tl:e ~-:() GS:::lil18:i:' s-tuc.:;- (1971) 
c19a:i:'ly presented t~~~, in Dost of the states, tbe ob-
jective of fi:r.:.al'lciai. ecr.lalization of edlwa"tio::''1aJ. op?or-
tur..i ty is fa.r frcrr~ being attai118tL. :::~videnc{.= :;,J:'~8sel1ted 
in that st~dy indicates that, fl ••• local revenue is 
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disequalizing and that basic state revenue is generally 
equalizi116 in effect. Categorical state r8ye:'lUe is gen-
erallv -,~e"+~""al or c.-l-Seq11a'';ro:i-'-'cr .;'V') e_TInpc+vo:l (c;>o~""~ille-'"  _010 ..... _Vl_ __ _ ..... -..I- ..... - .... .l. o ..L...I.... _ ...:.. .. i::)O,i.____ ...,1,., 
1971, p .115) ~his i,'ras confi_r::ned in a study conducted 
by Betsy ~evin (1972). Studying several states, i~cluding 
Oregon, she raached several con~:usions including the 
follO".'1i:nG: 
(1 )urban center schcol c:.istl~icts ap:pea.:c' ~o 
have relatively higher per :pupil p:copert;,i' cas:.!. 
val'...les and. 10':ie:r -Jer ca-oita i:'1come ':!l:en co=-
:pared to su::m:rban - and rllral school distl~icts; 
(2) ·urban school district s a:9~) ear to have 
relatively lov-rer prope:r'-::;Y tax rates for )ublic 
c:::., ... ~ ""'· ....... 1""1:::."'"'"" '''''t-' -("I - """1·'1'-- -'- - ' .J:I-r ,-,?~~ooJ.. 8.l?--- ~.:.l(.:' __ .;.~.:...,""G<-? cl....L. yro.:.J_t::_ ""G~~ vax ra-ces -,-0_ 
a , I serv~ccC! ,.....,"!Ull~.,-..... a' ov--"".-., .. ..,...,a.en)· ...L.~ . ...L. ~'-' ".l'- V.J..j}...L. C:.:... .. )!.,,_ ~ , 
(3) tax burdens to fin~:ce public edu-
ca~ion by inco::1e grougs vary sharply 2J:10ng 
states. Hovrever, in general, coobineci ta:c 
structure (state a:nd loca~) is regressive. 
(Levin, 1972, pp.203-204) 
This ir:l?ortar;.t researcll effort by Levi~.l. \'iaS fo2.-
lo~ .. ,ed. -::;:r stlJ.dies conducted b;'I Johns and 3urY'~s (1971) a..:''1G. 
3ac~:s (1972) '~r.:.e JolJlJ.s a:"ld :SU:r'~S st1.:<.dy ':12.S cas.ed en 
sc~ool ~ist:r'icts in ten selected states. The sc~ocl dis-
tricts in t}:is study i'lere classified into four 6:'0:':;':)S--
arb an , cent:'al, subu:-coan, inde'J8~ldent city and ru:-cal. 
TheY' concl"Ltded ti:lat there is no clear evidence to sl~_:;rport 
tl1e COr:telTtio:a of systern.atic discrisination a.;ai:r;.st ,.Iraan 
dist:,icts in the distri'butiol;' of state fl::::ds. (Johns 
a:i.1d Burns, 1371, :J.206) 
However, the results 0f the Sacks, et aI, (1972) 
stud~l cont:-casted -,'ri t1: Job_us a."ld 3urns I r2 search. In their 
st .... :.cly Jac~:s, et aI, atterl1pted to ana~_:/sc ::he basic :c'::asons 
behind the uroan-suburba~ locational fiscal conflict. 
Sac~::s cOl'lcluaed that urban Dublic education iina..."1ce has 
not been integrated into the domain of public educatio:Q 
finru1ce in general. 
The finrulcial problems emerge instead from 
the comple:·: interrelationsnips and deterior-
ating position of the large cities relative to 
their O\'m suburbs and states, a.11d from the 
standpoint of school finance, these chrulges in 
the position of large city school systems l"~ave 
not been recognized ar~d incorpo=ated into ef-
fective policy. In addition to the usual dif-
ficul ties associated i"/i th changes in policy, 
the basic rulalvtical lJersnective of school 
finances continues to·" be phrased. i;l terr:.s of 
rural ru1d suburbru1 nroble~s to the detrinent 
of the cities. (Sacks, 1971, p.167) 
The phenone:10n of uroan-ru.ral public education fiscal 
disparity has been st-;'ldied by Grubb (1971) 8.:.'1d ~=i..lller 
(1973) from the income redistribution perspective. Gruba 
(1 C;7,1') 1."0" :";s s.J..o,u';- e",.J..';-,-O!,::,-1 11r:,.;",0 Tll."co.1..rl."bu.1..;o"" o.f' "'"'s+s _ ... .1..1. ... l.J.. uu. ,i .l~v~t."_,,-,,U .1- __ ..... .!-) Io-llt l,,_ .1.":' _ VV v 
a::~d Benefi"c s in an Urba..."1 ?llolic SCllool Syste::l, II analyzed 
the income redistribution aspects of p1..1"blic school J:' " ..!..In-
aneing in Boston, :'~assachusetts. He I.'sported that :J::"olic 
education benei"its children i'ron higher-income families 
eore than 10'.ver-incooe fan:ilies. Gr"J"b'b clearl:r stat 8 s 
tl~at, H •• 0 insofar.' as poverty is a racial proble:::.J., public 
educatio:::: seems to exacer'bate ratr-_er tba."l ir.raro'te t:'19 
e;::istin~ si'tuation.!1 (Grubb, 1971, p.11) Lu2.1er, in 
0" t d ( 1 ""l 7 - \ ," .l.. • t' . '" . " I:..lZ S U Y ';.:; I eS'"Cl:::-11avea. ile lI:J.pac""C Dr.. J.Yl.COIJ8 rccas-
tribution of' , .J.. s-ca ... e aid to school districts in the State 
of De2.al,"rare. Lil:e Gregor.. Delai'!a-r2 y.'aise 3 :r:!O st of it s 
r8VGn~e f'ro~ a relative2.y progressive personal income 
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ta~[. Also, smilar to Oregon, the existence of a single 
major u:::ban area in Dela-;ilare, \'Ihich comprises 53 percent 
of t11e population and. contrio'J.tes over 90 percent of pub-
lic edu.cation funds, results in a redistribution of income 
fron the more affluent to relatively poorer school dis-
tricts. I-IullerJs study indicated that considerable ir..come 
redistribution occurs in Dela-uare resulting from the system 
of state aid. eiistributio~. He indicated that increasing 
the level of state ,s-o_?port with a distributive S~Tster.J. 
based on tl-:e size of the :9rorerty tax base 1.'1i11 :)rovic.e 
more aid. to relatively wealthier districts. The basic 
reason for this, as ~~ller noted, may be attributed to 
the lack of Dositive correlatio~ betvJeen inCOEe and pro-
perty value in Dela'.'lare. 1:::1 constructing a third cri-
tericn, 11 educational need," I,Inller concluded tllat: 
'1'11e aUDlicatiol1 of alternative state distri-
bution grant criteria in Dela\'Jare i:adicated t1:at 
rela~lve fiscal need criteria in t~e central city 
measured by ei~her property value or incone did 
not even ap;)roacl: the level of educatior.al l1.sed 
indicated 'S~~ tl~~e use of socio-economic cha:.>::'ac-
teristics of achievement scores •••• The ~se of 
educational need criteria to allocate state 
iUTJ.eiS could therefore result in conside::'able 
income redistribution from sUDur-oan districts 
to central cities, @:d to a lesser degree, to 
r' .. lral areas 0 (Euller, 1973, p. 245) 
Dealir..g specifically ':Ii th tlle distributi.on of tax 
barde::a.s in financ iT.:.G :publi.c education, n2.rtr;lal1. and Reis-
chauer (1974) concluded that public education fil:..ance 
i'e_To ..... J .T"'l_'" 'Ma"TT '01"';""''''' inc"V'OCI~s0a.' ·""-01'; c c>duca+~ on .L.~'r '-'0-11 oc.L. l" on'" _ ...... .!. .. L J -_ .. ':'J.e.:. -'- .... ...;.. ....... c ... ...., 1..JLA.. __ .J... _ _ IJ.L vc:,.""\,, _ ...... ___ l.J .,.,J 
a'1d also Day shift the distribution of ta::: bu~cdens aEwn; 
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school districts and taxpayers. In their- research, 
uSL'lg natiom'lide and the He'.'! York state data, they analyzed 
the effect s of t'.vo pr-incipal :r:-eform "'Jla."I1s: "District 
Power SQ.ualizint;lI a.i1d l!Full state As su .. 'Il.pt ion. II Tl'leir 
study indicated that a variety of revenue sources ','!i th 
dif£erent tax: burden distribution i::m2.ications a:r:-e ayail-
able for state gover~~ents to e:~and the level of support 
for public educatim.l. In dealing with the effects of 
statei;'lide ta.:{es on districts and fa:lilies, they concluded 
that cer-tain changes in tax policies may conpletel:r ~s­
lieve some groups from the responsibility of su~]ortirrg 
public education. In dealing with the incidence of such 
taxes on individual ta.:{"payers they concluded that, II ••• low 
incoT.'le honeol'mers living in high property tax districts 
sta.."1.d to gain un.der any shift in'ta:'{ SOUl"ces ~ \'lhile high 
incoce hO:r:l(:;o'tmers residing in tax he.vens would pay nore 
li.."1deI' a shift to state revenue sources. tl (Hartman a.nd 
Reischauer, 1974, p.143) 
Several extensive studies dealint; with t~le cor:~posi tion 
of local and possible statewide p:r:-operty taxation l1ave 
bee~ conducted by Ladd (1975, 1976), Thorson (1974) and 
Schoeplein (1974). Ladd (1975) examined. the education 
expelldi tiJ.re implications of tl:e cO:-:T:Josi tioD of the local 
p:r:-ope~t7 tax base in the Boston metropolitan area. ~er 
study s~t"lo\'1ed tl:at cO~:lercia:' ?:r:-o:;:)erty he.s a greater ef-
fect 011 the level of :.gu·olic educatior.. expenditures tll8l1 
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ind.':..lst:eial propertJ. Using a :public ed.ucation eyoendi ture 
codel, this study c0~cluded that property cash value 
pe:c student com:paI"3EJ 1..7:.fa-vo:~aD::"y 1ro;;) a state aid 
.,. ~ • ~ ...L-. , • 
cus "rlOl";' ... l011 perspecL;lve. 
If (p:coperty cash val~e per student) is the 
~asis for state or federal aid to local co~­
r:n.u:.i ties, the purpose of vlhicr.:. is to :cedLJ.ce 
disparities in education serrice levels caused 
by differing abilities to .fina:clce such ser-
vices, then, as has been shm-T1l, the distor-
tions caclsea. 'oy (property cash value pe::, st'll-
d .) - -'- -'-h - . - -'- f" -en:t ~;lOrl;: 1..10 ,, __ .e a.lsaa.Vai.'1 "age 0_ ..!.-0I-1 l:1.C0L18 
--l-' (- r1' 197~ 1£:;'-") cor.Jr.:l.Ulll" le s. J..:a~Q, . J, 'P. .....0 
IE 2, later articl'8, analy~ing the SCL::J.e data, 1adc~ 
('1~'7;-:;') ';-r('l;ca-'-0rl +1--'2t chane-J.°ne- +0 s+a"'e,,'ic~e 
'- . __ , v; _ ... _.......... l.I ...... -l. vJ. ... " 0 0 v 1...1 V .1 _ ~ 
~ax8.tiol1 for puolic educ2:tion J.)IJ,rpOSes I'iill have def-
O-..lrece:1 dL3t::::'ibution, dependillg 1.I..YOn the cl"2.aracter 0:: tL.s 
state aid. distrioutj,on fornula GL'luloved. • _ oJ ;::l:l:e C onc]. c":. ,::' r.:. 
commercial and i::;.cinst:cial property '.'lO',llc.'L 
:r:a~te 2.dV2l'Se distri":lu.tiona:!. effects a::i.d oe u11ci.2si:::.:ab12 
OIl equity 6::01.1...--;'28. (Ladd, 1976, :? .151 ) 
Shiftillg the fina..."1cing of public educatio:l to non-
:?ro:perty based re--renue sources ;,vas studied oy Ra;:r:r::.o::ld. 
(1974) Based on l\Te~,., York State data, he concll .. ded that 
total state aSS1ID.lJtion , .. ri t:-:. non-property 'oased t8 ... xatiGn 
might oe accol:1?lished wi t!:.c'ut pu.l1.i tively taxing a11~r 01-:'8 
gron:p of ta:·:pa:yers \-lit:hin the state .. (Raymo:ld, 197!;. ~ 
p .119) Hm'!eve:r., ,this finding was disputed by Grieson 
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(1974) who indicated that any shift, such as from local 
to state,'dde property ta....~ation or from local property 
to statevlide non-property taxes, \'lould have drastic ef-
fects on the distribution of costs of public education. 
In dealing with local impacts of public school fin-
&Lcing alternatives, Oakland (1974) studied the Baltimore, 
Haryland SESA, and Waldauer (1974) investigated comparative 
coturrty-level iopacts of alternative financing models in 
three states (~ilashington, Ne1'l York and New Jersey). The 
former study indicated that in Baltimore City tax bur-
dens I'lere significantly higher than in the surrounding 
suburba..."1 communities. Oakland stated that the existing 
system of state aid distribution in Naryland achieves a 
modest redistri-oution of resources to relatively less 
,,'1eal thy axeas of the state.. Ee concluded that most of 
the redistribution stems froB the source of revenues used 
( ". ....) s~a~e lncone vax rather thful the stste aid distributive 
system. He emyhasized that the state aid distribution 
system has an insignificant L""Jpact on the level of ed'l-
cation spending. In 2JLalyzing several state aid dis-
tril)ution reform proposals, Oakland eArpressed that, 
Ey redistributing present state aid accord-
ing to a foundation formula based on present 
state aid levels, the redistributive properties 
of state aid \-rould be improved, locational 
neutrali~y ~~~anced, and disparities in spend-
ing levels narrOl'led; however, the reform does 
not completely or even substa"1tially 
nate fiscal disparities between 3altimore City 
and its subt1.rbs,. (Oakland, 1972, p.244) 
The major conclusions of the Waldauer (1974) study 
show certain similarities to the Oakland (1974) study's 
findings, especially concerning redistributive criteria. 
\Valdauer stated that, 1I ••• greater equalization aI:long the 
counties takes place '",hen the flat grant is adjusted by 
deducting a ~~iform local share of education ~osts based 
on local fiscal capacity." (Waldauer, 1974, p.228) 
HOvTever, he indicated that such redistributive criteria 
based on p:!:'operty cash value "lOuld cause urban areas to 
lose state aid. His major conclusion '.'T2.S that pe~sonal 
income, rather than the tax:able property, ·would be re-
latively more beneficial to urban than subu:cban 8~t'eas. 
Public Education Finance--Oregon 
~ilithin the last decade there have been several major 
studies investigating the cost-benefit allocative cri-
terion of public school financing in the state of Oregon. 
Rose (1966) analyzed the rank order correlation between 
pro:ge~'ty oash value per student and. tax relief funds 
(ORS 615) per student among Oregon co~~ties. In 1965 the 
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Oregon Legislature enacted ORS 615 authorizing distribution 
of surplus state general fund revenues to the counties 
with a requireoent that such funds be used to reduce the 
property t~~ rate. Rose (1966) concluded that the dis-
t ·b ..... · . ~ r~ uv~on Oo!. ta::: relief fu..~ds highly correlated \Ili th pro-
perty ','leal th per student, ,!Thich shm.,ed that counties \'lith 
relatively greater fiscal ability and relatively less 
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educational need vlOuld receive larger portions of tax 
relief fl.mds to reduce their rates. (Rose, 1966, p.7) 
Research of the components of the property tax base 
L"1 school districts of Oregon was also conducted by Rose 
in i967. He scught to analyze the impacts of using the 
property tax base valuation as the measure of fiscal 
ability. Rose (1967) concluded that state equalization 
aid does equalize the disparities in tax rates among " 
school districts. Rose I s research, hm'lever, sho\'1ed that 
the equali:32.tion of tax rates does not neci.:!ssaril:r connote 
equalization of educational cost-benefit allocations. 
As indicated by several aforeDe~tioned studies, state aid 
distribution criteria based on property valuation per 
student may actually cause further cost-benefit distri-
bu~ion inequities b;:r reallocating reS01.1.rces iror:l relatively 
income-l)Oo.:r to relatively income-rich scnool districts .. 
T\'lo substantial contribu.tions to :public school f.'O .!.1.1l-
a.l1CirJ..g during the 1960 l S 'dere Dade by Prank ::tamer. In 
his earlier study Jarner (1966) analyzed Oregon f s sc:wol 
districts' socia-economic a..:."1.:i demographic characteristics 
and their relationships to the 3c~'lool district fin2.!.lCing 
practices. He cO:i."lcluded that the relationship bet'ween 
the socio-econon1c v.'~.riables cn:d district financial var-
• "i . h" - 0 0 'J.".J.. t"" d ~ao.J..es 1.S .I. J..g;1J.y. l.n;:i:..grU.LlC&'''1l. excep lor 110USJ.T1b an 
income-related variables. ( 'na c -, ,. c: ,.. .Jj rn ..... r, .:::'00, p.69) In his 
later study Farner (1969) approac'hed the school finance 
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problems from a broader perspective. He studied the 
relationships of county tax bases financing public edu-
cation in 11 western states, including Oregon. To des-
cribe and analyze the socio-economic and demograpl1ic 
characteristics among counties 'tlith identifiable property 
tax base relationships, he concluded that, " ••• the tax-
paying ability of a county as measured by property per pupil 
is not usefully related to that county's ta..\:-paying ability 
as measured by incotle :per pupil or sales per pupil. II 
A similar conclusion v'las reached in a study by Paus 
(1970) when he analyzed the problems of tax equity in 
fina~cing public schools in relation to the income and 
property base of counties in Oregon. Paus' research (1970) 
indicated that relatively higher income-base counties 
received relatively more state aid per pupil o (PallS, 
1970, p.199) Paus also reached the conclusion, conce~ing 
the ta..>.: bvxden distribution aspects of school finan.cing 
in Oregon, that a highly regressive tax pattern between 
the percentage of income collected for school support 
a...'1d the per pupil income was apparent. 
Total collections, composed of both state 
taxes a.."1.d local property taxes, ",ere regre s-
sive in relation to the income base among 
thirty-six counties. The percentage of re-
ported income collected for public school 
. funding was higher among counties eyJ1ib-
iting 10we2' income bases. (Paus, 1970, 
p" 198) 
Several studies approach Oregon public education 
financing measures from a primarily political pers~ective. 
(Lucier, 1971, Hiner, 1971, Saalfeld, 1972, Pierce, 1973) 
The study by Lucier (1971) 'I[as based on the 1969 tax sub-
stitution referendum submitted to the voters of Oregon. 
This referendum ~rescribed a sales tax to raise funds 
to be used in providing property tax: relief. Lucier, 
using a rational utility choice model, accurately pre-
dicted the outcome of the referendlliil. His findings were 
in agreement ,·ri th the assumption that indi-.,riduals ma...'d-
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mize their self-interest through political choice.. Lucier 
reported that minimizing the direct burden 0:;:' taxation 
enabled the voter to naximize 11is income. (Lucier, 1971, 
p. 90) 
In addition to Lucier's findings, Saalfeld (1972) 
in his study 'flaxoa:rers ar!d voter£.: Collectiye Choice i~ 
:Public Education, reached similar conclusions. In -2 .. ':''1a-
lyzing taxpa:ler-voter behavior in school district budget 
elections in Oregon, Saalfeld stated that the higher the 
-l- f' d -l- • .1.1 h' h..to' b ' . 1 . t +ha+; -:-: coSu 0_ e ucau~on, une ~g er vne pro aOl_~ y v v ~v 
will exceed tl1.e -oreference fu...1J.ction of the nedia."'1 voter. 
He indicated that this situation vrould result in 8.."'1 ove~all 
voter rejection of the school budgets. Saalfeld con-
1 . , th t " -..tot.l." -l-.I. • d -'-h c uaeCl a, ••• 00 u J. lIlle percenl.l iTO u~l1g no an v e suc-
cess and fail1.1re rate \'lere found to be most strongly 
related to tr ... e magnitude of the prcr90 sed tax rate." 
(Saalfeld, 1972, p.139) 
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Jerry i'liner (1971), in responding to the results 
of the 1968 property t~~ limitation referendum (Proposal 
Seven), analyzed in depth the pri.iTlary reasons of its over-
whelming rejection by the voters. He stated that the 
prope:rty tax was supported by every organized social entity 
except by the individual property-oriented enterprises. 
He concluded that Proposal Seven's attempt to impose a 
constitutional property tax limitation failed and would 
probably curtail future efforts to aoend the Oregon Con-
stitution. (TolineI', 1971, pp .183-184) In his analysis 
Hi...11er recognized that the percentage of votes cast in 
favor of ProDosal Seven increased \'ri th the property tax 
rates D1 a linear fashion. 
Increases in IlYes" votes with increasing ta"{ 
rates 'l:lould renresent decline in collective ac-
ceptance of higher property tax rates, following 
whatever individual evaluations may be made cf 
the services sup}?orted. thereby. On the other 
hand, decreases in IIYes" votes cast with in-
creasing tax rates \'lQuld indicate t not increas-
ing satisfaction "'fith increasi:"lg taxes ~ .§§., 
'but increased accepta11ce of t~e local gove~n­
mental services sUDDerted by those taxes. 
(IIIiner, 1971, p. 201 ") 
In response to the defeat of the 1973 referendwl1 
over a public school finance system of near total state 
assumption (The I,IcCall Fla.'1.) Pierce (1973) investigated 
the basic equity aspects of the l'":cCall ?1a...'1 a...11d analyzed 
the political rationale for its defeat. He reached the 
.follovring con~lusions in e:q>laini-<:_g the reasons behind 
the pu.blic :rejection of the BcCall Plan: 
(1) (A lack of consensus among the politi-
cal leaders) led to failtITe in the OrGgcn Sen-
ate a..11.d contributed to the defeat of the "plan 
at the "polls. -
(2) 1 It appears that) the defeat of the 
HcCall Pla..11. raises doubts about the efficacy 
of tying tax reform to changes in the structure 
of public services o (3) (It also appears) that the 11cCall Plan 
runs COU-11.ter to the tendency of state and local 
governments to select new taxes that are pain-
less rather than those that are fair. (Fierce, 
1973, pp.130-131) 
As a result of the 1973 referendum rejecting the 
EcCall Plan, the Oregon Legislature formed a Committee 
on Equal Educational CpportuJ."'1i t:/ to stud:r a..."'1d forr.rJ.lat8 
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policy suggestions for the subse~uent legislative session. 
This committee established a research staff under the 
gt1.idance of La"rrence C. Pierce of the University of 
Oregon to analyze the present public school finrulce system 
and to construct feasible financing alternatives to be 
considered by the Legislature. The final product of t~e 
study, 3tate School Finance AiternatiYes, presented 
tecD~ical infornation to assist the Legislature in its 
cons:Lderation of the proposals presented by the CorD::1i ttee 
on Equal 3ducational Cpportu..lJ.ity. (Pierce, 1975, p.4) 
CHAPTER III 
THE I>iffiTHODOLOGY 
There is a great deal of disagreement concerning the 
basic issues of public school finance. One reason for the 
disagreement is that the puxpose and essence of the partner-
shi:! between the state and the local school districts is not 
clearly defined. Consequently the decision-makers are faced 
with identifying the "problem" within a highly unstable 8..."Yld 
ill-defined political environment. To some decision-makers 
the problem is one of state government's avoidance of respon-
sibility in funding public schools by relying on local fin-
ancing. To others the problem is the dependence upon local 
property taxes in financing public schools. Some decision-
makers may feel that the problem is created by the use of 
local voting systems to determL"Yle the school financing levels. 
Other decision-makers believe that the basic problem j.n fin-
ancing public schools at the local community level is created 
by disparities in taxable property wealth among the local 
school districts. (Andersen, 1977, p.1) 
It is very difficult and troublesome to analyze the 
differently defined and interpreted school finance pro-
blems, especially when a comprehensive methodology for 
the study of public education policy impacts has not yet 
fully developed. (Coleman, 1971, Cresswell, 1974, p.42) 
Application of social science knowledge and methodology 
in policy analysis would improve the L"Ylformation avail-
able to decision-makers from a well-pI82h~ed policy de-
velopment procedure. 
The production of objective evidence is seen 
as a way to reduce the politicking, the self-
servicing maneuvers, an-d the log-rolling that 
commonly attend decision making at every level 
from the Congress to the local school. Data 
, . ,ill replace favors and other political nego-
tiations, so that the most rational decisions 
will be reached. (Weiss, 1972, p.3) 
Policy Research 
The conceptual framework of this study is based on 
analy--tical methods employed by policy analysis procedures. 
::i:he focus of this research is on the tax burden distri-
but ion impacts of public school finance reform al ter-
natives. This study is "decisi.on-oriented ll as opposed to 
"conclusion-oriented." "The latter is intended to con-
tribute to knowledge and theory building in some area. 
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Decision-oriented research is intended to be a guide to 
action. II (Cresswell, 1974, p.42) Therefore, policy 
research becomes a nethodologicalapproach to increase the 
rationality of making and selecting policies to accomplish 
certain social objectives. Anthony Cress\'lell states that 
the primary objective of policy resea::'ch is threefold: 
first, the policy re search is designed to transform the 
socially defined goals into workable policy varia~les; 
secondly , it is stru_ctured to disccver to what degree 
cUI'rent policies are successful in achieving their 00-
jectives; thirdly, the policy research is fOL~ed to de-
termine h0\1 to adjust t:te policy alternatives to achieve 
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the objectives more successfully. (Cresswell, 1974, p.42) 
As suggested by many policy scientists, a rational 
policy procedure should be based on empirical evaluation 
of policy alternatives designed to achieve a set of ob-
jectives. (Dror, 1968, Dye, 1975 and 3aker, 1975) 
By viewing policy analysis in these terms 
we can easily identify \vhere research based 
on positive methodology can be employed to 
guide reform. In the case of policy analysis 
for school finance, therefore, we can first 
look to the sources that will assist in spe-
cifying objectives for school fina~ce systens. 
Vie can then examine research '''/hich demonstrates 
ho".! to achieve policy objectives, and parti-
cularly studies' which ezplore- the relation-
ships between policy variables and policy 
impacts. (Cresswell, 1974, p.42) 
The strategy e~ployed in this policy research is as 
follo':18: (1) the social objectives, equal opportunity and 
equity in tax burden distribution, are defined as the 
basis by which the policy alternatives are analyzed; (2) 
alter-native policies a.re identified. and selected according 
to a criterion of political feasibility; (3) the necessary 
data is collected and simulated according to the speci-
fications of the policy alternatives; (4) resultant tax 
burden redistributions cf policy alternatives are iden-
tified; (5) results are analyzed to dete~ine the com-
parative advantages of alternative scnool finance policies. 
~\ri thin the scope of the tax burden redistribution 
effects of the different public education financing schemes, 
a number of specific c;.uestions shou.ld be considered: the 
changes in the 2ublic school fL"Ylal:ce scheme will benefit 
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\~·hich type of school districts (urban, subuJ:'ban, poor, 
111eal thy, etc.), and \'ihich socio-economic groups ,-rill gain 
or lose from the changes? For example, it has been pre-
dicted that to change from local school district level fin-
ancing to full state flmding of public education may shift 
the allocation of tax burdens from high property-valued 
urban center district to high income-earning suburban 
districts. Consequently, the suburban school districts 
may become relatively \'loJ..~se off in terms of increased 
tax pa;yments while revenues receiYea. may decrease or 
remain the same. Consequently, rural school districts 
might show increases both in taxes paid and revenues 
received for public education purposes. Furthermore, 
it has been predicted that increasing the state's share 
in financing primary ~~d secondary public education may 
cause shifts in the incidence of tax burdens from the loVl 
income to the high income-earners (a change in the vertical 
tax incidence structure), or from the low income-earners 
residing in the suburban school districts to the low 
income-earners residing in the urban centers (a change 
in the horizontal .tax incidence structure). 
lilany of the reform alternati'V"es to the existing pub-
lic school fina~cing system through legislati'V"e action, 
either to\'iard different ::-evenue distributive systens or 
different revenue-raising systems, avoid any substantial 
reference to the tax burden reciistribution impacts of the 
proposed policy changes. These shortcomings must be 
recognized by legislators in their policy deliberations. 
This study attempts to rectify these shortcomings by 
analyzing the tax burden distribution implications of 
revenue systems under different models of public school 
financing. 
The Intent and Limitations 
This research has three basic component s: (1) vrhat 
are the existing ~ublic school financial disparities in 
a major metropolitan area (Portland); (2) hm" \'lould var-
ious models of financing public education with different 
revenue structures, accompanied by different state aid 
distribution patterns, affect both the local school dis-
tricts as entities and the individuals as taxpayers; 
(3) from a tax burden redistribution perepecti-ve, \-That 
would be the comparative policy implications of the al-
ternati ve public education financing models? To ans\ver 
these questions the study incorporated, under different 
school financing models, variations in revenue systems 
of local school districts, major provisions of the state 
of Oregon's tax system and the empirical and theoretical 
basis of the ta~ burden distribution criterion. 
The equity ~~d fairness in public school financing 
is the basic theoretical and anal~~ical perspective em-
ployed in tl1is study. The basic cost-benefit distributi-ve 
equity criteria used in this rese~rch include: (1) allo-
cation of costs progressively, and of benefits equally, 
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by income and vlealth; (2) allocation of costs among house-
holds of like income and wealth, taking into account the 
family size; (3) allocation of costs so they do not dis-
criminate against status groups; (4) allocation of tax 
burdens by methods that increase the general level of tax 
consciousness. (Shoup, 1969, pp.33-37) 
There are several limitations to this study. First, 
the focus is explicitly on the revenue side of the fiscal 
operations. SL~ce this study sought to investigate the 
question of tax burden redistribution, the school finance 
alternatives tc be considered are based on various revenue 
formation structures. Secondly, attention is focused 
toward the tax: burden redistributive aspects of govern-
mental operations. This focus has been on both defining 
the existing ta.."'{ burden distribution as well as on iden-
tifying how different school financing models shift tax 
burden distribution tOvlard more or less Pareto optimal 
positions. * Thirdly, this study assllITled the possibility 
of a declining marginal utility of incone.. 'Within the 
premises of progressive taxation, a tax rate of ten pe~-
cent for the $4,000000 income bracket does not represent 
the sa~e burden as a ten percent taxation rate for the 
035,000.00 i:r..come bracket. Fourthly, this study aSS'UIDes 
that the ta..~ on the residential property shifts to the 
*Pareto Optimality is a position wherein it is impossible 
to make anyone better off without making at least one entity 
woree off by a~y changes in the allocation of resources. 
consumer. Controversy exists over this issue. (Aaron, 
1 974 a.11d Ladd, 1975) He len Ladd e:1.""P laine d that , although 
the case indicating the shift of ta.~es on commercial 
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and industrial property to the producer appears convincll1g, 
the situation for the residential property under many 
different market conditions does not indicate the same. 
Finally, resource allocation and stabilization aspects 
of alternative taxation policies are not dealt \,/i th be-
casue these issues go beyond the scope of the study. 
The Princinal Parameters 
The conceptual frame\'lOrk of this study is based on 
the main theorem: if the factors of deman~ for public 
education and the factors of adm i 11istrQtive procedures 
of uublic education are held constant aillong local school 
districts i,'lithin a state, then suggested and/or prescribed 
changes in the public school fin8.J.'1cing schemes will con-
sequently determine the direction a.l1d the cagni tud.e of 
cha.'Ylges in the horizontal and vertical tax burden dis-
tribution pattern. 
The research hypotheses and the procedure of a"'1alysis 
are as follo\-lS: 
HJ~othesis A, Present, system--fiscal and locational variations 
in school districts are I'elated to variations in tax bur-
den distriobution. (1) horizontal analysis--public edu-
cation tax as a percent of income identi:fies horizontal 
tax burden distribution among equally-circL:;.]lstanced 
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taxpayers; (2) vertical analysis--public education as a per-
cent of income identifies vertical t~~ burden distribution 
among taxpayers with different income and \'leal th capacities. 
H;[Dothesis B. Reform 1..ri thin the present systen--changes 
in the state aid distribution formulas are related to 
changes L~ the tax burden distributive structure. (1) 
horizontal analysis--actual to simulated comparative in-
dicator of horizontal tax burden redistribution among 
eQually-circlli~stanced taxpayers; (2) vertical &~alysis--
actual to simulated com~arative indicator of vertical tax 
burden redistribution among taxpayers 'vvi th different in-
come and 1N'ealth capacities. 
Hypothesis c. ~creased state support--chffi1ges in the 
level and type of funding of public education are related 
to cha,l1ge s in the ta.x: burden distributive strl'..ctu=e. 
(1) horizontal analysis--actual to simulated comparatiye 
L~dicator of horizontal tax burden redistribution among 
equally-circ'l1IT.stanced ta:qJayers; (2) vertical analysis--
actual to si:":mlated co:w.parative indicator of vertical 
tax: harden redistribution among ta:x-payers 1/i.l.th different 
income and v/sal til capaci tie s. 
H~uothesis D. r~ll state funding--changes in public 
h 1 ". . , ft· ~..t.. "11 . L. " d . sc 00 I~nrulc~ng SClleme rom par 1.2:..1 vO IU s-ca:l.Ie I'LL~ ~ng 
through in,:::oIDe andlor statewide property ta.."'tation are 
related to changes in the tax ourdsn distributive struct:'lre. 
(1) horizontal 9..nalysis--actual to simulated comparative 
indicator of horizontal tax burden redistribution among 
equally-circumstanced taxpayers; (2) vertical analysis--
actual to simulated comparative indicator of vertical 
tax burden redistribution among taxpayers with different 
income and wealth capacities. 
As illustrated in Figure 1, the parameters of the 
study are based on the present and proposed school fin-
ancing systems. ~he analytical scope is structured within 
the continuum of centralization of school financing 
functions. The criteria to differentiate the various 
financing models are based on the extent of state involve-
ment in public school finance. 
The postulates examined are based on the research 
paradigm formed within the perspectives of the stated 
hypotheses. It is the main postUlate of this study that 
the following variables: (a) t~~ayer socio-economic 
characteristics; (b) school district profiles; and (c) 
public school finance alternatives, are the primary de-
terminants of public education tax burden distribution. 
Postulate 1. A change in the state aid distribution cri-
terion and/or a change in the level of state share in 
funding public schools results in relative changes in 
local school property tax rates among school districts 
and consequently caused relative changes in the existing 
cost distribution structure. 
Postulate 2. A change in the state aid distribution 
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rre sent ~:;ystem 
.l1.9_'L?= 19762. 
30 percent 
state 8upport 
state and Local Financing 
Reforms Within the 
IJre sent System 
A. Foundation phase-
in plan 
B. IJocal goverl11nental 
yield plan 
c. Total tax equali-
zation plan 
D. Available l:!8al th 
equ.alization plan 
:i?igure 1. School finance alternatives: 
state as;:;mnption of school finance. 
Increased :Jtate 
Support 
40 percent state 
support with in-
creased state 
equalization 
level 
Full State Financing 
A. Income and state-
wide property tax-
ation 
B. Income and state-
wide business prop-
erty taxation 
c. Income taxation 
only 
comparativ(~ progression toward greater 
-..J 
\j) 
80 
criterion and/or ffil increase in the level of state share 
in funding :public schools redistribute s tax burden among 
individual taxpayers, and conse~uently causes relative 
changes in the existing horizontal and vertical tax bur-
den distribution structures. 
The 3am~le Data Collection 
, 
To empirically test and verify the hypotheses and pos-
tulates of this study, three sets of data "VIere used. The 
first set of data viaS based on a group of 15 unified public 
school districts in the ?ortland met::-opoli tan a:l.'ea of 
Cregon. 
.J:Oo' 1 .l.~sca , 
The actual data 'vras orga:lized to pre sent tlle 
demographic and socio-economic differences among 
the sa.'11ple school districts. Tile organized school district 
sample data \\Tas used to indicate the present actual cost 
expendit1ll'e allocative structure in operation. 
Saople School District Data: Group 1--3chool District Profiles 
1 • 
') 
'-. 
~ 
.-Ie 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10. 
per pupil prope~ty cash value 
:per pupil operational ez.pendi tTU'es 
local school district property tax rates 
local noneducation property tax rates (municipal 
overburden) 
teacher/student ratios 
enrollment ratios 
results' of school budget elections 
per capita income 
per pupil state equalization gr~lt to school districts 
per pupil state aid to school districts 
The second set of data was a hypothetically construc-
ted repre sentati ve population group of 45 taJ<..-:payers i-lith 
different socio-economic bacl::grounds based on t:!:1e leVel 
of annual income, family size and residential property 
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or rent value. This group of data \vas estimated and then 
projected to 1975 from. 1970 data supplied by the U.3. 
Census of Housing, Residential Finance, Vol. V, p.151 ~~d 
by the U.S. Department of Commerce, Housing C'.!laracteristics 
by Household Composition, 1971, PPc5-8. (3ee Appendix D.) 
Sample Data: Group II--Representative Taxuayer Characteristics 
1 • Ta.."'Cable income status: 
a" ~~4 ,000.00 
b. ::J;8,000.00 
c. ~~12 ,000 .00 
c. ~?25 ,000 .00 
d. ~35,OOO.00 
Family size: 
a. single 
b. head of a 
6. parentls) 
d. parent s) 
e. parent s) 
household with 
with exemption 
'Vii th exeD.:ption 
1:li tIl exeml='tion 
exemption 2 
3 
4 
5 
3. Residential, property mortgage or rent value s for 
a moderate shelter for the specific income level 
8:'.:.d family size (ovlller or renter). 
The third set of data vTaS based on the public school 
financing alternatives that are under consideration or 
may be considered by the Oregon state Legislature. 
Sa":mle Data: GroulJ III--'Publ; c School 'J:;'inancing .:~l ternatives 
(See ?iture 1.) -
1. The present system--1975-1976 school year 
2. Reforws within the present system: 
a. Foundation Phase-I~ Plan 
b. Local Guaranteed Yield Pl~~ 
c. Total T~~ Effort ~aualization ?lan 
d. AV2..ilable · .. realth E~ualization Plan 
3. InCre2,r:5ing the state share (from 30% to 40S~) 
4. Full state funding: 
a. incc:le and statevide property taxation 
b. incor.1e and state,'ride business prop erty ta..."{ation 
c. incone taxation only 
The actual data and ~ost of the simulated data for 
the present school financing system and several proposed 
alternative models of school financing were available 
from many local, state and federal governmental sources. 
The collected data was organized and compiled u...'1der four 
categories based on the inquisitive direction a'1d a~a­
lytical procedures of the research. 
Data Category 1--The Present Public School Financing 
System. 
The data ~",as organized to indicate: 
a. the fiscal, demographic and economic dif-
ferences among school districts; 
b~ the disparities in the state aid distribution 
criterion; 
c. horizontal and vertical tax burden distribution 
among the hypothetical ta~yayers located in dif-
ferent school districts. 
Data Category 2--The Reform Pro"Oosals Within the Present 
FinanCinr Svstem. Under four different a tefnatives, the simulated data 
\'las organized to indicate the horizontal and vertical 
tax burden redistribution among the hypothetical tax-
payers located in different school districts. 
Data Category 3--Increased state Share in ~'1dinp, Public 
Schools. 
The simulated data ,,,as orga..'1ized to inclicate the hori-
zontal and vertical tax burden redist::-i"bution among 
the hypothetical taxpayers located in different school 
districts. 
Data Category 4--Full State Funding of Public Schools. 
The simulated data v.Jas organized under three revenue 
source possibilities to indicate the horizontal and 
vertical tax burden redistributions. 
The iL'1alytical A"Ouroach 
To build a com~lete inDut file containing calcu-
lated and simulated information, the ra\'l data (including 
appropriate ta:x:payer information, sample school district s r 
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property tax rates, state income tax rate schedules, and 
the alternative school financing models) vIas progra.."lTID.ed 
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to indicate the public education tax burden distribution 
among 4,365 possible occurences. The criterion upon vThieb 
the tax burden distribution \'ras based is the percent of 
taxable personal income paid to state and local juris-
dictions to finance primary and secondary public schools 
in the State of Oregon. In calculating the public edu-
cation tax as a percent of taxable income, the following 
fornulas ~Nere used:* 
School district property tax rate + intermediate 
education district property tax rate + COU.."Ylty 
school fund property tax rate = Local -oublic 
educati on nronerty tax rate TIer ;~;1 ,000.00 X pro-
p-erty value = Local Public Eduoation Pro-oert, 
~ - [[if taxable income<~$15,000.00 property 
tax refund X % Education (varies according to 
municipal overburden ratio§.)} = Net Public 
:8duca.tion Pronerty Tax + Lstate Income Tax X 
% of Educationl = lTotal t~~ paid for Dublic 
education X 1007 + Taxable income = Public 
)'...;ducation Tax as ~ of Ta..,\:able Tncome . 
The progrw.med public educatio-~ tax burden distri-
bution data ~~d the school district data was appropriately 
combined and organized into a complete input file fornat. 
The complete input file \'ras then quantitati"'Tely a.l1alyzed 
using the statistical pacl::age for social sciences. (See 
AppendBc B.) (SPSS, Nie, 1975) The statistical analysis 
... ·las conducted under three categories: 
*See Appendix A for fvxther extrapolation of state 
property tax refund and state income tax payment fOrIDv.las. 
category I--Gene1"'al analy~is of the nresent school fin-
ance situation. Under this category' the data related to 
school district profiles is statisticall;}T a.."1alyzed. The 
following statistical methods were used: multiple re-
gre ssion-SPSS subprogram regression (Nie, 1975, pp. 320-
367) and scatter diagram of data points and simple re-
gression-subprogram scattergram (nie, 1975, pp.293-300) 
Category II--Analysis of horizontal tax burden distri-
bution. Tax burden distribution e~uity situation among 
identically-circU1Jstanced taxpayers, or groups of tax-
payers, located in sample school districts is analyzed 
~"1der the different school financing models. The fol-
10'vTing statistical methods were used: scatter diagram of 
data points and simple regression-subprogram scattergram 
84 
(Hie, 1975, pp.293-300) and description of sub-populations-
subprograIil breakdoi'Tn. (Hie, 1975, pp. 249-266) 
category III--}Ylalysis of vertical ta:-:: burden distri-
bution. Ta.."'{ burden progressivi ty situation among the 
alternative school financing models is analyzed. ( 'i'ho 
-- ~ 
federal income tax structure is used as the standard. 
The follm'ling statistical methods are used: scatter 
diagram of data points and simple regression-subprogram 
scattergram. (Nie, 1975, pp.193-300) and description of 
suO-POpt11ations-subprogram breakdmm.. (:i:1ie, 1975, pp" 
249-266) 
l·:ost of tb.G data collected for the present financing 
system and the school district fiscal profiles were 
already computed and refined.* However, two criteria 
needed further investigation and data computations. The 
first criterion to be investigated 'I!'ras the composition 
of the state budget for the fiscal year 1975-1976 e T',vo 
variable s "Ivere sought: (1) what portion of the total 
state revenue is composed of state income tax; and (2) 
\'That portion of the general fund expenditures is desig-
nated for funding public schools in Oregon. Personal 
income tax: revenues ,,'rere estimated to make up approxi-
mately 74 percent of the state's budget. Furthermore, 
public education e~~enditures, excluding higher education 
and COIT~unity colleges, comprised 33.2 percent of the 
state's general funds budget. (state of Oregon Adopted 
Budget, 1975-1977, pp.5-20) In calculating the state 
personal income tax on individuals, the 1975-1976 actual 
state incooe tax rate schedules based on standa~d de-
ductions ":rere used. Also, the federal income tax rate 
schedule s for 1975-1976 ".,.rere used for two reasons: first, 
to calculate the federal income t~c on L~dividuals to be 
deducted from their state taxable income; ~~d, secondly, 
to construct a progressive income t~~ation model against 
which the school financing alternatives could be compared. 
These results ,,'rere used in analyzLYJ.g the present school 
fL"'1ancillg system as well as in estimating the composition 
-X-The "ba.sic ravr data \'ras provided by the Oregon Depart-
ment of Education and Legislative Revenue Office. (Oregon 
Department of 2ducation, 1976 and Legislative Revenue Of-
fice Research Reports 20-76, 1976) 
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of the state budget for the school finance alternatives 
~~der consideration. 
The second criterion of investigation and data COD-
putation vIas the municipal overburden indicator. The 
raVl data to develop this indicator i:JaS acquired from 
appropriate county tax assessors' offices to determine 
the different level of property taxation for various 
educational and noneducational public servj_ces. Hm'lever, 
because public service levels and boundaries \'litilin and 
among school districts varied considerably, to emphasize 
and ma.gnify the ID1L11.icipal overburden situation, the 
highest possible noneducational property tax rates were 
selected for each sample school district. (Consolidated 
Tax Rates of Overlapping Taxing Districts, Hultnomah, 
\,lashington , Clackamas and ColU!IJ.bia Countie s, -l975-1976) 
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The mlllicipal overburden indicator (noneducational property 
taxes as percent of total property tax) was used in ana-
lyzing the fiscal problems facing urba~ school districts. 
Also, the mu...~icipal overburden indicator \tie,S used in 
calculating tile public education portion of propert~T tax 
refund applicable to certain L~come groups under differ-
ent financing alternatives o 
Some of the 1970 census data indicating the demo-
graphic and socio-economic characteristics of the sample 
school districts needed to be aggregated 8~d/or updated. 
The school district income distribution and population 
characteristics data was aggregated and estimated from 
the data provided by the Bureau of the Census, U.S. De-
partment of Co~~erce, Series P-25, Nos. 685 and 698, 1977, 
and from the 1975 Buildi~g Permit Statistics by Columbia 
Region Association of Gover~nents. (CPillG, 1977) The 
remainder of the school district data was fu....."""'!lished by 
the Oregon Department of Education and by the school 
districts. 
The data collected to analyze the four options 
suggested by the reforms within the present school fin-
ance system alternative 'was already computed and sj..m.u-
lated. The simulated property t~~ rates for the four 
alternatives were prepared by the University of Oregon 
study, State School Finance Alternatives 0 Hm'lever, since 
the out::,Jut of the Uni versi ty of Oregon's study 'ViaS based 
on 1973-1974 school year data, the simulated property 
ta..."{ rate figures were projected for the 1975-1976 school 
year for this analysis. The procedure to project the 
simulated property tax rates to 1975-1976 1,'TaS based on 
the actual change in per pupil property cash values and 
property ta..."{ rates between the school years 1973-1974 
and 1975-1976. 
The data simulated for the increased state share 
alternative ",as estimated fro:Q the 1975-1976 actual state 
and school di.strict fiscal data. (Legislative Revenue 
Office, 1976) The estimations of the changes in school 
district property ta.x rate s, the state level budgetary 
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allocations, and the resulting tax burden redistribution 
by increasing the state's share of funding public schools 
from 30 to 40 percent were based on the magnitude of the 
increase in the level of state aid to school districts 
and the relative decrease in the school district property 
tax rates.* It was estimated that ~~der this school fin-
ancing alternative, 44.3 percent of the state's general 
funds budget will be used in financing primary and sec-
ondary public education. 
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Based on the recent legislative activities increasing 
state support to public education, the state has chosen 
to reallocate funds from other services to public education 
rather than to increase the state income tax rates. It 
is quite possible that the local school districts, rather 
than decreasing their levels of property taxation, may 
choose to increase the level of expenditures. However, 
'V',i thin the parameters of this research, first, the levels 
of school district expenditures are assumed to remain 
the same for all alternatives except the full state options 
in which expenditures are uniform statewide; secondly, 
the revenue allocative pattern of the 1975 state budget 
is adjusted to reflect the change in the revenue allocations 
between other state government services and primary and 
secondary public education. 
For the full state school financing alternatives, 
*The calculated decrease in the local school district 
tax rates vary according to school districts' property wealth. 
the 1975-1976 actual state and school district data was 
simulated to indicate the aggregate statewide revenue 
increases needed to finance public schools under three 
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tax options: (1) L~come and statewide property t~~ation--
26% increase in the state income tax level; (2) income 
and statewide non-residential property taxation--35% 
increase in the state income tax level; and (3) income 
taxation only--92% increase in the state income level. 
The actual state personal income tax rate schedules for 
the 1975-1976 fiscal year were reconstructed according 
to the needed increase in state revenues for each taxation 
option under full state school finance alternative. (See 
Appendix C) It was calculated that under three t~~ options 
of full state assumption, the cost of primary and sec-
ondary public ed11cation in the State of Oregon would com-
prise approximately 62.3% of the state's general fmlds 
budget. The estimation of the aggregate statewide public 
school revenue under the ~ull state funding models was 
based on 1975-1976 statewide average per pupil e:~enditures. 
This assumes the political possibility of lowering the 
high-expenditure school districts to the statewide average. 
As indicated by many studies, in the short term a change 
to full state assumption of school financing may increase 
the aggregate cost. This occurs because many full state 
financing alternatives propose to increase the low expen-
diture school districts to a statewide average without 
decreasing the level of expenditures in high-spending 
districts. Consequently, since the school districts are 
prevented from increasing the level of expenditures, the 
statewide expenditure level will be established without 
much political turmoil. From these premises it may be 
stated that a statewide uniform expenditure level will 
develop with initial increases in total cost, balanced 
by later decreases in total cost resulting from the expen-
diture level control set by the state. Therefore, it is 
assumed by this study that, all things being equal, the 
overall cost of public education will, in the long run, 
remain the same. 
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PART II 
~IALYSES OF ALTERNATIVES AND 
RESULTANT TAX BURDEN DISTRIBUTIONS 
CHAPTER IV 
OREGON PUBLIC SCHOOL FIN~_~CE 1975-1976 
In the State of Oregon combined state and local oper-
ational expenditures for the 1975-1976 school year exceeded 
659 million dollars. The state provided over 200 million 
dollars of aid to school districts. This constitutes ap-
proximately 30 percent of the state's total public school ex-
penditures. Of that 200 million dollars of state aid, over 
162 million dollars, over 80 percent, was distributed through 
flat grants and categorical aid. The remaining 20 percent, 
38 million dollars, was distributed to school districts 
through the equalization fund. (state of Oregon Department 
of Education) 
The distribution of equalization funds is based on 
a statewide basic program (or fOillldation) level. For the 
1975-1976 school year the statewide basic program level 
was 827 dollars per pupil.* State equalization grants 
are given to school districts which cannot raise suffi-
cient revenues to provide educational services at the 
statewide basic program level. The main deficiency of 
the foundation-based state aid distribution criterion is 
that, while some property-rich school districts would 
raise revenues well above the foundation level, some 
property-poor school districts would not be able to 
raise aLove the foundation lavel with relatively greater 
*This is well below the per pupil operational expen-
ditures of school districts. 
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tax effort. (Pierce, et al, 1975, p. 22) 
During the 1975-1976 school year, the school districts 
in the State of Cregan operated with different fiscal cap-
abilities, resulting in different levels of educational 
service. These differences in levels of education ser-
vice delivery, in terms of quantity and quality, are 
functions of fiscal capacity and respective communities 
which the school districts serve. From this perspective 
the urban-suburban-rural differentiation, based on the 
available school district and census data vlhich indicates 
the fiscal and socio-economic variations among the sa~ple 
school districts, is a useful tool in analyzing the ex-
isting inequities in public education service levels and 
tax burden distributions. 
School District Pro£iles 
The per capita income figu.res a"'!long the lmified 
school districts in ?ortland Hetropoli tan .A.rea vary from 
a high of $7,446.00 in Lake Oswego to a 10if1 of ~3,936.00 
in Forest Grove.* Per capita income distribution indi-
cates that, in general, rural school districts have low 
per capita income ~~d suburban districts high per capita 
income. The urban central areas. where most of the low-
income fa~ilies are located, appear to have high per 
capita income figures" The Portland urba3:1 area contains 
high-income residential enclaves \'lhich distort the urban 
*Based on estimated data from sources provided by the U.S. 
Department of CO~"'!lerce Census Bureau (1971) and CRAG (1977). 
per capita income figures. (Table IV) 
The per pupil property cash value figures among the 
sample school districts vary from a high of $89,127.00 in 
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the Portland school district to a low of $36,533.80 in the 
Corbett school district. In general both urban and suburban 
school districts have relatively high per pupil property cash 
values and the rural school districts relatively low per 
pupil property cash values. Two factors contribllte to the 
high per pupil property cash values in the urban school dis-
tricts: (1) the concentration of commercial and industrial 
properties in urban areas and (2) the high population/student 
ratios. On the other hand, the suburban school districts ap-
pear to have relatively lower per pupil property cash values 
when compared to urban school districts. The factors that 
contribute to this situation are the high concentration of 
residential properties in the suburban school districts and 
the low population/student ratios. (Tables IV and VI) 
The analysis of the relationship between the level 
of per capita income a~d the per pupil property cash 
values indicates that the relationship between these two 
variables is not statistically Si~lificant at the .05 
significance level. Lr=.227 Accordingly, within the para-
meters of this research the property wealth of a school 
district does not indicate the level of income wealth 
of its residents. As cited in the literature review, 
several studies support this finding. (Sacks, 1973; Ladd, 
TABLE IV 
SCHOOL DISTRICT FISCAL AND ECONOMIC DATA 
1975-1976 
School Per Capita Per Pupil pro). Property Tax Per Pupil Opere 
Distrj_cts Income*O~) Cash Value ($ Hate (I'1ills) Expendi tures (~p) 
Portland ~~5,190 ~~89, ·127.02 14.59 $1,478.38 
Parkrose 4,930 61,778.31 18.16 1,329.42 
David Douglas 4,684 49,275.55 20.70 1,370.72 
Corbett 4,050 36,533.80 23.25 1,192.36 
Heynolds 4,567 56,260.32 16.31 1,137.27 
Beaverton 5,503 63,239.03 21.17 1,426.57 
Tigard 5,149 79,620.98 15.61 1,274 .. 26 
ShervlOod 4,100 63,004.22 -18.01 1,211.89 
Banks 4,202 40,882.66 18.81 1,070.24 
Forest Grove 3,936 41,212.64 20.46 1,111.82 
Oregon City 4,389 48,859.39 20.17 1,168.68 
vIe st IJinn 5,174 67,841.73 20.69 1,520.60 
IJake Oswego 7,446 59,992.04 19.16 1,181.22 
Scappoose 4,669 42,885.91 16.21 1 ,170 .. 19 
St. Helens 4,643 71,492.74 14 .. 23 1,219 .. 26 
Source: State of Oregon IJegislative Revenue Office Research Heport H.-I, No. 20-76, 1976; 
and U.S. Department of Commerce, Population Estimates and Projections, Series P-25, 
No. 698, April, 1977. 
*Based on (; sti.mated data from source s provided by the U. S. Department of Commerce 
Census Bureau (1971) and CRAG (197'7). \.0 ~ 
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1975 and Gatti, 1976) Thus, the per pupil property cash 
value may not be a reliable measurement of the actual 
wealth, both in terms of property and income, of the resi-
dents of a school district. Therefore, the present sys-
tem of distributing state aid'based on the per pupil pro-
perty wealth of school districts may result in redistri-
bution of income from relatively poor to relatively well-
to-do school districts. 
The sample data indicates that there are consid-
erable variations in public edu~atio:r.!. propel~tJ- ta:·: ratec, 
from a low of $14.23 per S1,000.00 assessed property value 
in the Helens school district, to a high of $23.25 
per !$1,000.00 assessed property value in the Corbett 
school district. A simple regression of public education 
property tax rates and per pupil property cash values of 
sample school distric-'vs indicates that there is &'1 in-
verse relationship betvTeen these two variables. Lr= -.617 
(Figure 2) This supports, to some d~gree, an already 
recognized fact that the wealthier the school district 
is in terms of real property, the lower are the public 
educat ion ta."'\: rates. However, the strength of this re-
lationship is 10vler tha..11 e:A::pected. lr~. 377 It resulted, 
principally, from the deviant behavior of t'.vo suburban 
(Beaverton and West Lirm) and se7eral rural school dis-
tricts. (:B'igure 2) The high property tax rates in 
Beaverton and West Linn, relative to their per pupil 
23.5~.corb. 
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m 
property cash values, have been caused both by high citi-
zen demands on educational standards and special educat-
ional programs designed to meet the needs of the student 
popula.tion. I'Jest Linn School District has the highest 
per pupil ope~ational eA~enditure and Beaverton 3chool 
District the third highest among the sample school dis-
tricts, The levels of per pupil operational expenditures 
of these two districts supports this contention. (Figure 
3) On the other ha~d, most rural school districts, re-
latiYe to their per pupil property cash valu·:;s, appear 
to have 10\" ta."'C rates as well as low operational eA-pen-
ditures 
The per pupil operational eA-:pendi ture profiles of 
the sample school districts indicate a significant pos-
itive relationship between the level of public education 
eJq)enditures and the property wealth of school districts. 
Lr=.627 (Figure 3) Figure 3 illustrates that most sam-
ple rural school districts with low property wealth also 
have low per pupil operational expenditures o This may 
suggest a possible relationship beti,veen the per pupil 
operational expenditures and the level of ta:;: rates. 
However, the reg-.cession analysis indicates that there is 
no signif'ican~ relationship oet',lfeen these tvlO varia.bles. 
The level of property tax rates in a school district do 
not determine the level of per pupil operational eA-pen-
ditures. 
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The multiple regression results of the municipal 
overburden issue indicates a positive significant =elation-
ship LR=.847 bet'i'J'een the municipal property tax overburden 
(measured in terms of percent of total local property 
taxes diverted for noneducation public services) and 
(1) the population per pupil Lr=.787 and (2) the number 
of pupils per teacher Lr=.637. School districts with a 
high concentration of individuals and families with no 
school age children appear to have a high municipal pro-
perty tax overburden. A Iocational analysis of this phen-
omenon indicates that the school districts located in 
urban areas and its peripheries have relatively higher levels 
of municipal overburden. (Tables V and VI) The signi-
ficant relationship between the municipal overburden in-
dicator and the number of pupils per teacher indicates 
that urban school districts 'with greater municipal over-
burdens would have relatively mo=e stude:::lts per teacher. 
(Table VII) Al~.n' ough ~n ~Ane~~l urban school d_;str;0.~iJ~ _ iJ '_,.l._ 6 _ .... cl._ , ..... - -
have relatively more stucients per teacher, this does not 
necessarily imply crowded classrooms. Depending upon the 
education curriculum and program content, a 10\'1 pupil/ 
teacher ratio of some school districts (especially sub-
urban) may imply an emphasis on certain special and/or 
extra education programs resulting in increased FT~. 
One Lrnplication of this phenomenon is that urban 
school districts 'l'/ith greater nee,d for special education 
TABLE V 
LOCAL PROPEHTY TAX AND fJiUNICIPAL OVERBURDEN 
1975-1976 
(1 ) (2) (3) 
School Local Prop. Tax l)ub. Educ. pro). (2)as % Non-Educ.Prop. (3)as % 
Districts H.ate (IlJills) Tax Hate (!I1ills of (1) Tax Rate(Mills) of (1) 
Port. 30.23 14.59 48.2 15.64 51.8 
Park. 33.80 18.16 53.7 14.64 46.3 
Dav.D. 36.34 20.70 56.9 15.64 43.1 
Corbo 34.05 23.25 68.3 10,,80 31.7 
Reyn. 28.59 16.31 57.0 12.28 43.0 
Beav. 34.38 21.27 61.9 13.11 38.1 
Tigard 24.53 15.61 63.6 8.92 36.4 
Shere 25.22 18.01 71.4 7.21 28.6 
Ban1~s 29.76 18.81 63.2 10.95 36.8 
F.Grov. 26.70 20.46 76.6 6.24 23.4 
Ore.C o 33 .. 11 20.17 60.9 12.94 39.1 
I:/.I,inn 29.12 20.69 71.0 8.43 29.0 
La.ke o. 30.19 19.16 63.5 11.03 36.5 
Scapp .. 24.12 16.21 67.2 7 .. 91 32.8 
St.Re1. 22.50 14 .. 23 62.4 8.47 37.6 
Source: State of Oregon Department of Education and County Tax Assessor Uft'ices 
(Hultnomah, Washington, Clackamas and Columbia). 
...l. 
o 
o 
TABLE VI 
SCHOOL DISTRICT MUNICIPAL OVERBURDEN 
1975-1976 
Non-Educ. Prop. Tax As % of Total Local Prop. Tax 
School 
Districts 
Low 
20% 25% 30% 35% 40% 45% 
F. "Grove 
Sher~\!Oocl 
West Linn 
Corbett 
Scappoose 
Tigard 
• • x • • • • 
• • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • 
· ~ . . . . . • 
• • • •• • 
JJake Oswego. • • • • • • • 
• • • • 
x • .. • 
• X • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
• • • • 
Banks • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • o • • • • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • .. • • • 
x. o • • • 
• .x. o • 
• • • • 
o • • • • 
• • • • • 
o • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
• • • • • • • o o • • • 
• • • • • • • • • • o • 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • 
.x. • • • • • • 
• 0 • • • 
oX. • • • • • • • • • • 
• x • • • • • • • o • • • 
• • • X • o • • • • • • • St. Helens 
Beaverton 
• • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 • • • • • .x. • • • • • • • • 
Oregon City. 
Reynolds • 
• 
• 
David Douglas. 
:Parkrose • • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • o • o 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • 
• • • • • • • • X. • • • • • • 
• • o • • • e • • • • • .x. • • 
• • • • • • • • • o o • • X • • 
• • • • • o • • • · .. . • • • • 
• • 
• • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • 
• • 
• • • 
• • 
• • • 
• • 
• • • 
• • 
• • • 
• x • 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
o 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
• 
-High 
50% 
• • • 
• II • 
• • 
• • 
• • • 
• • • 
• • 
• • • • 
• • • 
• • • • 
• • • 
• • • • 
• 0 • 
o • o 
Portland 
• • • • e • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • 0 • • oX 
~ 
o 
~ 
School 
Distr. 
Port. 
Park. 
Dav.D. 
Corbo 
Reyn. 
Beav. 
Tigard 
Shere 
Banks 
F.Grov. 
Ore.C~ 
\'I. Linn 
Lake O. 
Scapp. 
St.Hel. 
(# 
TABLE VII 
SCHOOL DISTRICT TEACHER/STUDENT 
AND ENROLll·1ENT RATIOS 
Teacher/Student Ratio 
102 
Enrollment Ratio 
of students/teaching FTE) (population/student) 
21.78 5.31 
18.04 5.62 
17.70 6.04 
17.60 3.44 
16.91 4.70 
17.77 4.41 
17.89 4.08 
16.60 3.11 
17.68 3.43 
17.34 3.67 
17.51 3.88 
15.74 3.53 
19.03 ).64 
17.31 3.08 
16.25 3.52 
Source: School Districts and Columbia Region Association of 
Governments (C~~G), Building Permit Statistics (1977) and 
General Planning Data and Projections (1977). 
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programs are limited in exerting greater tax efforts due 
to municipal overburden. This results in less per pupil 
revenues from local sources and froD the state. Conse-
quently, urban school districts are limited in increasing 
their FT3 to support special ~~d/or extra education pro-
grCL"11s. 
The analysis of the 1975-1976 school district budget 
elections results (Table VIII) shO\-:s that the fiscal var-
iable, state aid as a percent of operational expenditures, 
is directly correlated to the political behavior variable, 
percent voted "yes lf in the school district budget elections. 
[r=.717 (Figure 4) I~ Figure 4 the data point distribution 
from a Iocational perspective indicates a strong urban-
rural differentiation in terms of political support and 
state aid distributiono Rural school districts, relative 
to urban and suburban school districts, appear to re-
ceive greater political support for the approval of school 
budgets. 
It is evident that the higher the level of per pupil 
state aid as a percent of operational expenditures, the 
higher will be the probability of voter approyal of the 
school district budget measu:;:oes. Often the perce:."l.t of 
operational expenditures financed through state aid is not 
a knovffi fact to voters. Some indirect interveni.n.g factor 
(such as the size of the budget) affected by the pattern 
of state aid distribution may influence a school dis-
tri.~t' s -voting behavior. 
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TABLE VIII 
SCHOOL DISTRICT BUDGET 
ELECTIONS 1975 
School # of "No" 11 of "Yes" % Voted Ir 
Districts Votes Votes "Yes" 
Port.* 22,834 26,931 54.1 
Park. 1,548 1,866 54.7 
Dav.D. 1,523 1,601 51.3 
Corbo 189 251 57.0 
Reyn~ 785 1 ,241 61.3 
Beav. 6,646 6,774 50.5 
Tigard 1,866 1,883 50.2 
Shere 474 635 57.3 
BanJcs 142 230 61.8 
F.Grov. 712 922 54.4 
O~eoC. 1,390 1 ,511 52.1 
\'I. Linn 948 1,003 51.4 
Lake O. 1,808 1,884 51.0 
Scapp. 564 983 63.5 
St.Hel. 930 0-3 ../) 50.1 
Source: State of Oregon Department of Education, Sum-
mary of LC?cal District-13udget and Levy Electi..£n§" ""1975. 
*Special Levy Election, 1975 (no budget election that year)o 
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State Aid Distribution to School Districts 
State aid distribution to school districts has been 
measured under four interrelated categories: (1) per 
pupil state aid; (2) per pupil state equalization aid; 
106 
(3) per pupil state aid as a percent of per pupil oper-
ational expenditures and (4) per pupil state equalization 
aid as a percent of per pupil operational expenditures. 
The data indicates that the variations in per pupil state 
aid among the sample school districts are significant, 
from a 10\'1 per pupil state aid of :~325 .08 in the Tigard 
school district to a high of ~516.33 in the Banks school 
district. (Table IX) In general, per pupil state aid 
distribution patterns indicate that rural districts re-
ceive a relatively larger share of the total state aid 
as well as state equalization grants. The three highest 
per pupil state aid and 8m1alization gra.."rlts vlere received 
by the rural school districts of Banks, Forest Grove and 
Scappoose. (Figure 4) On the other hruld, the Tigard, 
St. Helens and Portland school districts received no 
equalization grants from the state. (Table IX) 
Analysis of the relationship between (1) per pupil 
total state aid a..~d (2) equalization grants and per pupil 
property case vul~es, as e:Qected, is significant and 
inversely correlated. lr= -.78 8...11.d r= -.90 respectivel~L:7 
(Figures 5 and 7) The statistical significance of these 
high correlations is a result of the state aid distribution 
TABLE IX 
STATE AID DISTRIBUTION 
1975-1976 
School Total State State Equal. Total State Aid/Pupil State Equal.Aid/Pupil 
Districts Aid/I)up il ( r$) Aid/Pup il ( j~ ) As % of Oper.Exp./Pupil As % of Expen./Pupil 
Port. ~1;401 .23 IH. ~i> a 27.14 0 
Park. 377.33 32.04 28.38 2.41 
Dav.D. 475.71 31.04 34.71 9.56 
Corbo 469.91 155.00 39.41 13.00 
Reyn. 430.69 104.92 37.87 9.23 
Beav. 396.04 57.58 27.76 4.04 
Tigard 325.08 0 25.51 0 
Shere 437.37 104.87 36.09 8.65 
Banks 516.33 198.83 48.24 18.58 
F.Grov o 50'1.64 1830'14 45.12 16.47 
Ore.C. 424.00 106.42 36.28 9.11 
VI. Linn 417.60 75.03 27.46 4.93 
Lake o. 354.93 27.67 30.05 2.34 
Scapp. 482.29 169.16 41.22 14.46 
St.Hel. 338.27 0 27.75 0 
Source: State of Oregon Legislative Revenue Office, Research Report R-I, No.20-76, 
1976. 
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criterion \vhich is primarily based on the taxable pro-
perty 'veal th of the school districts. (Figure 5) 
109 
The histogram (?igure 6) illustrates the state aid 
distribution pattern among the sample school districts. 
Two school districts vlith almost equal per pupil oper-
ational expenditures, Lake Oswego and Scappoose, =eceive 
$28.00 and $160. per pupil state equalization grants 
respectively. The Lake Oswego school district, a re-
latively high property value a~d high income-earning sub-
urban commu..'Ylity, receives comparably less in equalization 
grants than the property and income-poor rural school 
district of Scappoose. On the other ha~d, the suburban 
'Hest Linn school district, a relatively property-rich 
and high income-earning school district, receives compar-
atively more per pupil state aid than the property-rich, 
low income-earning Portland School District. This clearly 
exemplifies the property wealth-based inequities in the 
state equalization aid distribution pattern. 
i,Vhile the per pupil categorical state aid distribution 
appears to vary slightly, the per pupil state equalization 
aid varies from zero for three school districts (Port-
land, Tigard and st. Helens), to G199.00 per pupil for 
the :Banks schoel district. (Pigures 6 and 7) Further 
analysis cf the per pupil state equalization aid as a 
percent of per pupil operational expenditures indicateS 
that approximately one half of the :Banks school district'3 
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operational expenditures comes ~rom state aid, while 
only 25 percent o~ the Tigard school district's oper-
ational eA~enditures are supplied by state aid. While 
one-fi~th o~ the Banks school district's operational 
expenditures are supplied by state equalization grants, 
three school districts re~eived no equalization grants. 
This ~urther supports the ~inding that presently state aid 
distribution is based primarily on the per pupil property 
wealth o~ the school districts. In relating the per 
pupil total state aid as a percent o~ the per pupil oper-
ational expenditures to per pupil property cash values, 
a significant inverse correlation has been found. Lr= -.857 
(Figure 8) Therefore, under the present state aid dis-
tribution formulas, the less per pupil property cash 
value a school district has, the higher will be the per-
centage of its per pupil operational expenditures pro-
vided by the state. (Figure 8) This places most of the 
rural and some of the suburban school districts in a 
relatively advantageous fiscal position. 
Public Education Tax Burden Distribution 
The present form of public school financing has been 
heavily criticized because of the inequities in tax bur-
den distribution. This study has analyzed the tax burden 
distribution problem in public school ~inancing ~rom two 
distinct perspectives: the horizontal and the vertical 
tax burden distributions. 
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The horizontal tax burden distribution analysis is 
based en the level of tax payments by e~ually-circum­
stanced individual ta:~ayers. Theoretically, a just and 
fair tax system should distribute the cost of services 
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in a vmy that does not differentially treat the equally-
circumstanced taxpayers. This situation will be referred 
to as the "horizontal tax burden eg .. ui ty." 
To analyze the horizontal tax burden equity situation 
under the present public school financing scheme, a sample 
of 45 h;Y"pothetical "'caxpayers \'lere conpiled. Each tax-
payer's contribution to the fina.."lcing of public elementary 
and secondary education at the state and local level has 
been carefully calculated. E2.ch calculated figu,re was 
converted into a variable indicating each ta:~ayer's public 
education tax payments as a percent of his/her taxable 
income. A representative cross-tabulation table (15x5) 
vIas designed, out of the total (15x45) cross-tabulation 
table, to indicate the magnitude of the ho:::-izontal tax 
burden inequity resulting from the method of public 
school fin~"lce during the 1975-1976 school year. 
Each category of representative taxpayers \'lith equal 
taxable incomes, f~llily size and property status (owner 
or renter), located in different school districts, exem-
plifies the TncJ.gnitude of the existing horizontal tax 
burden inequity situation. (Table X) II Tax-
payer-2," \'lith a ::~4,OOO.OO taxable income, five-member 
TABLE X 
IIOHIZONTAL TAX BURDEN DISTRIBUTIONS7<-
1975-1976 
l)ublic Education Tax Payment As Percent of Income 
Scbool "Taxpayer-1"- iiTaxpayer-2"- iirraxpayer-14ii -IITaxpayer=17"- -"Taxpayer=35" 
District $4000 Inc. $4000 Inc. $4000 Inc. $12000 Inc. $25000 Inc. 
Corbo 
Dav.D. 
Reav. 
Ore.C. 
Parle. 
vI. Linn 
I,ake O. 
Banks 
F.Grov. 
Reyn. 
Port. 
Shere 
Scapp. 
Tigard 
St.Rel. 
5-Memb. Fam. ~-rlJemb. Fam. Single 5-rJ[emb .Fam. 5-fJiemb. Fam. 
Owner Henter Renter O\'mer Owner 
70 63 
7.13 
7.03 
6.47 
5.93 
5.87 
5.64 
5.46 
5.23 
4.53 
4.32 
4.24 
3.56 
3.52 
2.70 
10.70 
9.70 
9.82 
9.21 
8.34 
9.06 
8.49 
8.30 
8.68 
7.10 
6.48 
7.46 
6.58 
6.39 
5.50 
6.61 
6.15 
6014 
5~77 
5.33 
5.51 
5.27 
5.15 
5.17 
4.42 
4.23 
4.47 
3.98 
3.91 
3.37 
6.73 
6.12 
6.24 
5.95 
5.45 
6.01 
5.65 
5.55 
5.90 
4.92 
4.52 
5.26 
4.80 
4.67 
4.25 
7.81 
7.13 
7.28 
6.99 
6.46 
7.13 
6.73 
6.64 
7.07 
5.92 
5.52 
6.43 
5.95 
5.79 
5.38 
*By representative taxpayer categories 
~ 
~ 
\J1 
family and rented home, pays 10.7 percent of his/her 
income to finance public schools if he/she resides in the 
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Corbett school district. On the other hand, the equally-
circU!JstaJ.l.ced ta.:i,..-payer located in the St. Helens school 
district pays only 5.5 percent of-his/ber income to fin-
ance public schools. (Table X and Figure 9) Also, 
"taxpayer-17,n "tlith a ~12,OOOoOO taxable income, five-
member fa.'TIily and a pri-..rately-O\'med home, pays 6.73 percent 
of his/her income to finance public schools if he/she 
resides in. Corbett School District. On the other hand, 
the equally-circumst~~ced taxpayer located in Portland 
School District would pay only 4.52 percent of his/her 
income to fin8.J."'1ce public schools. (]:8:01e X and Figure 10) 
.Analysis indicates that there is no relationship 
between the leyel of public education tax as a percent 
of inco~e and the level of per pupil operational e;~en-
ditures in the sample school districts. L3= -.0£7 There-
fore, the existing horizontal ta:·: burden inequities are 
not determined by differences in ~er pupil e:Qenditures 
among sample school districts. For example, a relatively 
higher paynent by the taxpayer located in the Corbett 
school district does not necessarily indicate higher 
returns in terras of per pupil operational e::..--p,:mdi ture s. 
In actuality per pupil ogerational expenditures for the 
1975-1976 school year \'-rere $1,192.00 in the Corbett 
school district as against ~~1, 219.00 in the St. Helens 
school •• ..L. • ..L. o_:tS vr~c u. (Table IV) The taxpayer located in 
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m 
the St. Helens school district not only paid les3 in 
ta~es, but also received more in per pupil e:~enditures 
compared to his/her counterpart in the Corbett school 
district. 
Analysis of the property status criterion indicates 
that "taxpayer-211 located in t~'1e Corbett school district 
is equally-circ1.lW.stanced to IItaA--payer-1" in every aspect 
except that he/she rents a shelter of the same value. 
Because IItaxpayer-2" is a renter, he/she pays more than 
schools than the taxpayer , with equal income a..."'rld fmaily 
size, located in the same school district, but o~ning a 
home. (Figure 11) The cause of this is that the state 
property tax refund schedule treat s renters a..."YJ.d millers 
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discrillinantly. This study aSS1J.l"TIes that the pro:perty tax 
of a shelter, paid to various public agencies, is borne 
by the occupa...'l1t whether he/she rents or O\·ms. 'dith this 
assumption, the state property tax reflmd schedule, which 
favors home-o\'mers over renters, causes clear horizontal, 
as well as vertical, tax burden dist:::-ibution inequities. 
(Figuxe 11) 
There is a significant inverse relationship between 
taxpayers' public education tax paJillents as a percent of 
income and per pupil property cash values of school dis-
tricts. Lr= -.35 and -.597 (Figures 9 and 10) Therefore, 
the existing horizontal t2.X burden inequities are deter-
mined. partially by the differences in per pupil property 
Ql 
fj 
o 
u 
Q 
1-1 
~·t 
o 
.1-' 
11 
QI 
U 
~, 
Q) 
Pi 
[/) 
<>! 
~ 
E-i 
~ 
o 
'M 
ti 
U 
;-J 
'rj 
r,l 
u 
'r! 
r-l 
.n ~ 
~ 
12 
11 
R-Corb 
I 
10L i 
I 
9L~~F.GrOV 
, I 
! R-Danka 
UL I I I 
o i i 
4l 
I 
0 
31-
21 
R-Dav.D 
I 
H-Orc.C 
I ! 
o I 
I 
o 
. Reyn.-R 
I 
0 
"Txp-1" 
r= -.46 
a= 7.06 
b= -.04 
.L.--
36.60 41.85 47.10 52.35 57.60 
R-Deav 
I 
H-\'I.Linn 
I 
I 
o 
o 
o 
'------_ .... 
62.05 68.10 
"Txp-2" 
r- -.55· 
a=11.27 
b= -.05 
Tigard-~ 
I 
R-St.lIel 
I 
I 
1 
o 
I 
o 
Port.-H_ 
I 
73.35 70.60 83.85 89.10 
School District Per Pupil Property',.Cash Values (In Thouoo.ndo of DollarG)· 
Fip.;ure 11. Horizontal tax burden distribution, renter-owner (R--O) discrepencies, 1975-
1976: scattergram of public education tax an percent of income and per pupil property 
cash values, "Ta'Cpayer-1" (Txp-1) and "Taxpayer-2 IJ ('rxp-2). 
~ 
N 
o 
121 
cash values among sample school districts. This is par-
marily a result of the relatively lower tax rates of the 
property-rich school districts. Figures 9 and 10 clea~ly 
illustrate the variations in tax payments by the t\'lO re-
presentative taA,})ayers, and exemplify the existing hori-
zontal ta~ burden inequities based more on residential 
location than on the differences in the public education 
service levels. Both fig~res illustrate, not only the 
discre~ancies in tax pa~~ent among the equally-circunstanced 
taxp?-yers, but also the discrepancies in tax b:.i.rclen dis-
tribution among taJ..-payers \Vi th diffe~ent incomes. For 
example, the level of public education taxes, as a per-
cent of income, paid by "taxpayer-17" (:J;12,000.OO income; 
five-member fa:nily; homem"rner) residing in Corbett School 
IJistrict, is lower than the public education taxes, as 
a percent of income, paid by "taA'"Paye~-2" (84,000.00 
income; five-member family; renter)--6.73 percent and 
10.7 percent respectively. (Table X) 
Analysis of the variations of public education tax 
as a percent of income among the low-income t~~ayer 
categories also indicates a relatively , .. lider variation 
when compared to high-income taxpayer categorie s. ":rhis 
situation indicates that the magnitude of horizontal 
tax bu:-cden inequity a:oong the equally-circumstanced tax-
payers residing in different school districts is inversely 
related to the taxpayers' level of income. Therefore~ 
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lower ta..;cable-income taxpayers have greater variations in 
public school tax payments resulting in relatively greater 
horizontal tax burden inequities~ For example, the inter-
school district low-to-high variation of public education 
tax as a percent of income for "ta:x:payer-2" and "ta:xpayer-17!1 
was 94 an~ 58 respectively. This meruls that the p~blic 
educ9.tion tax as a percent of income would increase 94 
uercent for IItaJl..--payer-2" U~4 ,000.00 income; five-nemner 
family; renter ) if he/she were to move from the St. 
Helens school district to the Corbett school district. 
On the other hand, the same move "wuld cause only a 58 
percent increase in public education taxes as a percent 
of income for tftaxpayer-17" (::>12,000.00 income; five-
member fa':lily; homeow'"l1er). (Table Z) 
To further illustrate the tax. burden distribution 
inequi tie s, hypc,thetical taxpayer categorie s were reo:::'ga.."l1-
ized under six taxpayer income groups. The average public 
education tax payments as a percent of income ' .. rere calcu-
lated for each sample school district. ('Table XI) Re-
gardless of family size and property o1,'mership status of 
individuals, taxpayers with equal taxable incom.es do pay 
different aI:10lL"1.t s of taxe s to finance ..9iJ..blic schools. 
As indicated in Table XI, depending upon the taxpayers' 
residential locations, public education tax burdens for 
equal income ta:;:payers vary considerably. S:his illustrate s 
the existence of residential location based horizontal 
TABLE XI 
TAX BURDEN DISTRIBUTION* 
1975-1976 
School Public Education Tax As l">ercent of Income 
Districts i4-;000- - -~t8,000 - - 1"12,000 - - $18,000 - - $25,000 - - $35,000 
Corbo 7.65 7.02 6.34 6.41 7.15 6.97 
Dav.D. 7.12 6.42 5.80 5.87 6.56 6.42 
Beav. 7.07 6.52 5.91 6.00 6.69 6.54 
Ore.C. 6.57 6.19 5.65 5.78 6.44 6.30 
Park. 6.02 5.69 5.22 5.36 5.98 5.87 
\'1. Linn 6.15 6,19 5.71 5.88 6.56 6.42 
Lake O. 5.87 5.84 5.40 5.57 6.21 6.08 
Banks 5 .. 71 5.74 5.31 5.50 6.13 6.01 
F.Grov. 5.66 6.03 5.67 5.84 6.51 6.37 
Reyn. 4.85 5.06 4.76 4.98 5.56 5.47 
Port. 4-.57 4.68 4.40 4.63 5.17 5.09 
Shere 4.75 5.35 50 07 5.33 5.95 5.84 
Scapp. 4.11 4.87 4.67 4.96 5.54 5.44 
~eigard 4.04 4.74 4.55 4-.84 5.40 5.31 
st.Hel. 3.34 4.27 4.18 4.51 5.04 4.97 
- - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Mean 5.57 5.64 5.24 5.43 6.06 5.94 
5.59 
Stand.Dev. 2.17 1.00 0.72 0.64 0.78 0.80 
1.27 
*By representative ta)..rpayer income groups 
-" 
N 
~ 
tax burden inequities in financing public schools in 
the state of Oregon. 
In addition to horizontal tax burden distribution 
inequities, a high degree of vertical tax burden distri-
bution inequity exists in financing public schools. 
To deter:mine, comparatively, the degree of ver-~ical tax 
burden distribution, the 45 hypothetical taxpayers' fed-
eral income tax payments as a percent of taxable income 
have been presented in Figure 12 as a relative standard 
of pI'ogressivity of vertical tax burden d.istribution. 
124 
The alternative school fin~~ce models are compared against 
the level of federal income tax progressivity. 
The vertical tax burden distribution ~~ong the Port-
land, Beaverton and Scappoose school districts has been 
comparatively CL'1alyzed. (Figures 13, 14 and 15) The 
results indicate that in ?ortland ochool District there 
is no significant relationship betv.feen public education 
tax as a percent of income and the federal income tax-
based r~11ring of the tax".flayers. (FigJ.re 13) On the other 
hand, in the suburba'1 Beaverton School District the re-
lationship between public education tax as a percent of 
income and the federal i..."1.come tax-based rankings of the 
taxpayers is statistically significant a..'1d inversely co:c-
related, although not strongly. lr= -0317 (Figure 14) 
This may indicate that, in the 3eaverton school district, 
t~{ation for Dublic education is ~elatively regressive. 
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Tnis holds true for most, but not all, of the suburban 
school districts. 
In the Scappoose school district the relationship 
bet''leen the same variables is statistically significant 
and positively, but ,,,eakly, correlated. [r=.257 (Figure 
15) HovTever, this correlation does not hold true for 
most of the rural school districts. Conco~itantly, it 
may be stated that there is no clear (inverse or direct) 
relationship betvTeen the public education tax payment 
rru~:ings of the taxpaye~s located in the sa~ple school 
districts. The occasional appearance of relationships 
between these t\·ro variables results from the differences 
in per pupil property cash values ~d their resultant 
effects on the property tax rates. 
129 
The ~~alysis also indicates that the state's property 
tax refund schedule contributes considerably to the re-
lative regressivity of the local tax structure by dis-
regarding the differences in mlUlicipal overburden ratios 
among school districts. For example, ta:::.payers receivL'lg 
equal aBOUYLtS of state property tax refund would apply 
different percentages of their ref~~ds to the property 
taxes naid for public schools, depenc.ing upon the munici-
-oal overburden ratios of the resDective school districts 
... ... 
in ,·,hich they reside. This reBul ts in relatively lower 
proportion of the state property tax ref1..L"'ld being applied 
to the public education tax burden of taxpayers located 
in predominantly urban, and to sc~e extent ~ suburban 
130 
school districts. 
To analyze the overall vertical tax burden distribution 
situation, the composite scores of the public education tax 
as a percent of income for the 45 taxpayers has been calcu-
lated to indicate a metropolitan area-wide average based on 
the sample school districts. When the composite (sample) 
school districts) pattern of public education tax payments 
as a percent of income (as against the relatively progressive 
nature of the federal income tax structure), the public edu-
cation tax payments as a percent of income by the same set 
of taxpayers indicate, in terms of regressivity-progressivity 
of continuum, no clear pattern of vertical tax burden dis-
tribution. (Figure 16) 
While disagreeing \,/i th the contention that state and 
local financing of public schools is regressive, this 
study clearly recognizes no pattern to support this point 
of view. Such a vertical tax burden no-pattern distribution 
results primarily from the two-tier fj~ancing of public 
schools. The regressivity of local property t~~ation, 
when combined with a relatively progressive state income 
tax structure, results in a lessened regressivity in fin-
ancing public schools o* This depends first, on the level 
*This finding supports Donald Phares' conclusion that 
when the regressivity of the local sector is excluded, it 
is found that many systems are actually progressive or pro-
portional. (Phares, 1973, p. 91 ) 
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of the state's share in fin~~cing public schools and, 
secol'ldIJ, on the degree of progressivity of the state 
income tax structure. 
Tb.is analysis shows that the state cf Oregon's 
share in financing public schools and the relativ.ely 
progressive state incon8 ta:~ schedules are not sufficient 
to diminish the regressive impacts of the local property 
ta.."Ces on the individual taxpayerc. Presently the Oregon 
income ta:~ schedule is one of the most progressive ~ong 
the states. According to Pha=es' 2tudy (1973), Cregor:. is 
the fourth most income-tax-progrescive state in the Q~ion. 
HOi'rever, to finance public schools, the state of Oregon 
contributes less than 30 percent of the total public edu-
cation cost. This low level of state financi...'1g share and 
ineffective state aid system to eQualize differences in 
school districts' fiscal capacities results in tax burden 
distribution inequities based on the school district 
property \'l3alth. This has been a majcr concern of the 
Oregon state Legislature for some .J.. • Ltll:le .. 3very l~gislative 
session has been occupied by concerns to reform the :nethod 
of public school finance. 
After the failure of the I·!cCall seilool fiuance ::-8-
form plcu1., the 1973 Legislature initiated search fo= school 
finance a.lternatives. Tr.:.e University of Oregon Center 
for :8ducational ?olicy and L::anagement L11. 1975 supplied 
the Oregon Legislature I'lith four school finanCe alternatives. 
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These alternatives ",ere structured to reform the existing 
deficiencies in state aid distribution criteria. (Pierce, 
et al, 1975) In the following chapter these financing 
alternatives' effects on school district property tax 
rates, the level of state aid and tax burden distribution 
"'ill be analyzed in detail" 
'"' f..L.h 111' F' d' ;LlL.'1llIlary 0 1.1_ e l' aJ OJ:' ~n lngs 
This chapter presented the school district profiles, 
the state aid distribution and the t~c burden distribution-
related findings of the Oregon public school finance systen 
as operational during the 1975-1976 school year. In ac-
cordance illith the hypotheses and postulates of this re-
search, and 'within the parameters a..."1d limitations there-
u.pon, an analysis of Oregon's public school finance 
;:;ysten produced the follovling findings: 
1. 3chool District Profiles. 
a. The property wealth of a school district does not 
necessarily indicate the level of income wealth of its 
resident t~~ayers. 
b. There is a significant inverse relationship be-
tween per pupil property cash values and property t~{ 
rates of sample school districts. 
c. There is a significant positive relationship be-
t"reSl1 per pupil operational expenditures and the per 
pupi.l propertj! wealth of sample school districts. 
d. There is no statistically significant relationship 
bet'ttleen per pupil operational expenditures and property 
t~~ rates of sample school districts. 
e. There is a strong positive relationship bet\'ieen 
municipal overburden and the following two variable s: 
population per pupil and pupil/teacher ratios. 
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f. There is a strong positive relationship between 
the percent which voted Uyes ll in school district budget 
elections ruld per pupil state aid as a percent of per 
pupil operational expenditures. 
2. state Aid Dist=ibution. 
a. There is a significant inverse relationship between 
per pupil property cash values of sample school districts 
and per pupil state aid received. 
b. There is a strong inverse relationship between per 
pupil property cash values of sample school districts 
and per pupil equalization grants received. 
c. There is no statistically Si~lificant relationship 
bet"v"le~~n per pupil oyerational e:-:pendi tures of sample 
school districts and per pupil state aid received. 
d. There is a strong inverse relationship bet'lleen per 
pupil state aid as a percent of per pupil operational 
e:x:pendi tures and per pupil property cash values of saInple 
school districts. 
3.· Horizo~tal Ta::: Burden j)ist~"'ibutiono 
a. Under the 1975-1976 school finance scheme, there 
are considerable variations in the level of tax pa;y'Uents 
among the equally-circumstanced taA~ayers, resulting in 
horizontal tax burden inequities. 
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b. There is no statistically significant relation-
ship bet,,·.reen the level of public education tax as a per-
cent of income among equally-circumstanced taxpayers and 
the level of per pupil operational 8~~enditures of sample 
school districts. 
c. There is a statistically significant, but not 
strong, inverse relationship bet'v/een public education tax 
payments as a percent of income among e~ually-circumstanced 
taxpayers and per pupil property cash values of sample 
school districts. 
d. The state property tax refund schedule, which 
favors home-o\'ffiers oyer renters, cause s clear horizontal, 
as '\Vell as vertical, tax burden distribution i:lequitiese 
4. Vertical Tax Bl..U'den Distribution. 
a. The state property ta:c refund schedule contributes 
considerably to the relative regressivity of the local 
tax structure by disregarding the differences in ml~~­
icipal overburden ratios among the school districts. 
b.'There is no definite ru~d significant relationship, 
~lverse or direct, betiveen the public education ta:;: pay-
ments as a percent of income a..~d the federal income tax 
paj~ent raT.kings of the ta:Qayers located in the sample 
school districts. This indicates no clear pattern of ver-
tical ta."{ burden distribution--regressive, proportional 
01:- progressive. 
CHAPTER V 
REFORMS WITHIN THE PRESENT SYSTEI-1* 
This public school finance alternative was initiated by 
the 1973 Oregon State Legislature and developed by the Uni-
versity of Oregonls Educational Policy and Management staff. 
Its intention was to reform the present financing system with 
minimal changes in the level of participation by the state 
and the local school districts. The study was designed to 
redistribute state resources so that the local school dis-
tricts, relative to their tax efforts, would be able to pro-
vide equal amounts of resources for public schools. The 
basic objective of the University of Oregon project was to 
construct politically feasible proposals by changing the 
state equalization aid formulas to equalize the fiscal cap-
abilities of the school districts and to eliminate the ef-
fects of taxable property wealth. (Pierce,et al?1975, p.32) 
This alternative emphasizes that decisions regarding 
educational program content are the prerogative of the 
local school board and the voters in each school district. 
In developing this alternative, it was the primary as-
sumption of the authors thaot, " ••• equalizing the fiscal 
ability of school districts, however, would insure that 
local choices reflect differences of educational taste 
rather than the advantages of wealth." (Pierce, et aI, 
*The major part of this section is based on the data 
and the analysis provided by the Oregon School Finance 
Project, Volumes I and II by Pierce, et aI, 1975. 
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1975, p.32) 
The project developed four basic options to equalize 
the cost-benefit differentials among school districts: 
(a) Foundation Phase-In Plan; (b) Local Guaranteed Yield 
Plan; (c) Total Tax Effort Equalization Plan; and (d) Avail-
able Wealth Equalization Plan. The four options provided 
by the University of Oregon study vary according to the 
extent to which they emphasize different values. 
The foundation phase-in plan emphasizes con-
tinuity with the present system and a gradual 
equalization of district expenditures; the local 
guaranteed yield plan places more emphasis on 
the value of local choice; the total tax effort 
equalization plan focuses on the need to equalize 
the total local tax burden in school districts; 
and the available wealth equalization plan empha-
sizes the ratio of school taxes to noneducational 
taxes. (Pierce, et aI, 1975, p.34) 
In developing each option, the project used weighted 
per pupil local property wealth figures and the school 
district property tax rates as indicators of school dis-
trict fiscal' ability and tax effort. Also, the University 
of Oregon project built a data bank which contained simu-
lated figures indicating per pupil state aid and property 
tax rates under each option. 
The basic characteristics of each option have been 
represented by the sample data in Volume II of the pro-
ject's publication. (Pierce, et aI, Volume II, 1975) 
This representative simulated data has been updated by 
this research to analyze the public school finance plans 
under the reform within the present system alternative. 
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A. Foundation Phase-In Plan 
This option was designed to eliminate the major pro-
blems of the presently-operating financing system with 
least possible changes in ·the level of participation be-
tween the state and local school districts. This could 
be accomplished by abolishing the state flat grants to 
school districts completely and re-channeling these state 
funds to increase the state equalization grants to school 
districts. To insure that school districts with relatively 
high per pupil property wealth contribute to the equali-
zationprogram, at least up to the foundation level, a 
minimum tax rate of $12.00 per $1,000.00 of true cash value 
would be required of all school districts in the state. 
If a school district could not raise funds at least equal 
to fo~~dation level with the minimum tax rate, the dif-
ference would be provided by the state equalization grants. 
On the other hand, if a district with minimum tax rate 
collects funds above the foundation level, the excess amount 
above the foundation level would be given to the state for 
redistribution. 
Above the foundation level, a district would 
be free to use its local wealth to improve the 
quality of its educational offeringa To limit 
the range of school expenditures, however, there 
would b8 a limit on how much a district could 
tax itself for schools~ The permissible ad-
ditional tax would be limited initially to 50 
percent of the required local tax rate and then 
would be reduced gradually. (Pierce, et aI, 
1975, pp.35-56) 
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Pierce cited several problems inherent to this option. 
First, because of the limits to fiscal expansion, sub-
stantial increases in the state foundation level will 
take time. Second, a constitutional provision is needed 
before applying the recapture and maximum tax rate re-
quirements. Third, school districts may lose some of their 
local control. The state government, in order to reduce 
the inequities based on property wealth differentials, 
wculd enforce certain policies to equalize both the tax 
efforts and the level of expenditures among school dis-
tricts. (Pierce, et aI, 1975, pp.34-37) 
School District Property Tax Rates 
Analysis of the simulated property tax rates awong 
the sample school districts under the foundation phase-in 
plan indicates that local public school property t~~ rates 
would dicrease considerably for some of the sample school 
districts and slightly for others. While the decreases in 
property tax rates for Corbett, Tigard and Portland School 
Districts are minimal, they are considerable for the 
Forest Grove, Banks and Beaverton school districts. st. 
Helens and Scappoose are the only school districts whose 
property tax rates would increase. (Figure 17) 
Relative to the present financing scheme, the re-
lationship between public school property tax rates and 
per pupil property cash values under the foundation phase-
in plan would become less strongly correlated. Lr= -.61 
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would decrease to = -.5!! (Figure 17) Because of its 
minimum and maximum tax limi tat ions, and because of the 
recapture and equalize aspects of state aid distribution, 
the property tax rates would be determined to a lesser 
degree by the per pupil property wealth of. school districts. 
State Aid Distribution 
Analysis of per pupil state aid distribution to 
sample school districts under the foundation phase-in 
plan indicates that per pupil state aid receipts would 
increase considerably for most, and slightly for some, 
of the sample school districts, except Portland. (Figure 
18) For example, under the foundation phase-in option 
per pupil state aid to all of the sample districts, except 
St. Helens, Tigard and Portland, indicate considerable in-
creases. The increase in per pupil state aid for St. 
Helens and Tigard school districts were comparatively 
lower, approximately 15 percent and a relative seven per-
cent decrease for the Portland school district. The re-
capture and redistributive aspects of the foundation phase-
in option would make the urban Portland school district 
relativelv worse off while the rest of the samnle school v ~ 
districts would be better off. 
Under the foundation phase-in plan the inverse linear 
relationship bet''1een the per pupil state aid to school 
districts and per pupil property cash values of the school 
districts would become more strongly correlated. 
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Concurrently, under this financing option per pupil state aid 
distribution is determined to a greater extent by the 
per pupil property cash values of school districts. 
Lr= -.78 would increase to r= -.8il (Figure 28) This 
would mean that the more per pupil property wealth a 
school district has, the less per pupil state aid it would 
receive. This option was designed to equalize the dif-
ferences in taxable property wealth capacities among 
school districts. However, a result of the adoption of 
this option, which disregards the aggregate income dif-
ferentials among school districts, would be an increase 
in the existing state aid distribution inequities. From 
an income reidstribution perspective, this financing option 
makes the state funds increasingly available to property-
poor but income-rich school districts at the expense of 
income-poor but property-rich school districts. 
Tax Burden Redistribution 
Under the foundation phase-in option, analysis of the 
horizontal tax redistribution indicates that, relative to 
the presnet situation, the variation in the level of tax 
payments among the equa~ly-circumstanced taxpayers would 
slightly decrease. (Table XII) However, the relative 
decrease in variations of tax payments among equally-
circumsta~ced taxpayers is not significant to SUbstantiate 
a movement toward horizontal t~~ burden distribution equity. 
(Table XII and Figure 19) For example, as illustrated in 
TABLE XII 
TAX: BUIillEN DISTRIBUTION*--FOUNDATION 
PHASE-IN PLAN (FP) 
Public Education Tax As Percent of Income 
School $4,000 $8,000 $12,000 $18,000 825,000 835,000 
Districts 75-76 FP 75-76 FP 75-76 FP 75-76 FP 75-76 FP 75-76 FP 
Corbo 
Dav.D. 
Beav. 
Ore.C. 
Park. 
\,1 "Linn 
Lalce O. 
Banks 
F.Grov. 
Reyn., 
l?ort. 
Shere 
Scapp .. 
Tigard 
St.Hel. 
7.65-7.257.02-6 0 76 6.34-6.13 6.,41-6.22 
7.12 - 6.22 6.42 - 5.83 5.80 - 5.33 5 087 - 5.46 
7.0'7-5.876.52-5.72 5.91-5.27 6.00-5.43 
6.57- 5.63 6.19- 5.56 5.65- 5.15 5.78- 5.33 
6.02-5.265.69-5.17 5.22-4.80 5.36-4.99 
6 • 1 5 - 4.91 6 • 19 - 5. 37 5 .. 71 - 5.06 5 .88 - 5. 31 
5.87 - 4.50 5.84 - 4.91 5.40 - 4.65 5.57 - 4.90 
5.71 - 4.23. 5.74 - 4.72 5.31 - 4.50 5.50 - 4.77 
5 .. 66 - 3.60 6.03··4.64· 5.67 - 4.52 5.84 - 4.86 
4 0 85 - 4.18 5.06 - 4.60 4.76 - 4038 4.98 - 4.64 
4.57 - 4.48 4.68 - 4.62 4.40 - 4,,36 4.63 - 4.59 
4.75·- 3.46 5.35 - 4.46 5.07 - 4.35 5.33 - 4.69 
4.11·-4.824.87-5.354.67-5.054.96-5.31 
4.04- 3.74 4.74- 4.53 4055- 4.38 4.84- 4.69 
3.34-3.734.27-4·.564.18-4.414.51-4.72 
7.15 - 6.94 
6.56 - 6.09 
6.69-6.06 
6.44-5.94 
5.98-5.57 
6.56 - 5.92 
6.21 - 5.47 
6.13 - 5.32 
6.51 - 5.42 
.5.56 - 5.18 
5.17-5.12 
5.95 - 5.24 
5.54-5.92 
5.40 - 5.23 
5.04 - 5.27 
6 .. 97 - 6.78 
6.42 - 5.97 
6.54-5.94 
6.30 - 5.83 
5.87-5.47 
6.42-5.81 
6.08 - 5.38 
6.01-5.24 
6.37 - 5.33 
5.47-5.10 
5.09 - 5.05 
5.84 - 5.16 
5.44-5.81 
5.31-5.15 
4.97-5.19 
Mean . 5.57 - 4.79 5.64 - 5.12 5.24 - 4.82 5.43 - 5.06 6.06 - 5.65 5.94 - 5.55 
5.59 - 5.08 
Stand.Dev .. 2.17- 1.96 1.00- 0.84 0.7200.59 0.64- 0 .52 0.78- 0 •65 0.80- 0 •68 
1.27- 1.14 
*By representative taxpayer income groups 
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Figure 19, "taxpayer-2" ($4,000.00 income; five-member 
family; renter) living in Corbett School District, under 
the foundation phase-in option would pay 10.2 percent of 
his/her income to finance public schools as against 10.7 
percent under the present financing form. On the other 
hand, in the lo,.,er quadrant, under the foundation phase-in 
option, the same taA~ayer located in the Sherwood school 
district would pay the lowest percentage of public edu-
cation taxes (5.79 percent) as compared '-lith the taxpayers 
located in St. Helens School District under the present 
financing scheme4(5.5 percent). 
Under the foundation phase-in plan the inverse re-
lationship between public education tax payments as per-
cent of income and per pupil property cash values of school 
districts would" 'become less strongly correlated. LT;= 
-.55 Vlould decrease to r= -.4§7 (Figure 19) Concurrently, 
under this option the horizontal tax burden distribution 
inequities would be determined to a lesser extent by the 
per pupil property \'leal th of school districts. 
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To determine the degree of vertical tax burden re-
distribution, the sample school districts' composite pat-
tern of public education tax payments as a percent of in-
come under the foundation phase-in option has been compared 
to the present vertical tax burden distribution pattern. 
(Figure 20) Under this fina~cing model the level of 
public education taxes would decrease for all categories 
of "taxJayers.. Hm"lever, from a vertical tax burden 
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distrib~tion perspective, the change in correlation value from 
-0.08 to -0.07 is insignificant. Acco~dingly, analysis 
of the public education tax payments as a percent of income 
by the same set of taxpayers under the foundation phase-
in plan indicates no significant change in the existing 
vertical tax burden distribution pattern, which is a no-
pattern distribution in terms of regressivity-progres-
sivity continuum. (Figure 20) 
B. Local Guar§~~~ed.Yielg Plan 
This public school financing proposal is designed 
on the basis of the state's guarantee that the school 
districts making the same tax effort \'lould receive rel-
ativ~ly equal state support. If a school district's tax 
effo=t is not sufficient to fulfill the state standard, 
the difference will be paid by the state. Under this 
option the state would design a schedule inidcating the 
required. level of school district tax effort to be gua-
ranteed. at vcU'ious levels of receipts per pupil. (Pierce» 
1915, pe40) The choice for level of receipts ruld corre-
sponding level of property tax remains with the school 
districts. As an option, it may also be possible to re-
quire that the school districts contribute their surplus 
revenues to the state for redistribution. 
Under a local guaranteed yield plan s1.1.ch as 
this, if a dist;rict taxes itself at a rate be-
tween $10.00 and $22.00 but does not have enough 
t~{able property wealth to producethe guaranteed 
amount, the state makes up the difference. Dis-
tricts can also tax the~selves above the $22.00 
maximum guarar4tee level but there is no equali-
zation above this point. (Pierce, 1975, p.40) 
The primary advantage of the local guaranteed yield 
option would be its ability to equalize the fiscal capa-
city of local school districts without reducing the 
local control of public education-related decisions. 
"The plan simple equalizes the tax price different dis-
tricts must pay to obtain the same education program per 
pupil." (Pierce, 1975, p.41) 
There are several major problems to this option. 
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One difficulty would be that the state would not l~ow 
exactly how much state support for schools would cost in 
any year. Antoher difficulty is the t\'l0 criteria (fiscal 
ability and tax effort) upon which the equalization aid 
calculations are basedg This situation has been heavily 
criticized by many public school finance specialists on 
the basis that this measurement system discriminates against 
tl+e residents of the urban central school districts which 
are already over-burdened with relatively higher levels 
of protJerty taxation to finance needed municipal services. 
Also, it is questionable that the local guaranteed yield 
option would satisfy the Serrano-based legal requirements 
that the q1.1.ali ty of public education not be determined 
by local wealth. (Pierce, et aI, 1975, p.42) 
School Disi~ict Prouerty Tax R2tes 
Analysis of the simulated t~{ rates among the sample 
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school districts under the local guaranteed yield plan 
indicates that local public education property tax rates 
would decrease considerably for all of the school districts 
except Scappoose and St. Helens. Under this public school 
financing option these two school districts' tax rates 
would increase slightly. Three school districts (Banks, 
Forest Grove and Oregon City) show substantial decreases 
in property tax rates. (Figure 21) 
Under the local guaranteed yield option the inverse 
relationship between the public school property tax rates 
and the per pupil property cash values would become sta-
tistically insignificant at the .05 level. Because of its 
emphasis on local tax effort rather than local property 
wealth, the tax rates of sample school districts would 
not be determined by per pupil property cash values. 
State Aid Distribution 
Analysis of the per pupil state aid distribution to 
sample school districts under the local guaranteed yield 
plan indicates that per pupil state aid receipts would 
increase considerably for most, and slightly for some, 
of the sample school districts, except Portland. (Fig-
ure 22) For example, under the localguaranteed yield option 
per pupil state aid to all of the sample districts, except 
three high per pupil property cash value school districts 
(St. Helens, Tigard and Portland), would increase consid-
erably. The increase in per pupil state aid for st. Helens 
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and. Tigard, relative to other school districts, would be 
considerably less. For the Portland school district, re-
lative to the present situation, per pupil state aid received 
would be approximately four percent lower. (Figure 22) 
The state aid distribution criterion of the local guaranteed 
yield plan would make the Portland school district re-
latively worse off while the rest of the sample school 
districts would be better off. 
Under the local guaranteed yield plan the inverse 
linear relationship between the per pupil state aid to 
school districts and per pupil property cash values of 
the school districts would become more strongly correlated. 
Lr= -.78 would increase to r= 0.827 (Figure 22) Therefore, 
under this financing option per pupil state aid distri-
bution would be determined to a greater extent by the per 
pupil property cash values of school districts. The local 
guaranteed yield option was designed to equalize the tax-
able property wealth capacities among school districts. 
Nevertheless, the implementation of this financing option, 
which disregards the aggregate income differentials among 
school districts, would be an increase in the eXisting 
state aid distribution inequities. 
Ta~ Burde~-&edistribution 
Analysis of the horizontal tax redistribution under 
the local guaranteed yield option indicates that, relative 
to the present financing scheme, the degree of variations 
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in the levels of tax payments among the equally-circumstanced 
taxpayers would. slightly decrease. (Table XIII) The 
relative decrease in the variations in public education tax 
payments among equally-circumstanced taxpayers under this 
financing option is not significant to substantiate move-
ment toward horizontal tax burden distribution equity. 
(Table XIII and Figure 23) For example, Figure 12 illus-
trates that "taxpayer-2ft ($4,000.00 income; five-member 
family; renter) living in Corbett School District, under 
the local guaranteed yield option would pay 9.5 percent 
of his/her income to finance public schools as against 
10.7 percent under the existing school finance system. 
On the other hand, in the lower quadrant the same taxpayer 
located in Forest Grove School District would pay only 
five percent of his/her income for public school taxes. 
Relative to the present financing form, the ru~al school 
district taxpayers would become better off under the local 
guar~~teed yield option. Under the present financing system 
the taxpayers in Portland, Tigard and St. Helens School 
Districts would be paying the lowest percentages, relatively. 
Under the local guaranteed yield plan taxpayers in three 
rural school districts (Forest Grove, Banks and Sherwood) 
"'Iiould pay the ::-elatJ-vely lowest percentages. (Figure 23) 
Under the local ~Laranteed yield plan the inverse 
relationship between public education tax payments as 
percent of income and per pupil property cash values of 
TABLE XIII 
TAX BURDEN DISTRIBUTION*--LOCAL 
GUARANTEED YIELD PLAN (L.G.Y.) 
Public Education Tax As Percent of Income 
School $4,000 $8,000 $12,000 $18,000 $25,000 $35,000 
Districts 75-76 LGY 75-76. I!GY 75 w'76 LGY 75-76 LGY 75-76 LGY 75-76 LGY 
Corbo 
Dav.D. 
Beav. 
Ore.C. 
Park. 
W.IJinn 
Lake O. 
Banks 
F.Grov. 
Reyn. 
Port. 
Shere 
Scapp. 
Tigard 
St.Hel. 
7.65-6.677.02-6.386.34-5.83 6.41-5.96 7.15-6.65 
7.12 - 5.81 6.42 - 5.55 5.80 - 5.10 5.87 - 5.26 6.56 - 5.87 
7.07-5.776.52-5.655.91-5.216.00-5.386.69-6.01 
6.57- 4.46 6.19- 4.76 5.65- 4.50 5.78- 4.74 6.44- 5.30 
6.02 - 5.07 5.69 - 5.04 5.22 - 4.69 5.36 - 4.89 5.98 - 5.46 
6.15- 5.12 6.19- 5.50 5.71- 5.17 5.88- 5.40 6.56- 6.03 
5.87-4.295.84-4.76 5.40-40535.57-4.796.21-5.35 
5.71-3.295.74-4.055.31-3.96 5.50-4.27 6.13-4.78 
5.66 - 2.86 6.03 - 4.10 5.67 - 4.09 5.84 - 4.47 6.51 - 4.99 
4 .. 85-4.025.06-4.494.76-4.294.98-4.565.56-5.09 
4.57 - 4.42 4.68 - 4.58 4.40 - 4.32 4.63 - 4-.56 5.17 - 5.09 
4.75-3.135.35-4.225.07-4. 16 5.33-4.52 5.95-5.04 
4.11- 4.32 4.87- 5.00 4.67- 4.78 4.96- 5.0G 5.54- 5.65 
4.04-3.654.74-4·,,474.55-4.334.84-4.645.40-5.18 
3.34- 3.77 4.27- 4 .. 59 4.18- 4.44 4.51- 4.74 5.04- 5.30 
6.97 - 6.50 
6.42 - 5.76 
6.54-5.89 
6.30 - 5.21 
5.87 - 5.37 
6.42 - 5.91 
6.08 - 5.26 
6.01 - 4.72 
6.37 - 4.92 
5.47-5.02 
5.09 - 5.01 
5.84-4.97 
5.44 - 5.55 
5.31 - 5.10 
4.97 - 5.21 
Mean 5.57 - 4.44 5.64 - 4.38 5.24 - 4.63 5.43 - 4.88 6.06 - 5.45 5.94 - 5.36 
5.59 - 4.84 
Stand.Dev. 2.17 - 1.91 1.00 - 0.83 0.,7200.58 0.64 - 0.52 0.78 - 0.64 0.80 - 0.67 
1.27-1.13 
*By representative taxpayer income groups 
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school districts would become statistically insignificant. 
Concurrently, under the local guaranteed yield plan the 
horizontal tax burden inequities vlOuld not be determined 
by per pupil property wealth of school districts. (Fig-
ure 23) 
To determine the degree of vertical tax burden re-
distribution, the sample school districts' composite pat-
tern of public education ta~ payments as a percent of in-
come under the local ~~aranteed yield option has been com-
pared to the present vertical t~{ burden distribution 
pattern. (Figure 24) Under this financing model the level. 
of public education taxes would be reduced for all cate-
goires of ta~ayerso From a vertical tax burden redis-
tribution perspective, the change in correlation value, 
from -0.08 to +0.15, is insignificant. Accordingly, analysis 
of the public education tax payments as a percent of in-
come by the same set of t~~ayers under the local guaranteed 
yield plan indicates no significant change in the existing 
vertical tax burden distribution pattern, which is a no-
pattern distribution in terms of regressivity-progres-
sivity continuum. (Figure 24) 
C.. Total !~.f. ~.ffor~. Equali~Jon Pla."1. 
It is evident that the provision of educational ser-
vices is relatively more costly in urban central areas than 
in the surrounding areas. Comparisons of per pupil 
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expenditures hide the fact the higher cost of land, con-
struction, personnel salaries and general maintenance 
means that relatively less educational services, on a 
per-dollar basis, are offered in cities than elsewhere. 
(Pierce t et aI, 1975, p.45) 
The number of school-age children in need of com-
pensatory and special education is relatively greater in 
the urban central as compared to suburban areas. In ad-
dition to these two factors, the existence of relatively 
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higher per capita local noneducational public expenditures 
(municipal overburden) leaves relatively less tax dollars 
available for public schools. The total tax effort equali-
zation fin~~cing option was designed in response to these 
problems inherent to urban school districts in order to 
change the state aid distribution policies to favor the 
urban educational systems. 
Under this plan the local guaranteed yield 
schedule r~~s from $5.00 to $35.00. If a dis-
trict has a total tax rate between ~5.00 and 
$35.00 but does not have enough taxable pro-
perty wealth to produce the guaranteed amount, 
the state makes up the difference between the 
guara..."1.tee and a percent of TOV multiplied by 
the total tax rate.* Districts can also have 
total tax rates above" the $35.00 maximum gua-
rantee, but there is no equalization above this 
point. (Pierce, et aI, 1975, pp.45-46) 
In general, the total t~~ effort equalization plan 
appears to be a different version of the local guaranteed 
*School property taxes on the average are roughly 60 
percent of total property taxes. (Pierce, et aI, 1975, 
p.45) 
yield plan. The basic difference is that the total t~~ 
effort equalization plan realigns the measure of local 
160 
tax effort by means of equalization of the entire local 
tax effort, rather than only the school district tax ef-
fort. Under this financing" option the tax rate for each 
school district is computed and used as the basis to es-
tablish corresponding schedules to distribute state equali-
zation funds. One primary problem with this plan is that 
it may encourage municipal governments to raise their 
level of expenditures. This may result in gross levels 
of economic inefficiencies in local governmental oper-
ations. (Pierce, et aI, 1975, p.47) 
School District Prouerty Tax Rates 
Analysis of the simulated tax rates among the sample 
school districts under the total tax effort equalization 
plan indicates that local public education property tax 
rates would decrease considerably for most, and slightly 
for some, of the sample school districts, except Portl~~d. 
(Portland School District's tax rate \-lOuld increase from 
14.59 to 15.12.) 
The t~{ rate distribution pattern in Figure 25 indi-
cates a change in the direction of tax burden distribution. 
Under the present fina'1cing form, the relationship bet\1een 
the school district ?roperty t~~ rates ~'1d per pupil pro-
perty values are negatively correlated. Lr= -.617 (Fig-
ure 2) Under the total tax effort equalization plan this 
161 
relationship, while not statistically significant, becomes 
positively correlated. Lr= +.327 (Figure 25) Apparently 
this financing model induces a definite change in the tax 
burden distribution. Contrary to the present, under this 
financing model school districts with relatively more pro-
perty wealth would have relatively higher public school 
property tax rates. Concurrently this \'1ould result in 
a higher tax burden for urbrul school districts in the 
Portland metropolitan area. 
stat~-!id Distribution 
Analysis of the per pupil state aid to school dis-
tricts indicates that, relative to the present financing 
form, under the total tax effort equalization plan the level 
of state aid would increase substantially for all of the 
sample school districts except Portland. Portland School 
District, under this financing model, would receive 
$303.00 per pupil state aid as compared \'iith $401.00 \,lith 
the present financing form. (Figure 26) Evidently the 
state aid distribution criterion of the total tax effort 
equalization plan would make the Portland school district 
relatively worse off while the rest of the sample school 
districts would be considerably better off. 
Under the total t~c effort equalization plan the L~­
verse linear relationship between the per pupil state aid 
to school districts and per pupil property cash values of 
t:h.e school districts would become more strongly correlated. 
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Lr= -.78 would increase to r= -.9Q7 (Figure 26) Therefore, 
the more per pupil property ''leal th a school district has, 
the less per pupil state aid it woulQ receive. Like the 
previous financing options, this financing model was 
designed to equalize the differences in taxable property 
wealth capacities among school districts. However, a re-
sult of the implementation of this financing option which 
disregards the income differentials among school districts 
vlOuld be an increase in the existing state aid distribution 
inequities. 
Tax._Burden Redistribution 
Analysis of the horizontal tax burden redistribution 
under the total tax effort equalization option indicates 
that, relative to the 9resent financing scheme the degree 
of variations in the levels of tax payments among the 
equally-circumstanced taxpayers would slightly decrease. 
(Table XIV) This relative decrease in variations in 
public education tax payments among equally-circumstanced 
taxpayers under the total tax effort equalization plan is 
not significant to SUbstantiate movement to\'lard hori-
zontal tax burden distribution equity. (Table XIV) For 
example , it is illustrated LTJ. Figure 27 that "taxpayer-2" 
($4,000.00 income; five-member family; renter) living in 
Beaverton School District, ~~der the total tax effort equali-
zation plan would pay 7.95 percent cf his/her income to 
finance public schools as against ~~other equally-
TABLE XIV 
TAX BURDEN DISTRIBUTION~--TOTAL TAX 
EFFORT EQUALIZATION PLAN (T.T.E.) 
Public Educa.tion Tax As Percent of Income 
School $4,000 $8,000 $12,000 $18,000 $25,000 $35,000 
Districts 75-76 TTE 75-76 TTE 75-76 TTE 75-76 TTE 75-76 TTE 75-76 TTE 
Corbo 
Dav.D. 
Beav. 
Ore.C. 
Park. 
W.Linn 
Lalee O. 
Banks 
F.Grov. 
Reyn. 
Port~ 
Sher. 
Scapp. 
Tigard 
St.Hel. 
7 • 65 - 4. 76 7.02 - 5. 1 0 6 • 34 - 4.80 6 • 4 1 - 5.04 7. 1 5 - 5. 63 6 .97 - 5. 53 
7.12 - 4.92 6.42 - 4.94 5.80 - 4.61 5.87 - 4.81 6.56 - 5.38 6.42 - 5.29 
7.07 - 5.57 6.52 - 5.51 5.91 - 5.11 6.00 - 5.29 6.69 - 5.90 6.54 - 5.78 
6.57- 3.20 6.19- 3.85 5.65- 3.76 5.78- 4.07 6.44- 4.55 6.30- 4.50 
6.02 - 4.80 5.69 - 4.85 5.22 - 4.54 5.36 - 4.75 5.98 - 5.31 5.87 - 5.22 
6.15- 4.66 6.19- 5.20 5.'71- 4.93 5.88- 5.18 6.56- 5.79 6.42- 5.68 
5.87 - 4.03 5.84 - 4.58 5.40 - 4.38 5.57 - 4.66 6.21 - 5.21 6.08 - 5.12 
5.71- 1.92 5.74- 2.97 5.31 - 3.06 5.50- 3.45 6.13- 3.86 6.01 - 3.85 
5.66 - 1.80 6.03 - 3.28 5.67 - 3.43 5.84 - 3.87 6.51 - 4.32 6.37 - 4.28 
4.85 - 3.96 5.06 - 4.45 4.76 - 4.26 4.98 - 4.53 .5.56 - 5.06 5.47 - 4.99 
4.57 - 4.76 4.68 - 4.83 4.40 - 4.52 4.63 - 4.73 5.17 - 5.29 5.09 - 5.20 
4.75 - 2.70 5.35 - 3.89 5.07 - 3.90 5.33 - 4.27 5.95 - 4.78 5.84 - 4.72 
4.11- 3.59 4.87- 4.50 4.67- 4.37 4.96- 4.69 5.54- 5.24 5.44- 5.16 
4.04 - 3,,45 4074 - 4.32 4.55 - 4.21 4·.84 - 4.53 5040 - 5.06 5.31 - 4.99 
3.34- 3019 4.27- 4.16 4.18- 4.09 4.51 - 4.43 5.04- 4.95 4.97- 4.88 
-Mean . 5.57 - 3.82 5.64 - 4.43 5.24 - 4.26 5.43 - 4.56 6.06 - 5.09 5.94 - 5.01 
5.59 .. 4.41 
Stand.Dev. 2.17- 1.83 1.00- 0.83 0.720 0.59 0.64~ 0.53 0.78- 0.64 0.80- 0.66 
1 .27 - 1 .13 
*By representative taxpayer income groups 
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circumstanced taxpayer residing in Banks school district pay-
ing only 3.25 percent of his/her inoome. Relative to the pre-
sent financing form, the rural school district taxpayers 
would become better off under the total t~{ effort equali-
zation plan. Under the present financing system taxpaye~s 
in Portland, Tigard and st. Helens School Districts are 
paying the lowest relative percentages. Under the total 
tax effort equalization plan, taxpayers in three rural 
school districts (Banks, Forest Grove and Sher\'lOod) \'lould 
pay the 10\'lest relative percentages. (Figure 27) Under 
the present fL~ancing scheme, the relationship between 
the horizontal tax burden distribution and the per pupil 
property cash values is inversely correlated. Lr= -.4§7 
Under the total ta~ effort equalization option this re-
lationship would become positively correlated. Lr=.3g! 
Although this positive relationship is not statistically 
significant at the .05 level, the considerable change 
in the direction of horizontal t~~ distribution indicates 
shifting of the tax burden from per pupil property-poor 
to per pupil property-rich school districts. (Figure 27) 
To determine the degree of vertical tax burden re-
distribution, the sample school districts' composite pat-
tern of public education t~{ pa:nnents as a percent of in-
come under the total tax effort equalization option has 
been compa=ed to the present vertical tax burden distri-
bution pattern. Under the total tax e.ffort equalization 
plan the level of public education taxes would be reduced 
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for all categories of taxpayers. Also, from a vertical 
tax burden redistribution perspective, the change in cor-
relation value, from -0.08 to +.29, does indicate a shift 
toward a relatively more progressive ta~ation. (Figure 
28) However, relative to the federal income t~x progres-
sivity level, the total tax effort equalization plants 
progressivity in terms of public education tax paJ~ents 
would not be significant to verify a substantial movement 
toward a vertical tax burden equity-based public education 
tax structure ... 
D. AVqilabl? Wealth Eaualization Pl an 
This financing o~tion was designed in res~onse to 
the municipal overburden problem facing urban school dis-
tricts. Simply equalizing total wealth does not t~ce into 
consideration other public services to be financed by taxes 
on the Saille property valuation base. One technique to 
overcome this problem is to tax only that portion of local 
property wealth available for financing public schools.* 
The available "!''leal th equalization option is basically a 
local guaranteed yield plan \'111.ic11 uses the ratio of the 
school t~{ rate to the total tax rate in the .calculation 
of state equalization aid to individual school districts. 
-*If 50 percent of local taxes is used for schools, the 
school districtts property wealth silould. be discounted by 
50 pel"cent \'lhen computing state equalization. (Pierce ~ 
et al~ 1975, p.50) 
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Under this plan the state would guarantee 
$770.00 ~er Am'lli (average claily membership 
weighted) at a school tax rate of $10.00 per 
$1,000.00 of true cash value. Districts would 
reveive an additional $40.00 for each $1.00 
of tax up to $16.00, and ~25.00 for each $1.00 
of tax from $16.00 to a maximum of $22.00. 
Districts would be uermitted to tax above 
$22.00 without recapture. (Pierce, et aI, 
1975, p.50) 
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The primary advantage of the available wealth equali-
zation plan is that it would help those school districts 
with relatively higher noneducational property taxes. 
This financing option has certain basic problems. First, 
there exists the problem of differentiating apparent muni-
cia~l overburden from community preference situations. 
Secondly, there exists a problem of adjusting the fin-
ancing scheme to the communities ',':here some publicly-
needed services are provided privately. Finally, it 
could be argued that the municipal overburden situation 
may be a result of service delivery inefficiencies in 
high-density urban areas. (Pierce, et aI, 1975, p.51) 
School District Prouerty Tax Rates 
AnalysiS of the simulated tax rates among the s~~ple 
school districts '!..L."1.der the available '\-leal th equalization 
plan indicates that local public education tax rates would 
decrease for 11 of the sample school districts. Of that 
11, four school districts, Oregon City, Portland, David 
Douglas and Beaverton, would end up with substantial pro-
perty tax reductions, averaging 20 percent. On the other 
hand, four suburban and rural school districts (Scappoose, 
West Linn, St. Helens and Tigard) would end up with re-
latively higher tax rates. Especially, the Scappoose 
school district's property tax rate for public schools 
would increase approximately 27 percent. (Figure 29) 
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Relative to the present financing scheme, the inverse 
relationship between the public school property t~~ rates 
and per pupil property cash values under the available 
\.,realth equalization plan would become less strongly cor-
related. Lr= -.61 would decrease to r= -.427 (Figure 29) 
Accordingly, under this financing option school district 
property tax rates \'iould be determined to a lesser extent 
by the per pupil property cash values of school districts. 
Because of this financing model's emphasis on the municipal 
overburden-based state aid distribution criterion, the 
property tax rates would be determined to a lesser degree 
by the per pupil property wealth of the school districts. 
state Aid Distribution 
Analysis of per pupil state aid distribution indicates 
that, relative to the present public school finance scheme, 
under the available wealth equalization plan the level of 
state aid distribution would increase considerably for 
most, and would decrease slightly for some, school districts. 
(Figu.re 30) J?or e:mmple, under the available wealth equali-
zation plan all except three sample school districts would 
receive relatively more per pupil state aid. The urban 
school. districts of David Douglas: Par}:rose and Portland, 
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especially, would be the recipients of sUbstantial increases 
in state aid distribution. On the other hand, three sub-
urban school districts, 'dest Linn, St. Helens and Tigard, 
would receive relatively less per pupil state aid. The 
state aid redistribution aspects of the available wealth 
equalization plan would make the urban school districts 
relatively better off at the expense of suburban school 
districts. From an income redistribution perspective this 
fin~~cing option mru~es the state funds increasingly avai-
lable to property-ricn but income-~oG~ school districts 
at the expense of property-poor but income-rich suburb~~ 
school districts. 
Under the avail&ble wealth equalization plan, the 
inverse linear relationship bet\'1een "Oer Duuil state aid 
- ....0.: .... 
to school districts and per pupil property cash values of 
school districts would become less strongly correlated. 
Lr= -.78 would decrease to r= 0.5g7 (Figure 30) Concur-
rently, under this financing option, per pupil state aid 
distribution \vould be determined to a lesser extent by 
per pupil property cash values of school districts o (Fig-
ure 30) Primarily because of its designed purpose to talee 
the municipal overburden situation into account, this fin-
ancing modells state aid distribution is based more on 
the local m~l~cipal overburden ~atios th~~ on local per 
pupil property wealth. A major result of the implementation 
of this financing model would be reallocation of resources 
fro:n suourba.:u. to urban a:nd, to a lesser extent, to rural 
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school districts. This reduces the current inequities in 
state aid distribution which favor suburb~~ and rural 
districts over urban ones. 
Tax Burden Redistribution 
Analysis of the horizontal t~~ burden redistribution 
under the available wealth equalization plan indicates 
that, relative to the present financing scheme, the degree 
of variations in the levels of tax payments among the 
equally-circumstanced ta"'qJayers \'Iould slightly decrease. 
(Table x:v) 
The relative decrease in variations in tax payments 
among equally-circumstanced ta~ayers is not significant 
to SUbstantiate a movement toward horizontal tax burden 
distribution equity. (Table XV and Figure 31) ~or example, 
as illustrated in Figure 31, "taxpayer-2" ($4,000.00 in-
come; five-member family; renter) living in Corbett School 
District under the available wealth equalization plan would 
pay 9.78 percent of his/her income to finance public schools 
as compared i,'1ith 10.7 percent under the present financing 
form. On the other hand, i::l the 1m-fer quadrant, under 
the available "real th equalization plan the taxpayers lo-
cated L'1 the Portl2..nd school district would pay the 10'.'fest 
percentage of public education taxes, 4.94 percent, as 
against the 5.5 percent public education tax paid by the 
taxpayers in st. Helens School District under the present 
fina..'1cing form. 
School 
Districts 
Corbo 
Dav.D. 
Beav. 
Ore.C. 
Park. 
W.Linn 
Lake O. 
Banks 
F.Grov. 
Reyn. 
Port. 
Shere 
Scapp. 
Tigard 
St.Hel. 
Mean 
5.59 - 5. '14-
$4,000 
75-76 AWE 
TABLE XV 
'TAX BURDEN DISTRIBUTION*--AVAlLABLE 
WEALTH EQUALIZATION PLAN (AWE) 
Public Education Tax As Percent of Income 
$8,000 $12,000 $18,000 $25,000 
75-76 AvlE 75-76 A\'lE 75-76 A\VE 75-76 AWE 
$35,000 
75-76 AWE 
- - - ~ - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7.65 - 6.90 7.02 - 6.53 6.34 - 5.95 6.41 - 6.07 7.15-6.76 6.97-6.61 
7.12 - 5.59 6.42 - 5.40 5.80 - 4.9B 5.87 - 5.15 6.56-5.75 6.42 - 5.65 
7.07 - 5.68 6.52 - 5 .. 59 5.91 - 5.16 6.00 - 5.34 6.69 - 5.96 6.54 - 5.84 
6.57 - 4.40 6.19 - 4.72 5.65 - 4.47 5.78 .- 4.72 6.44 - 5.26 6.30 - 5.18 
6.02-4.78 5.69 - 4.84 5.22 - 4.53 5.36·-4.74 5.98 - 5.30 5.87-5.21 
6.15 - 6.38 6.19 - 6.34 5.71 - 5.83 5.88 - 5.99 6.56 - 6.68 6.42 - 6.53 
5.87 - 5.10 5.84- 5.32 5.40 - 4.98 5.57--5.19 6.21 - 5.80 6.08-5.69 
5.71 - 4.58 5.74 - 4.97 5.31-4.70 5.50 - 4.94, 6.13 - 5.52 6.01-5.43 
5.66 - 4.09 6.03- 4.99 5.67 - 4.80 5.84 - 5.11 6.51-5.70 6.37 - 5.59 
4.85- 3.91 5.06 - 4.41 4.76 - 4.23 4.98-4.51 .5.56-5.03 5.47-4.96 
4.57 - 3.39 4.68 - 3.84 4.40- 3.72 4.63 - 4.00 5.17 - 4.48 5.09 - 4.43 
4.75 - 3.93 5.35 - 4.80 5.07 - 4.63 5.33 - 4.94- 5.95-5.51 5.84 - 5.42 
4.11-6.02 4.87-6.14 4.67 - 5.68 4.96 - 5.86 5.54 - 6.54 5.44 - 6.40 
4.04 - 4.21 4.74 - 4.(36 4.55-4.64 4.84 - 4.92 5.40 - 5.50 5.31 - 5.40 
3.34 - 4.27 4.27 - 4.93 4.18-4.71 4.51 - 4.99 5.04-5.57 4.97 - 5.47 
- - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5.57 - 4.88 5.64 - 5.18 5.24 - 4.87 5.43-5.10 6.06 - 5.69 5.94-5.59 
Stand.Dev. 2.17 - 1.95 1.00 - 0.91 0.720 0 .67 0.64 - o. Ci2 0.78- 0 .75 0.80 - 0.77 
1 .27 -1.18 
*By representative taxpayer income groups 
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Under the available '!fleal th equalization plan the 
inverse relationship between public education tax pay-
ments as percent of income and per pupil property cash 
values of school districts \'/ould become less strongly 
correlated. {r= -.55 would decrease to r= -.4r£! (Fig-
178 
ure 31) Accordingly, ~~der this financing option the hori-
zontal tax burden distribution inequities itlOuld be deter-
mined to a lesser extent by the per pupil property \'/eal th 
of the school districts. 
To determine t!:e degree of vertical tax burden redis-
tribution, the sample school districts' composite pattern 
of public education tax payments as a percent of income 
under the available wealth equalization plan was compared 
to the present vertical tax burden distribution patterns. 
(Figure 32) It is evident that under the available \'leal th 
equalization plan the level of public education t~{es 
would decrease for all categories of t~~ayers. However~ 
from a vertical tax burden redistribution perspective 
the change in correlation val'.le, f:rom -0.08 to -0.05 
is insignificant. Accordingly, analysis of the public 
education tax payments as a percent of income by the same 
set of ta::::payers under the available ".'leal th equalization 
plan indicates no significant c!J.a...~ge in the existing 
vertical ta.""{ burden distribution pattern, .... v"hich is a 
no-pattern distribution in terms of reg=essivity-pro-
gressivity continuum. 
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Summary of Tllajor Findings 
This chapter presented the reform alternatives within 
the presently-operating public school finance system. 
In accordance with the hJ~otheses and postulates of this 
research, and \,lithin the parameters and limitations there-
upon, the impleI1entation of reforms \·ri thin the present 
system of public school finance \'/ould result in the fol-
lowing changes: 
1. School District Pronerty Tax ~ates~ 
a. The inverse relationship between the pro:p8r'ty tax 
rates and the per pupil property cash values of school 
district would become less strongly correlated under the 
foundation phase-in and the available \'leal th equalization 
plans. 
b. Under the local guaranteed yield and the total tax 
effort equalization plans the inverse relatiOl:ship between 
the property tax rates and the per pupil property cash 
values of school districts would become statistically 
insignificant at the .05 lev·elo 
~. §tate Aid to 3chool Districts: 
a. The inverse relationship bet\·reen the per pupil state 
aid distribution to school districts and per pupil property 
cash values of the school districts would become more 
strongly correlated under the foundation phase-in, local 
guaranteed yield 8.:ld total ta..~ effort equalization plans. 
b. Under the available wealth equalization plan the in-
verse r8~ationship between the per pupil state aid to school 
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districts and :ger pupil property cash values of school dis-
tricts would become less strongly correlated. 
3. Horizontal Tax Burden Distribution: 
a. The inverse relationship between the variations 
in the level of tax payments of income among the equally-
circumstanced taA~ayers and the per pupil property cash 
values of school districts '\'lould become less strongly cor-
related under the foundation phase-in and the available 
wealth equalization plans. 
b. Under the local guaranteed yield a..""1.d the total tax 
effort equalization plans, the inverse relationship be-
tWeen the variations in the level of tax paJ~ents among 
the equa~ly-circumstanced taA~ayers and the per pupil 
property cash values would become statistically insig-
nificant at the .05 level. 
c. Under any of tr..e reform \,li thin the present system 
alternatives, the variations in the level of pablic edu-
cation tax payments a:i:long the equally-circumstanced ta.:-~­
payers would not signiiica.."'1tly change to substantiate a 
movement toward a horizontal tax burden distribution equity-
based revenue system. 
4. Vertical Tax Burden Distribution: 
a. Relative to federal income tax progressivity levels, 
the total t~{ effort equali3ation ~lan's progressivity in 
terms of pubJ.ic education tax pa:t-ments would not be suf-
ficient to verify a substantial movement toward a vertical 
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tax burden equity-based public education revenue structure. 
b. Under the foundation phase-in, the local ~~aranteed 
yield and the available wealth equalization plans, there 
would be no significant change in the existing vertical 
tax burden distribution pattern, \'Thich is a no-pattern 
distribution in terms of a regressivity-~rogressivity 
continuum. 
CHAPTER VI 
INCREASED STATE SUPPORT 
The second major alternative to reform the financing of 
public schools considered by this study is based on increas-
ing the state's share of support. During the 1975-1976 
school year, the state support to school districts amounted 
to approximately 30 percent of the total revenues for public 
schools. Oregon is one of the few states with less than 35 
percent support for public schools. Also, the level of state 
equalization for the 1975-1976 school year was less than 20 
percent of the total state aid to public schools. (State 
of Oregon Department of Education, 1976) 
Depending upon the magnitude, increasing the state's 
share in supporting public schools may result in reduction 
of the inequities in revenue capacities among school dis-
tricts. Research and studies on this subject have indi-
cated that the higher the state's share for public schools, 
the less become the expenditure disparities among school 
districts. (Michelson, 1974; Levin, 1972; Briley, 1971; 
Rossmiller, 1971; and Johns, 1971) Furthermore, a major 
study by the National Education Finance Project reported 
that increasing the state's responsibility for f~~ding 
its schools' support program would result L~ relatively 
greater financial equalization among school districts. 
(NEFF, Vol. 5, 1971, p.249) However, a simple marginal 
increase in the level of state support may not accomplish 
much in terms of subst~~tial fiscal equalization among 
school districts. As indicated by the N.E.F. Project, 
a state may advance toward relatively greater equali-
zation of the financial resources available to school 
districts when it: 
.1. Increases the percent of school re-
venue provided from state sources. 
2. Apportions the state funds available 
in inverse proportion to the taxpaying abil-
ity of local school districts. 
3. Hakes allm .... ance in its aPDortionment 
formula for the necessary variations in cost 
per unit of educational need. (~~?P, 1971, 
p.246) 
The j.977 Oregon state Legislature increased the 
leVel of state support to public schools from 30 to 40 
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percent of the total cost of operational expe:r:ditures, 
effective the 1978-1979 school year. (Oregon 3tate House 
3209, 1977) ~he state Legislature also made cer-
'-' 
tain changes in the state aiddistribution formulas. 
A nel" distribution formula \vill be in ef-
fect the second of the bie~~~ium (1978-1979) 
which will place greater emphasis on eClual~ 
izing property ta:~ effor-:; bet~leen scne'ol dis-
tricts. The state will also participate in 
the funding of progra~ costs up to the ztate-
wide average. ~his should result in signi-
fic~~t state revenue gains for all but a 
handful of school districts in the state • 
••• However, a save harmless 1?rovision was 
included in the 1m', at OSBA (Oregon School 
Boards Association) requ.est ';;hich provides 
that no district will receive less ~oney 
from th'3 state than they did in 1977-1978. 
(OSBA LeglGlative Reryort, 1977, p.1) 
The approved state aid distribution formula prc-
vides each school district with a basic grar.t equal to 
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30 percent of the district's per pupil operational ex~en-
diture up to the statewide average. (Oregon Department 
of ~ducation, 1977 j p.6) These basic grant pay~ents 
would COnS1JJl1e some 67 percent of the basic state support 
fund. The remainder would be distributed to school dis-
tricts according to their relative property 'I,'lealth and 
tax effort. The e~ualization proportion of the state 
aid distribution formula indicates an. increase from 18 
percent of the present formula to 33 percent. (OSBA, 
~~gislative ReDort, 1977, p.13) 
School District Pronerty Tax ne.tes 
The property tax rates among school district~3 undt?r 
the increased state support financing alternatiYe 'vould 
decrease considerably for all school dis-crict8 exceJ;lt 
Portland, i'ihere the property tax rate would remaiy.:. n:e 
sa~e. (Figure 33) In actuality, if the increased sta~2 
SUPPOl.,t alternative were not coupled vrith a s2"ve-harmle.ss 
proYisicn, the Portland school district would. have to 
raise its property tax rate. On the other h8..J.'1d, the 
rural Corbett School District's property tax rate would 
decrease from 23.25 to 12.56, a 46 percent decrease. 
Also:; the Scappoose school district's tax rate 'I,'lould de-
a 41 percent decrease. 
eVer, as indi0ated by the data, t:he decrease in tax rates 
wou.ld be ::'elatively less in suburban and urban districts. 
For example, as compared v:ith the 46 percent decrease in 
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Corbett School District a~d the 41 percent decrease in 
Scappoose School District, property tax rates would. be 
reduced 16 and 10 percent in Beaverton an.d Tigard School 
Districts, respectively. Purthermore, the property tax 
rates would be reduced only 17 perce!1~ in :David Douglas 
and 14 percent in Parl~ose School Districts. Zvidently: 
the rural school districts wou.ld benefit the most, in 
terms of property tax reduction, fo110 .... ;8d by urb2.n fringe 
school districts ~~d suburb~~ school districts. The only 
sC:1ccl district ·~·r!":.':'c!'l ~.'lOuld appear to 19se as 2. :::-8sult of 
the change is Portland .3chool District. Although at the 
inj.tial stage a sa7e-·haJ.:nless provision might diminish 
the apparent cost increases in urban central school dis-
trict operations resulting from lower levels of state 
aid, Portland 3chool District ~ relative to the preS2!lt 
financing scheme, \'.'oll.ld :have to rely i!1creasingly 111o::'e 
on its ~ropertv tax base. _ u 
Under the present financing scheme the variations 
in local school district property ta.,X rates were signifi-
cantly and negatively correlated to the school district 
per pupil.property cash values. Lr= -0617 (Fig~re 23) 
This IDeans that, under the present financing scheme, the 
the higher the per pupil property wealth a school dis-
trict nas, the. lower is the property tax re.te in fin-
ancing public schools. Increasing the state support 
level from 30 to 40 percent, coupled. ivi th increasing 
sta~e 9Clua.J .. ization aid, appears to ::-8 suIt ill a 
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statistically insignificant (at the .05 level) and weak pos-
itive correlation between local school district property 
tax rates and per pupil property cash values. 8= +.22.7 
(Figtrre 33) Under the increasad state support alternative 
and contrary to the present situation, the higher t11e 
per pupil property ':lealth of a school district, the higher 
would be the property tax rate in financing public schools.* 
This · .... 'ould put the l"ural school districts in the Portland 
metropolitan area. in a relativel~T advantageou.s position.** 
On the other h[-:-'1d, the inc:::OGe.sed state s"..1.pport alternatiYe 
,'IQuld place the urba..'1 and suburban school districts wi t11 
high per pupil property wealth in- a. l,'elatively disadvan-
t ....... ageous pos~vlon. 
State Aid j)istri'bution 
The anal;:,rsis of per pupil st2.te aid distribution 
indicates that, relative to the present public school 
f · , ll1anc e sc.r~e!:1a, under the increased state support alter-
native the level of state aid dist=ibution would increase 
substantially for all scheol districts except ?ortla..id. 
(Figures 34 and 35) Because the state e~ualization aid 
is based on :per pupil property v:ealth and property tax 
effort, school districts \-lith relatively 10'11 per pupil 
property '.'1e2.1 th at'.:.d greater property ta}: effort 2,:'e 
*'1'-0. t,..... ... .,:-' ..1..'. ",ol-..L.4 ~. -,... _.,..L t t..; .... ..t..i l'"t- ,..,ic- . 
• .b;v ~n .1..:.0 :,. •• :.~n vn~s 1: ..... c:1.lI..:..onsnlp ~..:> J._o v S a ..... i:> v_ca~..:..j '.)-6n~-
f;c~n'" a ..... +'.ne 05 10i7e' t.ho di -'-'oc.l-J.· en of' .J-·hF! "'-n':>"" at=. ''''ela-'-'; 'r:::. ... cw. II t" v •• t."..;.. , '" ~ _ ..... "" IJ _. \I _ l,; ~-O'" _ U .;.. ". 
to the present financing situation, would support this assumption. 
**This may net hold tr~e for a:l rural school districts 
in the state, especially thOSE: '<'lith 8. small student Dcd~r. 
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receiving relatively greater per pupil equalization aid from 
the state. Figures 34 a..'1d 35 illustyate that the rural 
school districts of Garbett, Danks, Forest Grove and Sca-
p:poose would be the recipients of relatively greater 
marginal increases of state aid when compared to the state 
aid receipts of the urban fringe and subvxbsn school dis-
tricts. 
'iii thout a save-harmless pl"ovision, the state aid re-
distribl.l.tive aspects of the increased state support a1 teI'-
native ':TOuld make the urban 20rtland scheol district 
relatively \'lorse off. The enactment of a save-harmless 
provision which :prevents possible reducticns in state aid 
to urban central school districts i-lould also prevent a 
property tax rate increase. EO\-leVer, when the re suI ta.."'lt 
cost burden distriol.'i.tion of increasing state SUpP01 .. t to 
public schools is taken into considi~ration, the ta:~3.yeys 
in rl.2:'ban central school d.istricts viOuld dei'initel~~ 08 
in relatively ..,-/Orse p08i tions. Such policy ChaJlge, \'/hi19 
"10+ _in''''r~8.r~_inor. +}18 bp-neJ..'::-_'its in +'P-·""""".""s o-F' """""1'" ~o'p;l ·"e'-",::,;·o+.q 
......... _ '" __ .  v_ _ .J- v_.J--''''' ... .!!'~_ .!!_~_.l.._ ~ ''-''''-1 v~, 
vlOuld increase the urban ta..'\."':payers I contributions to the 
financing of public schools in the state. Since tl:.e i11-
creased state support alternative desitSned. by th& Cregon 
Legislature does not propose a state income tax increase, 
th3 overall "ta:c burden for the u:cba.."rl central ta::.;Jayer3 
would remair.:. the S&118. finance the 
L"'lcreased suppc,rt to 9ub1ic schools, the state WO"...1.ld have 
to reallocate f1..w."'1cS f~"OB noneG.1..waticll -;;0 ed"lcation-re1ated 
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services. Juch budgetary reallocations '.'lould increas2 the 
portion of state gene=al fID1ds to be allocated fer support 
of public schools. ;;.~ Concomi t~"'1.tly, this ':louIe.. re ;:ml t i~ 
a marginal increase in public education tax burden for 
the u=ban central ta:-:payer ':ri thout an increase in benefits. 
The relationship bet..,.,een p,:;r pupil state aid and per 
pupil property cash values indicates that, relative to 
the pre SG::lt financing scheme, l.md':::2 the • .....L.. ..L. ~ncreaseCl S lJalie 
support altel~natiY8 the per PUI)il state aid distribution 
pattern '\-lould not change. LTD -.78 ".'!ould decrease to 
~ .... _- -.7_"',7 (-:-,." ';g'·lre ~~) ~~ d." .1." d t.1. .J... 
'" ~.J...~. _'~ un er vne ~ncrease save supporv 
mod·::l the more per :9upil property weal"tb. a school district 
has, the less per pupil state aid it would :::,ece~ve. The 
equalization aspect of this financing alte=native has 
beer.. designed to mininize the differences L"'l taxable pro-
p8rty w82..1th capacities among school districts. The im-
plementation of the increased state support alternativG 
would r2sult in decreased state aid distrib.utior.. i:-LeCluities. 
From ~"'l inccme red~st:::,ib~ticn yerspective, this finx~cing 
al te:cnative ';vould still ::lake the state fu ... "1uS a"'Tailuble to 
property-poor but incoJ?!e-rich school districts at the 
e:q)~ns'3 of inccme-poor but nToD:?rt";?'-:;:'ic':l school d.istricts. ~ ... " 
J..nalysis o~ the horizontal tax burd·en redistribution 
~~Under this fLlancing illodel the state fU.1:lds to support 
" I" hI' -, . ......,.- . .., t A A 3 .J... f' DUO ~c SC 00 S wOU.J...Q lncrease Iro~ ~).~ 0 ~~. percenu OL 
th=:- state eene=a.l funds' budget. 
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indicates that, relative to the p::'esent situation, 1L."'1der 
the increas.:?d state support financing alternative varia-
tions in the level of tax Davments amon.!=': the equallv·-cir-J", v _  
c1.U:lStanced ta.x:paye:::-s \'lOuld dec-rease slightly. The var-
iatio!!.s in :public education tax pa:.rments as percent of 
income p::08sellted in Table ATI indicate that the hori-
zontal tax burden di3tribution inequities under the in-
creased state support alternativ3 'dould be lessenc::d. 
in the S8..:!l8 tabls, that differ::mce 
inc 0:-.,·-:-
the ::::4, 000.00 taxpayex inc ome grou:p would va::::i f:::-om. a 101.'1 
of 1.66 in ;:Jcappoose to a hiSh of 5.75 in 3eav:3rton 3chool 
District. Furthern:ore, it is illustre.t2d in ?i.:; .... ;.re 
+:11~t rl+:~''""''"'~'''-~r 'll! v_ a.. v  ... ,,-~c.~,,; c -,- (':;;4,OOO.CO income; :ive-membe::- f::o:nily; 
renter) living in Beaverton School District ','[auld pa:/ 
as against the 3.22 percent :pc-del by the 8C2.1).ally-circ'u..:'"'l-
3tanced taxpayer livinS in Sca~poo2e School :Jistrict. 
Ther·2fore , it iS2vident that under the i~creaGed st2.te 
S1.:l.pport alternative, even though rela-:i-\:'"e to the present 
fina~cing sc~eme it is reduced; the level of horizontal 
ta::: o·urden distri'Jution ineql.J,its'" iIOU.Ie. still be S1J.bst2.J.1-
tial. 
Under the present financing form, a.."'1a1s"sis has indi-
between horizont2.1 ta:-: burden distribution and the school 
~.istrict per pupil pror>erty i',·:::alth. L- ..,. r= -.521 (:5'igure . 
TABIJE XVI 
TAX BURDEN DISTRIBUTION*--INCREASED 
STATE SUPPORT (ISS) 
Public Education Tax As Percent of Income 
School $4,000 $8,000 $12,000 $18,000 $25,000 $35,000 
Districts 75-76 ISS 75-76 ISS 75-76 ISS 75-76 ISS 75-76 ISS 75-76 ISS 
Corbo 
Dav.D. 
Beav. 
Ore.C. 
Park. 
W.Linn 
Lake O. 
Banks 
F.Grov. 
Reyn. 
Port. 
Shere 
ScaPPa 
Tigard 
St.Rel. 
i'Iean 
5.59 - 4.79 
7.65 - 3.28 7.02 - 4.25 6.34 - 4.28 6.41 - 4.72 7.15 - 5.29 6.97 - 5.27 
7.12-4.886.42-5.155.80-4.895.87-5.26 6.56-5.906.42-5.84 
7.07- 5.75 6.52- 5.86 5.91- 5.54 6.00- 5.84 6.69-6.54 6.54-6.45 
6.57-4.216.19-4.845.65-4.725.78-5.10 6.44-5.726.30-5.67 
6.02 - 5.05 5.69 - 5.29 5.22 - 5 005 5.36 - 5036 5.98 - 6.00 5.87 - 5.95 
6 0 15 - 5.18 6.19 - 5.83 5.71 - 5.59 5.88 - 5.94 6.56 - 6.64 6.42 - 6.55 
5.87 - 4.24 5.84 - 4.99 5.40 - 4.85 5.57 - 5.27 6.21 - 5.90 6.08 - 5.84 
5.71-4.06 5.74-4.795.31-4.715.50-5.12 6.13-5.74 6.01-5.69 
5.66 - 4.32 6.03 - 5.01 5.67 - 4.88 5.84 - 5.27 6.51 - 5.90 6.37 - 5.84 
4.85-3.795.06-:1-.564.76-4.514.98-4.91 5.56-5.51 5.47-5.47 
4.57 - 4.76 4.68 - 5.00 4.40 - 4.81 4.63 - 5.16 5.17 - 5.79 5.09 - 5.73 
4,,75 - 3.66 5.35 - 4.86 5.07 - 4.84 5.33 - 5.29 5.95 - 5.93 5.84 - 5.87 
4.11-1.664 0 87-3.364.67-3.594.96-4.13 5.54-4.64 5.44-4.64 
4.04 - 3.50 4.74 - 4.54 4.55 - 4.60 4.84 - 5.04 5.40 - 5.65 5.31 - 5.61 
3.34 - 2.38 4.27 - 3.88 4.18 - 4.01 4.51 - 4.5~~ 5.04 - 5.07 4.97 - 5.06 
5.57 - 4.04 5.64 - 4.50 5.24 - 4.72 5.43 - 5.13 6.06 - 5.75 5.94 - 5.70 
Stand.Dev. 2.17- 1.44 1.00- 0.67 0.7200.39 0.64- 0.38 0.78-0.42 0.80-0.50 
1.27-0.83 
*By representative taxpayer income grou.ps 
..J. 
\0 
.~ 
195 
36) This relationshin is statisticall iT insio!"T'".!1ificant at 
• v 
the .05 significance level. Nevertheless, from. a com-
parative perspective the incre~sed state support altar-
native would make the horizontal tax burden distribution 
relatively less responsive to the school district property 
wealth and relatively more responsive to the tax. efforts 
and level of expenditures of the school districts. The 
primary cause of this is the criterion upon which the 
state aid to school districts is distributed. Because 
it would be advantageous for school districts to ShOTd 
greater tax effort to raise their level of operational 
expenditur",;s to t:!1e state"'!ide level 1.:G.lder this financi11g 
!:lodel, future horizontal tax burd en in '2 '11.1.i tie S '.'!Culd be 
deter:nined, not only l)jT t~8 pe::.:' pupil property '>'isalth of 
the districts, but also by the school districts' =esponses 
to state aid forT:lulas. ~~lis in tu:'n \,/ct:.ld ::2i:1i:-.:i:':2 the 
overall differences in oDer-ational eZ-:Jenditl~.re lev'21s 
- ... 
e~lJ.alization :?rocedu1:'a, wi t:'lout an et;.i.:ti ty-b2.s'2ci t<;.:: b"C.:'-
den dist=ibutio:::1 polic:!, 'doulo. scI ve onlj· a se&=",e~t of the 
:problem inherent to financing public schools. 
:J8 spite the faot that th'2 "hC'::.:'izon-:'a.l ta ..:: bu::.'c..en 
ine~lity situation wo~ld not be :,~medied un~e~ this fin-
2..."1cing al te:rnati ve, tbe cha."1ge in the :-celati.::;nshi~ 8et·,teen 
the ""ub'ic e"::uca.L.; on +::'1" ,...,C' ~ 'Dc'Y''"'''n.Jo o_~ J.·.·.~._com·., e a·.l1,l 7:'.r.Le .!:' ..L...... U. " !" _ v c.;..j. O •. J '_ 1"~ ~ 'J c:: _ I.J , _ v -
Per TI.l;uuil nronert-c? wealth of i3chocl diztrj.c~s indicates 
.... . .... ..' 
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district s. For in.stance, lL~cler th~ 11J::'8 sent i'in2ncing 
faIT}., t:1.? t8,:Qa~'ers in 10'.'1 per pupil property l"lee..l tIl .SChODl 
district s, such 2..G ,Joroett and ]or3 st GraYs, are OV2r-
r'~l .J-~,,::, o'!-'},o"Y> n' and "~:nri::.-(' V~ v..&._'-' V-l..I..'_..L. , \.A....l. __ • __ the increased state 8~pport al-
ternative this l"'elatively heavy tax burden ':To:":.lc1. be shifted 
to school districts '.'ri th hiGher pe:;:o pupil property wealth, 
such as 3eaverton and ;1est Linn. (Jigilre 36) For ex-
anple, :i:able ~01I illu.strates th8.t for t;16 :)4,000.00 and 
"l'lOuld be lm'ler , relative to the present fh:211Cir:.8 scheme, 
except in ?ortland. School District. I!l the ;~12 ,000.00 
ta:::payer l.r~~O!D.'3 g::,ou~ ,Ti.c;2.::-d ':chool District, in. acldi tion 
to Portland, indicates as increased tax burden fa::" this 
taJ:payer income group. -11"1 .!..'nr::> ":-1 f'"' 00('. 00 .J....., __ ."\~y""_.., __ lJ ..,. ~t'IO,) v. vc....;~ . ..t'ct._- inCOrG8 
gro~J.J? I t\·/o Dare school districts, St. Helens and ·J'.:::;t 
Lil'L11, indicate 2.:1 ir~creased ta::;: burc.en. In the :~25,OGG .00 
school 
3her'.'lood. respecti V'ely I \'iould b,~ 
burdened \'li th increased public school taxes. Also, a.t 
thz ;'?35,OOO.OO ta:Qayer income level si:,: out of 1 5 S2.:np J.8 
school districts have 8..:1 inc::::'e8.sed bu::-den ll.:.'1der 
~'1cing alternative.* This is primarily due to the 33 per-
cent increase in the statels share in funding public 
*In relative terms, at the $35,000.00 income level two 
school dist~icts, Portl~'1d 9ILd Tigard, appear to have the 
gre2.test increases in ta..~ burder./.o 
schools. It is apparent that, relative to the present 
i'inancing form, a greater portion of funds for public 
schools would be provided from relatively pro~ressive 
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state inco~e taxes. This \·muld result in higher ta..--x: bur-
dens i'or high income ta.xpayers residing in school districts 
with relatiV"el-y less Der DUDil state aid. ~ .... 
In o~der to determine the degree of vertical tax 
burden redistribl.l.tion, th0 s8J11ple school districts' com-
posite :pattern of Dublic 
... 
education tax payDents, a rer-
cent of incc:::,::; l.L"'1de~ t~1.e increo.;:ed 
has been co~p2.red to -!;he prGsG~t vertical te.:: burder-'. dis-
+- ., ..:... t' vrlCUvlon pa ~erne C..,· ~7' J:' l.gure ) ) 
fina2lci:!lZ c~l t8:::'l1ctti vo the level 
ation raises the question: 
tl:2 ?1.lblic 
Gr.der the in.creCl.sed 
of Jtl.b1ic educatiol': to.:-:-
... 
it possible to finm,-~e 
18V"e18 of 
thG usage 0:7: e:z:cess state fUJ.'1ds and the cha.!L"1.'sllin8 of 
federal revenuc-sh.e.::-ing ii.mds to cO!!1pensate for the 
ference :i.n total re"T2nU8 ca:paci t~r in fino,ncin:::; ::,ublic 
schools resulting from the inc:::'eased state St).]lJOrt. 
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~t ".1 ('.00 GO,· -"'.,.. ~,-, t 4 t::'o . ..t- ,-L- "0 (,J'C 00· c<. 0;,'. ,,) .), -l._om ~.o4 0 • ..; )ercenv 8.v ·,?v,UI.). , 
from 5. !i-3 to 
5.13 percent at 018,000.00; frOD 6.06 to at 
""')'- oon 00 ' 
.,;',--:J, -v. ; anCl from 5.94 to 5.70 ]3::,cent 2.t the :~35,OOO.OO 
inco:ne level& 
Under this fin8.J2cing r:lOd'31 the overall t2.X burden 
r'eduction is coupled \'lith a recognizable increase in the 
leyel of t2.X burden progressivity. P::'om a ve~C'tical ta:: 
the cl:'2l:..ge in correlatio:l 
value from -0.08 to -0.45 does not i~dicate a .. ,. • • ..L. -. "'''+-ae I J.TU IJ e S.n::"I v 
education. purp02es. (Figure 37) 
education te.:: y::'o-
gressi vi ty VTOi.1.1d not c:_~_f:i.ce to S~J.b st2..:."'1tiate 2. Y2::-ticaJ. 
tax burden e1uj:t:-r-b~'_se0. :public educati.on revenue structure. 
of Vertical ta::: oIJ.rd'3n :progr2 ssi vi ty ,'lOuld ~ustif~T further 
increases in the level of state SU1)nort to public scl:ool 
...... 
syste:!ls. 
,..., .co th ~.. - . ,. ;;:;UT:1.mary 0 I e .!.'la:Jor '::'lnalngs 
This chapter presented the local pro:!!erty te.}:, the 
state aid distribution and the tax bUI'c.en redistribution-
related finding;:; of the increased state sUl>port financing 
alternative. 1;:1 accordance with the hypotheses a..."'1d pos-
tulates of this research, a.nd wi thin the p2"raneters and 
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limitations ther8upon, the implementation of the public 
school financin8 policy alternati"'le, increased sta.te 
support, would result, relative to the present financing 
schene, in the fo110'.'ring changes: 
a. Local public school property tax rates \'ro'lld de-
crease considerably for all school distrir:!ts e:xcept Pcrt-
laJld. 
b. The rural school districts in the Portlar..C: metro-
polit~~ area would benefit the most in ter~s o~ public 
school property ta~ reduction 
c. !:::.creC':.sh1s.:; the state support leyel, cou]l-:=-:d vii th 
correlation b0tween 
pro:pe~t:T t8.~;: ra:tes and. ::!i:;~::' IJi.J_pil property cash va.lues 
of school districts. 
2. State Aid Di2trihutio~: 
a. The level of st2ta aid distribution woul~ increase 
substantially for all 3chool districts e:-:cept :fo~ctl"~v~_. 
b. Th8 r~)_r2.J_ SC11001 cUstrict:3 in t}l; ?ortlill1c. lJetro-
poli ta..rl arG8. ','TQuld. oe the r8cipient~3 of "\~,:::~ 1 ~..:.... i '"':T,~ 1 -1" r.-n ~ ~ 4-- .~"Y' .... ___ ..I_V ... _~. o-· ... _"v_-
of stat-e 2.1c1.: 
st2.t-2- aid distribn-:;ion to school districts 21d ~t:;:: Pll~;~_l 
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Eo~izor:t~~l ~a:?: 31.lro .. e!1. Distribl.ttio:~: 
eclucatio::1 
tEt:': as 8. percent of i.ncone of equally-circl1.:~1.'3t2.nced taz-
districts \'rou1o. becone consid.e:::,abl~T less corre12.ted. 
b. S:he reduction in va1. ... j,ation i~1 tax pe.j'"!!lent vio .... J.1d 
be insiDlific2.nt to substa."1tiate a r:lOver::18nt to'.\rard h03:'i-
~.. Vertical T2.X 3:..U'Qe:'.1 :Jistx-ibution: 
a. ?\.elati'l2 to the present 8i tU2.tion 2.nd -the inc:-C'2aseci 
b. It i3 evident that the incr2E.28 in the st2.te t s 
3ha~('8 in financi:::lg public s8hoo18 frOD 30 to 40 percent 
1,'Tould not substantiate successful 
grsssiv2 inracts of t~2 local school dj.st:::-ict 'proPert:~ 
ta:ze:3 on individual ta:cpayers 0 
c. Relative to the federal i::,~come ta:;;: progressivity 
level, the increased state financing alt.ernative's pro-
gressivity would not be strong enough to substantiate a 
vertical tax burden eQuity-based public education revenue 
structure. 
CHAPTER VII 
FULL STATE FUNDING 
Under this alternative solution to the problem of fin-
ancing public schools, the state would provide all of the 
funds needed to operate primary and secondary public edu-
cation. Studies by Johns, 1973, Alexander, 1973, Berke, 1974 
and Benson, 1974 indicate a strong rationale for supporting 
full state funding of public education as the solution to 
the existing inequalities in educational opportunity and the 
inequities inherent to the existing system of cost allocation. 
There are many arguments against the full state as-
sumption of iinancLig public schools. One of the basic 
arguments is that local control over primary and secondary 
educational policy-making congruently will be diminished. 
Full state financing of public schools may curtail the 
flexibility of school district decision-making by estab-
lishing and controlling the level of expenditures. 
Opposing full state assumption of public education 
finance, Harvey Brazer emphasized that total state pro-
vision of funds, while allowing local school districts 
to decide ho\'l to spend the state-allocated monies, may 
not be realistic. (Brazer, 1970, p.245) Additionally, 
Richard Rossmiller argued that full state funding may eli-
minate the possibilities for educational experimentation 
and innovation~ (Rossmiller, 1973, pp.68-72) Evidently, 
under the full state funding alternative, a school district's 
ability to innovate and implement community-based 
programs '\'lOuld not be dependent upon the compliance of 
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local residents to pay for additional taxes. In a rather 
limited way, the school district1s ability to e~eriment 
with community-based programs will depend upon the budget-
ary manipulations within the predetermined level of re-
venues provided by the state. 
Responding to the demand for local control of public 
schools, some supporters of the full state funding alter-
native have suggested a relatively moderate financing 
model that permits limited local supplement. Hewever, it 
is the contention of many scholars that, if such local 
supplement is allowed, the existing differences in fiscal 
capacities between the wealthy and poor school districts 
may not be completely diminished. (Fleischm~~ Con~ission, 
1972) 
There are several advantages to the full state funding 
of public schools. Initially, full state funding would 
reduce and, in time, eliminate the range between the ex-
penditure levels of wealthy and poor school distric~s. 
A systematic effort to raise the level of 
expenditure L~ low e:~enditure districts is 
likely to be accompanied by monitoring by the 
state to insure the wise use of additional funds. 
\'lhile this may infringe on traditional local 
prerogatives, it will probably be necessary to 
assure state policy makers that school f'ands 
provideJ from,the g~neral revenues' of the state 
are not being 'Hasted. (Rossniller,1973, p.68) 
From an efficiency perspective, full state flmding 
of :;mblic schools may increase 10eal control. Under a 
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centralised financing system the individual school dis-
tricts' fiscal responsibility would shift from concen-
tration on procedures to raise revenues to concentration 
on efficient, effective ways to spend the allocated funds. 
Under the full state funding alternative the primary task 
of the school district ac~inistration would be to produce 
as much educational output as possible from a given amount 
of public resources. 
The full state funding alternative has a major ad-
v~~tage in terms of tax burden distribution equity. It 
would reduce the existing horizonta: and vertical tax 
burden inequities among individual taxpayers. Richard 
Rossmiller explained that full state funding \'Iould result 
in greater reliance on more productive and less regressive 
ta.."'{es and thus 11lould result in greater eq'lJ.i ty for ta;~­
payers. (Rossmiller, 1973, p.68) 
A..~-::I movement tm'la::-d a shift in the financ ing of public 
schools from local property to statewide taxes might en-
counter certain political obstructions. state legis-
lators may not approve of fu:l state funding if it causes 
substantial increases in the general level of tax levies, 
or if it imposes ne'll; taxes. HO\-/ever, trade-offs are pos-
sible to m~~e the full state ftmding alternative pol-
i tically more acceptable. For instance, j.n Oregon expanded 
income tax may be politically feasible if the local nro-
perty tax rates could be reduced sub stantially Q 
(Rossmiller, 1973, ,p.47) 
The probability of adoption of full state funding 
of public schools is greater in states ,·,herein a sub-
sta..."1tial proportion of the revenues are already provided 
by the state. Presently this is not the case in Oregon. 
Approximately 30 percent of total public school expendi-
tures is provided by the state. The state's share \'/ill 
be increased to 40 percent during the 1978-1979 school 
year. Future increases of the state's support level 
may make the full state funding financing alternative 
relatively more appealing and politically feasible o 
206 
The 1973 Oregon State Legislature, under the guidance 
of Governor Tom McCall, offered a sweeping reform of Ore-
gon's ta~ system. In substance, the Legislature approved 
the bill, terminating the financing of school districts 
by local property tax revenues primarily derived from 
residents of the local communities. This legislative en-
actment would have replaced the local property taxes for 
educational purposes by increasing other revenue sources, 
primarily taxes on personal income, income-producing pro-
perty and business profits. In total, this enactment 
would have virtually' aba...~doned the local property tax 
system as a revenue source for financing school district 
operations. 
The McCall Plan was approved by the Oregon State 
Legislature after heavy debates and politicking. However, 
subsequent to its amendment to the state constitution, 
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the voters of Oregon overwhelmingly rejected this policy 
measure in the May 1973 election. This measure would have 
shifted the decentralized method of financing public 
schools to a nearly full state assumption. Loss of 
local control and uncertainty about the effect of a mas-
sive tax shift from property taxes to ability-to-pay taxes 
led to the defeat of the McCall Plan. (Pierce, 1973, and 
Benson, 1974) 
Presently there are three basic tax approaches to 
the statewide finance of primary and secondary public 
education in Oregon. The first financing approach, under 
the full state funding alternative, would employ a state-
wide property tax to replace the local property taxes for 
public schools. This full state financing option would 
tax, state\'lide, both residential and income-earning real 
property to finance public schools. It would employ 
property tax refund criteria to decrease the tax burden 
on low income individuals and families. 
The second financing approach is based on the original 
McCall Plan of 1973, without local school district sup-
plement. This option is based on shifting the local 
financing of public schools to statewide business property 
tax and to personal income and business profit taxes~ 
This option maJl also employ property tax refund criteria 
to ease the noneducation property tax burden on low in-
come families and individuals. 
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The third approach to ~ir-ance the full state funding 
alternative is based totally on personal income and busi-
ness profit taxes. The state would finance primary and 
secondary public education from general funds acquired 
primarilY,from ability-to-pay taxes. This option may also 
use the property tax refund criterion to ease the local 
noneducation property tax burden on low income individuals 
and familie s. 
Income and State'odde ?ronerty Taxation 
This financing approach under the full state funding 
alternative is based on a revenue formation system composed 
of statewide property and income taxation. Under this 
financing option the statewide property t~{ation criterion 
would include t~~able residential as well as commercial 
and industrial properties. A statewide property tax rate 
for this financing option is estimated to be $10.00 per 
thousand dollar property cash ya~uee This figure is some-
what lower than the statewide average of $13.00 per thou-
sand dollar property cash value. (state of Oregon'De-
partment of Education, 1976) This is because this model 
was structured with the intention of shifting the financing 
of public schools to income-based ability-to-pay taxes. 
Therefore, it is estimated that a 26 percent increase 
in the state income tax schedules would equalize the 
revenues lost from the reduced level of property t~~ation 
for public schools. Furthe~~ore, under this option the 
state general funds' share to finance public schools 
,,,ould increase from 33.2 percent to 62.3 percent. 
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Analysis indicates that under this full state fin-
ancing option, because of the differences in municipal over-
burden ratios among the school districts, the property 
tax refund criterion \'/ould still influence the tax bur-
den distribution among the taxpayers. In Table VI (p.1 01 ) 
the sample school districts have been presented in a scale 
indicating relative m~~icipal overburden situations among 
districts. As expected, the urban school districts are 
situated in the high municipal overburden portion of the 
scale. On the other hand, most of the rural school dis-
tricts are situated in the low municipal overburden protion 
of the scale. Such differences in noneducation property 
tax rates among the local school districts vlould result 
j~ different proportimns of the property tax returns being 
a~plied to financing public schools. From a tax burden 
distribution perspective, this "'iould indicate a relatively 
heavier tax burden on urban taxpayers than on suburban and 
rural taxpayers. Although the magnitude of the differences 
in public education tax as a percent of income is minute, 
it would still result in horizontal tax burden distri-
bution i1'1equities. Figure 38 illustrates that "ta:A1'ayer-1 If 
($4,OOO~OO income; five-member family; homeowner) would 
pay a relatively low -.52 percent of his/her income for 
public. schools if the ta.:;;..'"Payer is located in school 
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districts with relatively lower noneducation property tax 
rates. On the other hand, if the same taxpayer is located 
in school districts with relatively high noneducation pro-
perty tax.rates, he/she would pay 2.41 percent of his/her 
income to finance public schools in the state. Also, 
"taxpayer-2" ($4,000.00 income; five-member family; renter) 
would pay a relatively low 3.22 percent of his/her income 
for public schools if the taxpayer is located in school 
districts with relatively lower noneducation property ta.."'{ 
rates. On the other hand, if the same taxpayer is .. located 
in school districts with relatively high noneducation 
property tax rates, he/she would pay 4.17 percent of his/ 
her income to finance public schools in the state. This 
particular problem caused by the property tax refund 
scheme could only be remied by including the municipal 
overburden criterion into the property tax refund distri-
bution formula. Furthermore,the renter-owner discre-
pancy situation, as illustrated in Figure 38, would still 
be present. This problem could only be remedied by equali-
zing the differences in the state property ta..~ refunds 
to owners and renters. 
The analysis of the horizontal tax burden distri-
bution among the income groups under this full state fin-
ancing option indicates that, since the property tax refund 
criterion is applicable to "taxpayers with incomes of 
$15,000.00 or less, taxpayers with incomes greater than 
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$15,000.00 would be in perfect horizontal tax burden equity 
situations. (Table XVII) On the other hand, taxpayers 
with incomes greater than $15,000.00 would pay different 
public school taxes, depending on the location's municipal 
overburden situation. As indicated in Table XVII, the 
magnitude of the horizontal inequity increases as the level 
of income decreases. This is due primarily to the marginal 
increases in property tax refund as the level of income 
declines. 
Comparing the overall level of tax burdens of dif-
ferent income groups under this full state funding option, 
the level of tax burden, relative to the present ~inancing 
scheme, would be lower under both the $4,000.00 and $8,000.00 
income groups. In the $12,000.00 income group the level 
of tax burden would be lower for all sample school dfutricts 
except Portland, Reynolds, Scappoose, Tigard and st. Helens. 
In the $18,000.00 income group, five school district tax-
payers (David Douglas, Corbett, West Linn, Forest Grove 
and Beaverton) would be burdened by relatively higher taxes 
while the rest of the school districts' taA~ayers would 
be burdened with relatively less taxes for public schools. 
In the $25,000.00 income level, all school districts 
(except Corbett and Beaverton) would have their tax bur-
den increased. In the $35,000.00 income group, relative 
to the present financing scheme, the Corbett school dis-
trict would have a lower tax burden. (Table XVII) 
School 
Districts 
Corbo 
Dav.D. 
Beav. 
Ore.C. 
Park. 
W.Ilinn 
La.l{e O. 
Banks 
F.Grov. 
Reyn. 
Fort. 
Shere 
Scapp. 
Tigard 
St.Bel. 
Mean 
5.59 - 4.'71 
$4,000 
75-76 FI&P 
TAJ3LE 'XVII 
TAX BURDEN DISTRIBUTION*--FULL STATE FUNDING: 
INCO~lli AND STATEWIDE PROPERTY 
TAXATION (FI&P) 
Public Education Tax As Percent of Income 
~~8 ,000 ~~12 ,000 $18,000 $25,000 
75-76 FI&P 75-76 FI&P 75-76 FI&P 75-76 FI&P 
$35,000 
75-76 FI&P 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - _0- _____ ~ ____ 
7.65 - 2.56 7.02 - 4.33 6.34 - 4.76 6.41 - 5.81 7.15-6.61 6.97-6.75 
7012 - 3.12 6.42 - 4.48 5.80 - 4.82 5.87 - 5.81 6.56 - 6.61 6.42 - 6.75 
7.07 - 2.80 6.52 - 4.40 5.91 - 4.79 6.00 - 5.81 6.69-6.61 6.54-6.75 
6.57 - 2.80 6.19 - 4.40 5.65 - 4.79 5.78 - 5.81 6.44 - 6.61 6.30 - 6.75 
6.02 - 3.12 5.69 - 4.48 5.22- 4.82 5.36 - 5.81 5.98 - 6.61 5.87-6.75 
6.15 - 2.21 6.19 - 4.24 5.71 - 4.73 5.88 - 5.81 6.56 - 6.61 6.42 - 6.75 
5.87 - 2.56 5.84 - 4.33 5.40 - 4.76 5.57 - 5.81 6.21 - 6.61 6.08 - 6.75 
5.71 - 2.56 5.74 - 4.33 5.31 - 4.76 5.50 - 5.81 6.13-6. 61 6.01 - 6.75 
5.66 - '1.91 6.03 - 4.13 5.67 - 4.69 5.84 - 5.81 6.51 - 6.61 6.37- 6 .75 
4.85 - 2.80 5.06 - 4.40 4.76 - 4.79 4.98 - 5.81 .5.56 - 6.61 5.47-6.75 
4.57- 3.12 4.68 - 4.48 4.40 - 4.82 4.63 - 5.81 5.17-6.61 5.09 - 6.75 
4.75- 1.91 5.35- 4 .. 13 5.07- 4.69 5 .. 33 - 5.81 5.95 - 6.61 5.84 - 6.75 
4.11 - 2.21 4.87 - 4.24 4.67 - 4.73 4.96 - 5.81 5.54 - 6.61 5.44- 6 .75 
4.04 - 2.21 4.74 - 4.24 4.55 - 4.73 4 0 84 - 5.81 5.40 - 6.61 5.31 - 6.75 
3.34 - 2.21 4.27 - 4.24 4.18-4.73 4.51 - 5.B1 5.04 - 6.61 4.97 - 6.75 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
5.57 - 2.52 5.64 - 4·.31 5.24-4.76 5.43 - 5.81 6.06 - 6.61 5.94- 6.75 
Stand.Dev. 2.17- 1.15 1.00 - 0.44 0.720 0.43 0.64 - 0.25 0.78 - 0.05 0.80 - 0.17 
1.27-1.58 
*By representative taxpayer income eroups 
I\) 
..J> 
u.l 
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From a locational perspective Table XVII illustrates 
a comparative tax burden advantage for the residents of 
the most suburban school districts resulting from the 
implementation of this full state funding option. The 
full state funding options are designed to equalize the 
differences in expenditure levels among the school dis-
tricts. This may diminish the long-term suburban tax 
burden advantages resulting from the implementation of the 
full state funding model. For example, Beaverton and West 
Linn School District's per pupil operational expenditures 
are $1,427.00 and $1,521.00 re~pectively for the 1975-1976 
schoolyear o Under the full state assumption a statewide 
average of $1,220 0 00 per pupil operational expenditure 
for that school year would be the appropriate standard 
for comparative reasons. Under these circumstances this 
would indicate an expenditure loss for these two school 
districts.* On the other hand, the rural school districts 
of Banks and Forest Grove, with per pupil operational 
expenditures of $1,070.00 and S~,112.00 respectively, would 
end up with increased levels of expenditures.** 
However, for the Portland school district the change 
*This may not necessarily result in lower quality education. 
However, it may result in more efficient usage of available 
resources. 
**The adoption of a save-harmless clause would protect ex-
penditure aQvantages of property-rich school districts at the 
initial stage of full state f~~ding. Since the property-rich 
school districts could no longer increase expenditures indi-
vi dually , the expenditure effect of full state funding vlOuld 
favor the property-poor districts. 
215 
to full state funding appears to be detrimental in terms 
of levels of expenditure, even though the level of taxes 
would decrease for the $4,000.00 and $8,000.00 inoome groups. 
(Table XVII) It should be remembered that the high level 
of eA~enditures in urban central school districts does not 
necessarily indicate a relatively high quality of educational 
services. Urban centers contain most of the underprivi-
ledged and low-income families of the respective metro-
politan areas. As illustrated by Seymour Sacks's study 
(1972) this high concentration of low-income families in 
urban centers results in increased cost in public education 
services o The per pupil operational expenditures o£ 
$1,423.00 for the Portland school district in 1975-1976 
is above the statewide average. If the special education 
needs of school districts are taken into account during 
the distribution of funds to school districts under full 
state funding, the school districts with a higher number 
of disadvantaged pupil populations would receive relatively 
more state funds. From this perspect~re, Portland School 
District would still receive the necessary funds to pro-
vide the needed extra educational services to the dis-
advantaged pupils. 
Analysis of the mean values presented in Table XVII 
indicate that, relative to the present situation, the over-
all tax burden would decrease for the taxpayer group with 
a $12,000.00 or less income while it would increase for 
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the taxpayer group 't/ith incomes above $12,000.00. Evi-
dently, in terms of vertical public education tax burden 
distributions, this full state funding option would be 
more progressive, relative to the present financing system. 
The vertical tax b~~den distribution presented in 
Figure 39 illustrates a strong positive linear relation-
ship between federal income tax rankings of the taxpayers 
and their public education tax payments under this full 
state funding option. Lr=0.9jJ (Figure 39) comparative 
analysis of the regression coefficients of this full state 
financing option, the present financing system and the 
previously-presented financing alternatives, indicates that 
under the full state funding (income and statewide property 
taxation) the vertical tax burden distribution structure 
would become considerably progressive. (Figure 39) 
Therefore the shift to statewide tax:ation, when combined 
with reduced dependence on the property t~~ by increasing 
the allocation of income tax-based funds to finance public 
schools, would make the state public education finance 
a relatively progressive revenue system. 
Income and Statewide Busine ss Pronerty Ta.xation* 
This financing approach under the full state funding 
alternative is based on a revenue formation system composed 
*This full s~ate financing option is based on Governor 
Tom McCall's Tax Reform Plan of 1973. (Office of the Gov-
ernor, 1972 and Legislative Revenue Office, 1976) 
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of personal and business income taxation and state-
wide buisness property taxation. Under this full state 
financing option, the statewide property taxation would 
exclude miller-occupied residential properties. In order 
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to equalize the resultant excess tax burden on the renter-
occupied residential properties, which may result in re-
latively higher residential rent values, the state may 
employ, in addition to the ongoing property ta~ refund 
scheme, a renter refund criterion. This financing option's 
result~~t t~~ burden distribution has been calculated 
within this assumption of the state's adopting a renter 
property tax refund criterion. Also, this financing model 
has been structured with the intention of shifting the 
financing of public schools to income-based ability-to-pay 
taxes. Therefore, it is estimated that an appropriate 
increase in the state income tax schedules (35 percent) 
would equalize the revenues lost from a reduced level of 
property ta~ation for public schools. Also, it is esti-
mated that, under this option, the state funds' share to 
finance public schools would increase from 33.2 percent 
62.3 percent. 
The analysis of the horizontal ta:c burden distribition 
among the equ.ally-circumstanced taxpayers under this full 
state financing option indicates that there would be no 
horizontal tax burden distribution inequities. It is il-
lustrated in Figure 40 that the straight horizontal 
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regression line indicates a perfect horizontal tax burden 
distribution situation. Also, it is exemplified in the 
same figure that "taxpayer-17" ($12,000.00 income; five-
member family; owner) would become better off, in terms 
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of public school t~~ payments, in all of the sample school 
districts. Evidently, this particular taxpayer's tax pay-
ments would be lower in all of the sample school districts 
under this full state funding option. However, it is il-
lustrated in Table XVIII that the magnitude of the re-
duction in tax burden for the $12,000.00 income group 
varies from a low of 4 0 18 to 3.01 in St. Helens to a high 
of 6.34 to 3.02 in Corbett School District. The distri-
butive pattern of the tax burden reduction indicates that 
the suburban taxpayers, relative to their equally-circum-
stanced counterparts in urban and rural school districts, 
would be better off under this full state funding option. 
This has been further illustrated in the $35,000.00 income 
group presented in Table ~~III. At this high income level, 
tax payments to finance public schools would increase for 
taxpayers residing primarily in urba...'1. a...'1.d rural school 
districts, and would decrease for those taxpayers residing 
in suburban school districts. From a locational per-
spective, this may indicate comparative tax burden ad-
vantages for the residents of most suburban school dis-
tricts resulting from the implementation of this full 
state funding option. However, the long-term effects of 
this tax burden advantage would be balanced by equalized 
TABLE XVIII 
TAX BURDEN DISTRIBUTION*--FULL STATE FUNDING: 
INCOME AND STATEvlIDE BUSINESS PROPERTY 
TAXATION (FIBP) 
Public Education Tax As Percent of Income 
School $4,000 $8,000 $12,000 $18,000 $25,000 $35,000 
Districts 75-76 FIBP 75-76 FIBP 75-76 FIBP 75-76 FIBP 75-76 FIBP 75-76 FIBP 
Corbo 
Dav.D. 
Beav. 
Ore.C. 
Park. 
W.IJinn 
Lalce O. 
Banks 
F.Grov. 
Reyn. 
Port. 
Shere 
Scapp. 
Tigard 
St.Hel. 
7.65- 0.77 7.02- 2 .. 39 6.34- 3.02 6.41- 4.30 7.15- 5.36 6.97- 6.14 
7 .12 - 0.77 6.42 - 2.39 5.80 - 3.02 5 .. 87 - 4.30 6 .. 56 - 5.36 6.42 - 6.14 
7.07- 0.77 6.52- 2.39 5.91- 3.02 6.00- 4.30 6.69- 5.36 6.54- 6.14 
6.57 - 0.77 6.19 - 2.39 5.65 - 3.02 5.78 - 4.30 6.44 - 5.36 6.30 - 6.14 
6.02 - 0.77 5.69 - 2.39 5.22 - 3.02 5.36 - 4.30 5.98 - 5.36 5.87 - 6.14 
6.15- 0.77 6.19- 2.39 5.71- 3.02 5.88- 4.30 6.56- 5.36 6.42- 6.14 
5.87 - 0.77 5.84 - 2.39 5.40 - 3.02 5.57 - 4.30 6.21 - 5.36 6.08 - 6.14 
5.71- 0.77 5.74- 2.39 5.31- 3.02 5.50- 4.30 6.13- 5.36 6.01- 6.14 
5.66 - 0.77 6.03 - 2.39 5.67 - 3.02 5.84 - 4.30 6.51 - 5.36 6.37 - 6.14 
4.85 - 0.77 5.06 - 2.39 4.76 - 3.02 4.98 - 4.:S0 .5.56 - 5.36 5.47 - 6.14 
4.57- 0.77 4.68- 2.39 4.40- 3.02 4.63- 4.30 5.17- 5.36 5.09- 6.14 
4.75- 0.77 5.35- 2.39 5.07- 3.02 5.33- 4.30 5.95- 5.36 5.84- 6.14 
4.11- 0.77 4.87- 2.39 4.67- 3.02 4.96- 4.:20 5.54- 5.36 5.44- 6.14 
4.04- 0.77 4.74- 2.39 4.55- 3.02 4.84- 4.)0 5.40- 5.36 5.31-- 6.14 
3.34- 0.77 4.27- 2.39 4.18- 3.02 4.51- 4.30 5.04- 5.36 4.97- 6.14 
Mean 5.57- 0.77 5.64- 2.39 5.24-- 3.02 5.43- 4.30 6.06- 5.36 5.94- 6.14 
5.59 - 3.12 
Stand.Dev. 2.17- 0.83 1.00- 0.81 0.720 0.74 0.64- 0.78 0.78- 0.56 0.80- 0.40 
1 .. 27-1.91 
i(-By representative taxpayer income groups 
f\) 
f\) 
~ 
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school district per pupil expenditure levels. 
Analysis of the mean values presented in Table XVIII 
indicate that, relative to the present situation, the 
overall tax burden would decrease for all sample income 
groups except the $35,000.00 income level. The magnitude 
of the tax burden reduction for the remaining income groups 
would be from 5.57 to 0.77 percent at the $4,000.00 level; 
~rom 5.64 to 2.39 percent at the $8,000.00 level; from. 
5.24 to 3.07 percent at the $12,000.00 level; from 5.43 
to 4·.30 percent at the $18,000.00 level; and from 6.06 
to 5.36 percent at the $25,000.00 income level. The in-
crease in the tax burden for the $35,000.00 income group 
would be from 5.94 to 6.14 percent of taxable income. 
Relative to the present financing system, this full 
state funding option would be more progressive in terms 
of vertical tax burden distributions. The vertical tax 
burden distributions illustrated in Figure 41 indicate 
strong positive correlation between federal income tax 
rankings of the taxpayers and their public education 
tax payments under this full state funding option. 
Lr=0.92/ (Figure 41) A comparative analysis of the re-
gression coefficients of this full state financing option, 
the present financing system and the previously-presented 
financing alternatives indicates that ~~der full state 
funding (income and statewide busL~ess property t~~ation) 
the vertical tax burden distribution structure would 
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become considerably progressive. 
the shift to statewide business 
(Figure 41) Therefore 
property taxation and 
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increased dependence on the income taxes to finance public 
schools would make Oregon's public education finance a 
relatively progressive revenue system. 
Income Taxation Only 
This financing approach under the full state funding 
alternative is based on a revenue formation system com-
posed of personal and business income taxation. Under 
this full state financing option, there would be no property 
taxation, business or residential, to finance public 
schools. Funds to finance public schools in the state would 
be provided from state, personal and business income tax 
sources. This full state financing model has been structured 
with the intention of completely shifting the financing 
of public schools to income-based ability-to-pay taxes. 
Therefore, an appropriate increase in the state income tax 
schedules (9Z percent) would equalize the lost property 
tax revenues. It is also estimated that under this full 
state funding option the state funds' share to finance 
public schools would increase from 33.2 percent to 62.3 
percent. 
The analysis of the horizontal tax burden distri-
bution among the equally-circumstanced taxpayers under 
this full state financing option indicates that there would 
be no horizontal tax burden distribution inequities. It 
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is illustrated in Figure 42 that the straight horizontal 
regression line indicates a perfect horizontal tax burden 
distribution situation. As exemplified in the same figure, 
"taxpayer-17" ($12,000.00 income; five-member family; 
onwer) is better off in terms of ~ublic school tax pay-
ments in all of the sample school districts. Evidently 
this particular ta.."q)ayer's tax paj-'1D.ents would be lower in 
all of the sample school districts under this full state 
funding option. However~ as illustrated in Table XIX, the 
magnitude of the reduction in tax burden for the $12,000.00 
income gro~p varies from a low of 4.18 (in Corbett School 
District). The distributive pattern of the tax burden 
reduction indicates that the suburban taxpayers, relative 
to their equally-circumstanced counterparts in urban and 
rural school districts, would be better off under this 
full state funding option. This has been further illus-
trated in the $35,000.00 income group presented in Table 
XIX. At this high income level tax payments to finance 
public schools i.'lOuld increase for all taxpayers residing 
in the sample school districts. The magnitude of the in-
crease, however, would vary from a low of 6.97 to 6.99 
(in Corbett) to a high of 4.97 to 6.99 (in st. Helens 
School District). At this high income level, tax pay--
ments to finance public schools \'/ould increase relatively 
more for the taxpaye:-s located i.."l urban a..l1d rural school 
districts, and relatively less for the taxpayers residing 
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School 
Districts 
Corbo 
Dav.D. 
Beav. 
Ore.C. 
Park. 
VI. Linn 
Lake O. 
Banks 
F.Grov. 
Reyn. 
Port. 
Shere 
Scapp. 
Tigard 
St.Rel. 
TABLE .XIX 
TAX BURDBN-DISTRIBUTION*--FULL STATE Fm~DING: 
INCO}ill TAXATION ONLY (FI) 
Public Education Tax As Percent of Income 
$4,000 $8,000 $12,000 $18,000 $25,000 $35,000 
75-76 FI 75-76 FI 75-76 FI 75-76 FI 75-76 FI 75-76 FI 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
7.65 - 0.95 7.02 - 3.15 6.34 - 4.13 6.41 - 5.71 7.15 - 6.62 6~97 - 6.99 
7.12 - 0.95 6.42 - 3.15 5.80 - 4.-13 5.87 - ·5.71 6.56 - 6.62 6~42 - 6.99 
7.07 - 0.95 6.52 - 3.15 5.91 - 4.13 6.00 - 5.71 6.69 - 6.62 6.54 - 6.99 
6.57- 0.95 6.19- 3.15 5.65- 4.13 5.78- 5.71 6.44- 6.62 6.30- 6.99 
6.02- 0.95 5.69- 3.15 5.22- 4.1'3 5.36- 5.71 5.98- 6.62 5.87- 6.99 
6.15-0.956.19-3.155.71-4.135.88-5.71 6.56-6.626.42-6.99 
5.87- 0.95 5.84- 3.15 5.40- 4.13 5.57- 5.71 6.21- 6.62 6.08- 6.99 
5.71-0.955.74-3.155.31-4.135.50-5.71 6.13-6.626.01-6.99 
5.66 - 0.95 6.03 - 3.15 5.67 - 4.13 5.84 - 5.71 6.51 - 6.62 6.37 - 6.99 
4.85 - 0.95 5.06 - 3.15 4.76 - 4.13 4.98 - 5.71 .5.56 - 6.62 5.47 - 6.99 
4.57- 0.95 4.68- 3.15 4.40- 4.13 4.63- 5.71 5.17- 6.62 5.09- 6.99 
4.75- 0.95 5.35- 3.15 5.07- 4.13 5.33- 5.71 5.95- 6.62 5.84- 6.99 
4.11- 0.95 4.87- 3.15 4.67- 4.13 4.96- 5.71 5.54- 6.62 5.44- 6.99 
4.04- 0.95 4.74- 3.15 4.55- 4.13 4.84- 5.71 5.40- 6.62 5.31- 6.99 
3.34- 0.95 4.27- 3.15 4.18- 4.13 4.51- 5.71 5.04- 6 .. 62 4.97- 6.99 
Mean . 5.57- 0.95 5.64- 3.15 5.24- 4.13 5.43- 5.71 6.06- 6.62 5 .. 94- 6.99 
5.59 - 3.98 
Stand.Dev. 2.17- 1.07 1.00- 1.20 0.7201.05 0.64- 0.94 0.78-0.54 0,,80-0.27 
1.27-2.30 
*By representatiY~ taxpayer income groups 
r\) 
r\) 
-3 
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in suburban school districts. From a locational perspective 
this may indicate initial comparative tax burden advantages 
for the residents of most suburban school districts re-
sulting from the implementation of this full state funding 
option. However, the long-term effects of this t~~ burden 
advantage would be balanced by equalized school district 
per pupil expenditure levels. 
Analysis of the mean values presented in Table XIX 
indicate that, relative to the present situation, the overall 
tax burden would decrease for the 04,000.00, $8,000eOO 
and *~12,000.00 income groups. The magnitude of the tax 
burden reduction for these three L~come groups would be 
from 5.57 to 0.95 percent at the $4,000.00 level; from 
5.64 to 3.13 percent at the ~8,000.OO level; and from 5.24 
to 4.13 percent at the $12,000.00 lllcome level. On the 
other hand, for the upper income groups, relative to the 
present situation the overall tax burden would increase. 
The magnitude of this tax burden increase would be from 
5.43 to 5.71 percent at the $18,000.00 level; from 6.06 
to 6.62 percent at the $25,000 8 00 level; and from 5.94 
to 6.99 percent at the $35,000.00 income level. (Table 
XIX) Evidently, relative to the present finrulCing system 
the full state funding option based on the ability-to-pay 
taxes would beco~e increasingly progressive in terms of 
vertical tax burden distribution. 
The vertical 'tax bu.rden distributions presented in 
Figure 43 indicate a strong positive correlation between 
CIl 
~ 
() 
J:l 
1-1 
\.4 
0 
.... 
~ 
CIl 
() 
~ 
Q) 
~ 
III 
<OS! 
~ 
E-l 
J:l 
0 
..-l 
.... 
III 
() 
.6 
~ 
() 
..-l 
.-I 
.g 
Pi, 
10 
9 
B 
7 
6 I 
t:.,;' 
./ ~cr 
't/I 
4'/1 
I 
I 
I 
I 
FS-IT 
rill .99 
aD-.On 
bo .17 
• 
I • 
_.-.-._.-.-.-._. -/_.-.- '-'-'-' _.-.- ':-;-Y-'-'-'-'-.'-' - '-'-'-'-'_'. F . . 5 
4 
, 
2 
1 I 
I , •. / /. 
/ /' . 
I ..... • // ... / 
I • • 
I • • I 
I /' I .~. 
'15-'16 
r:a -.00 
aD 5.14 
b .. -.006 
0 ~---------------------'-.1. ~ _____ • 
5 10 15 20 25 ,0 '5 40 45 
Taxpayer Federal Income Tax Ranldngo 
Fl~O ~1, Vertical tax burden redIstributIon, Full state Fundlng--Inoome ~axatlon 
nn y (F -IT): Bcattergram of.public education tax as percent of income and federal 
income tax ranldngs. 
50 
N 
N 
\D 
230 
federal income tax rankings of the taxpayers and their pub-
lic education tax payments under this full state funding 
option. Lr=O.927 (Figure 43) A comparative analysis of 
the regression coefficients of this full state financing 
option, the present financing system andthe previously-
presented financing alternatives indicates that under the 
full state funding (income taxation only) the vertical t~{ 
burden distribution structure would become considerably 
progressive. (Figure 43) Therefore, the shift to state-
wide business and personal income taxation would make the 
State of Oregon's public education finance a relatively 
progressive revenue system. 
Summary of the r1ajor Findings 
This chapter presented the tax burden redistributiol1-
related findings of the three financing options under the 
full state funding alternative. In accordance with the 
hypotheses and postulates of this research, and within the 
parameters and limitations thereupon, the imple~entation 
of this public school finance policy alternative (full 
state funding of public schools) "lOuld redistribute the 
t~~ burden among individual taxpayers and cause the fol-
lowing relative changes in the existing horizontal and 
vertical t~~ burden distribution structures: 
1 • Income and Statewide Pronerty Ta.~ation--relative to 
the present situation and to the previously-presented 
fina~cing alternatives: 
a. The horizontal tax burden distribution would be 
minimized. 
be» The vertical tax btU'den distribution, in terms of 
income and family size, would become more progressive. 
2. Income and State\'1ide Business Property Taxatio..n--re-
lative to the present situation and to the previously-
presented financing alternatives: 
a. The horizontal ta~ burden distribution inequities 
would become nonexistant. 
b. The vertical tax burden distribution, in terms of 
income and family size, would become more progressive. 
3. Income T~{ation Only--relative to the present sit-
uation and to the previously-presented financing alter-
natives: 
a. The horizontal tax burden distribution inequities 
would become nonexistant. 
b. The vertical tax burden distribution, in terms of 
income and family size, would become more progressive. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
COMPARATIVE ANALYSES OF FINANCING .&LTERNATIVES 
The school finance alternatives considered by this 
study have been presented under four broad categories: 
(a) the present system (1975-1976); (b) reforms within 
the present system; (c) increased state support; and 
(d) full state funding. Each category has been indivi-
dually illustrated, detailed and analyzed in chapters four 
through seven. In this chapter the financing alternatives 
considered by this study, inclusive of the present 1975-
1976 financing scheme, will be examined under the fol-
lowing four categories: school district property tax 
rates; state aid to school districts; horizontal tax bur-
den distribution; and vertical tax burden distribution. 
1. School District Property Tax Rates* 
Under the present financing scheme (1975-1976) the pro-
perty tax rates among the school districts vary consid-
erably. The data indicates that the school district property 
tax rates are relatively higher for property-poor school 
districts and relatively lower for property rich school 
districts. (Figure 2, p.97) Also, Table XX illustrates 
that the level of school district property tax rates are 
greatly determined by per pupil property cash values of 
school districts. This indicates that the greater the per 
*Since tbere would be no school district level taxation 
under the full state funding alternative, only the reform 
within the present system and the increased state support 
financing alternatives are analyzed in this section. 
TABLE XX 
STATISTICAL INDICATORS--INDEPENDENT VARIABLE: SCHOOL 
DISTRICT PER PUPIL PHOPERTY CASH VALUES 
Public School 
Finance 
Alternatives 
Present('75-76) 
Reform vii thin 
'Present 
D e pen 
School District Property 
Tax Rates 
r b 
-.61 -.11 
a.Foundation Phase-
In Plan 
b.Local Guaranteed 
Yield Plan 
c.Total Tax Effort 
Equal1.zation Plan 
d.Available Wealth 
Equalization Plan 
Increased State 
Support 
-.54 -.08 
-.22** -.03 
+.32** +.05 
-.49 -.09 
+.25*-)(' +.04 
*Horizontal Tax Burden Distribution 
den t V a ria b I 
Per Pupil State Aid 
r b 
-.78 -3.02 
-.84 -6.82 
-.85 -7.26 
-.90 -9.41 
-.52 -4.90 
-.'77 
-7.79 
**Not significant at the 0.05 significance level 
e s 
Public Education Tax as 
% of Income-"Taxpayer-2"* 
r b 
-.55 -.05 
-.46 -.04 
-.17** -.01 
+.32** +.03 
-.48 -.04 
+.16** +.01 
r\) 
~ 
~ 
pupil property wealth of a school district, the smaller 
its property tax rate. 
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Comparative analysis of the school district property 
tax rates among the financing alternatives considered by 
this study indicates that two of the reforms within the 
present system plans--foundation phase-in and available 
wealth equalization--would not cause significant changes 
in the level of school district property t~{ rates. (Fig-
ures 17 and 29) Under both these models the change in 
the regression and correlation coefficient values indi-
cating the relationship betvleen the property ta.."'{ rates 
and the per pupil property cash values is minimal. Under 
these two reforms within the present financing plans, school 
district property tax rates Vlould still be determined by 
per pupil property cash values of school districts. 
(Table XX) Consequently, school districts "\·rith relatively 
higher per pupil property values ".,ould exert relatively 
lower tax efforts. 
Under the local guaranteed yield and total tax effort 
equalization plans the level of property taxes, relative 
to the present scheme, would become considerably lm..,er for 
property-poor school districts; there would be no signifi-
cant changes for property-rich school districts. (Fig~es 
21 and 25) The change in the regression and correlation 
coefficient values indicates that the relationship between 
the property tax rates and the per pupil property cash 
values of school districts would become statistically 
insignificant under the local guaranteed yield and total 
tax effort equalization plans. Therefcre, ~~der these 
plans school district propeI'ty tax rates wou.ld not be 
determL~ed by per pupil property cash values of school 
districts. 
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The analysis indicates that the school district pro-
perty ta..."{ rates under the reforms \'1i°t;hin the present system 
alternative plans, except the total tax effort equali-
zation plan, do not change significantly to indicate a 
direction of property tax rate equalization among school 
districts \.,ith different per pupil property wealth. From 
a comparative perspective, the most obvious change in the 
level of property tax rates \'lould occur under the total 
tax effort equalization plan. (Figure 25) Under this 
financing plan the level of property taxes would be con-
siderably lower for all rural and most suburban school 
districts. The reduction in property ta...~ rates among urban 
center school districts \'lould not be considerable.* 
Furthermore, contrary to the present situation, under the 
total ta...~ effort equalization plan the level of property 
ta...~ rates would not be based on the per pupil property 
cash values of school districts. (Table XX) Evidently, 
under the total ta...~ effort equalization plan the level and 
variations Ol property tax rates among school districts 
*Contrary to its purpose, the iwplementation of the total 
tax effort pl~~ may not result in considerable property tax 
reductions for the "llrban center school districts. 
would be determined to a greater extent by the state aid 
distribution. 
Under the increased state support financing alter-
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native, the level of proper-ty tax rates would become con-
siderably lo'w'er, relative to the present system, for the 
property-poor school districts and slightly lower for 
property-rich school districts. ( 1i" '7~) _~gure .-/.., The change 
in the regression and correlation coefficient values in-
dicates that under the increased state support alternative 
the relationship between property tax rates and the per 
pupil property cash values of school districts 'ilould not 
be statistically significant. Therefore, contrary to the 
present situation, under the increased state support alter-
native the level of property rates viould not be determL"1.ed 
by per pupil property cash values of school districts. 
(Table XX) Evidently, under this financing alternative 
the level and variations of property tax rates among school 
districts would be determined to a greater extent by the 
state aid distributions. 
2. state Aid Distribution to School Districts* 
Under the 1975-1976 financing scheme per pupil state 
aid distribution to school districts varied considerably. 
*Under the full state funding alternative there ... ,ould be 
no state aid distribution criterion as is presently oper-
ating. Under full state alternatives state monies would be 
distributed to school districts, not as grants or aids, but 
as total funds to operate public schools. For that reason only 
the reform vlithin the present system and the increased state 
support .i.'i:1ancing alternatives are analyzed under this section. 
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Figure 5 illustrates that the level of per pupil state 
aid is relatively higher for property-poor school districts 
and relatively 100'/er for property-rich school districts. 
Also, the pattern of state aid distribution is determined 
by per pupil property cash values of school districts. 
(Table y..x) 
Comparative analysis of state aid distribution to 
school districts under the financing alternatives consid-
ered by this study (except the full state funding) indicates 
that the overall level of state aid to school districts, 
relative to the 1975-1976 financing scheme, would in-
crease considerably. Under all of the financing alter-
natives the increase in state aid is SUbstantial for pro-
perty-poor and minimal for property-rich school districts. 
(Figures 18, 22, 26, 30 and 35) In terms of equalization 
of differences in property-based t~cable capacities of 
school districts, all of the alternatives, except the 
available wealth equalization plan, would accomplish their 
objectives to varying degrees. Table XX and Figure 30 
illustrate that the available \'/eal th equalization plan is 
least capable of accomplishing a property wealth ... based 
state aid distribution. The regression coefficient indi-
cates that under the available wealth equalization plan 
the state aid distribution criterion is determined to a 
lesser extent by the per pupil property cash values of 
school districts. Concomitantly, under this financing 
:pIa::. the property-rich school districts "lOuld get, relative 
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to the present financing scheme, more per pupil state aid. 
other reforms within the present system plans, es-
pecially the total tax effort equalization plan, shm'i that 
the state aid distribution pattern "1ould be increasingly 
determined by the per pupil property cash values of school 
districts. (Table XI and Figure 26) The same situation 
prevails under the increased state support financing al-
ternative. Relative to the present scheme,.under the in-
creased state support alternative the higher the per pupil 
property cash values a school district has, the lower the 
level of state aid it would receive. If the property wealth 
of school districts is the valid indicator of the wealth 
of its residents, the objectives of these two financing 
alternatives would be the appropriate policy choice to 
equalize the differences in taxable capacities of school 
districts. Hm'lever, there is a current controversy over 
the issue of school district wealth. This research and 
studies by Gatti (1976) and Ladd (1975) indicate that the 
level of school districts' property wealth does not corre-
late with their level of aggregate income. Acceptance 
of income as a measurement of school district 'Vleal th and 
its usage in conju....'».ction with property wealth may result 
in a different and more equitable criterion by which to 
distribute state funds to school districts.* 
*Presently the Oregon Department of 3ducation and the 
Legislative Revenue Office are conducting research to study 
the possibility of combined usage of income and property 
as t112 indicators of school districts I '-lealth. 
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3. Horizontal Tax Burden Distribution 
Comparative analysis of horizontal t~c burden dis-
tribution indicators among the school financing alter-
natives considered by this study is based on the follm·ling 
t""o analytical cat egorie s: ( 1) the magnitude of the tax 
burden variations am.ong equally-circumstanced-t~~ayers 
(Figure 44); and (2) the extent to which the horizontal 
t~~ burden distribution pattern is based on the per pupil 
property cash values of school districts~ (Table XX) 
As previously discussed, analysis indicates that there 
exist considerable horizontal t~: burdan distribution 
inequities under the present financing scheme (1975-1976)0 
(Figures 9, 10 and 44) Furthermore, the data indicates 
an inverse correlation beti'leen per pupil property cash values 
and the pattern of horizontal tax burden distribution, 
measured by public education tax as percent of L."'1come of 
equally-eircumst~~ced t~~ayers. (Table ~{) Although 
the strength of this relationship is not substantial, it 
still connotes variations in equally-circumstanced t~~­
payers' public education t~~ burden according to the pro-
perty \'lealth of the school districts in which they reside. 
From a loeational perspective this suggests that residents 
of property-rich school districts pay less for public edu-
cation services in the state than do their equally-cir-
cumstanced countel~arts in property-poor school districts. 
(Table-XX and Figure 9) 
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An analysis of the changes in horizontal tax burden 
distribution brought about by alternative school financing 
models indicates that all of the reform within the present 
system plans would bring no significant changes to the 
existing horizontal tax burd.en inequities.' (Figure 44) 
Therefore, the reform within the present system alternative 
plans would not reduce the existing tax burden inequities 
among the equally-circumstanced taxpayers. 
Under both the local guaranteed yield and total tax 
effort equalization plans the inverse linear relationship 
between the horizontal tax burden distribution and per 
pupil property cash values would become statistically 
insignificant. (Table XX and Figure 23) Concurrently, 
under both these reform plans the public education taxes 
as percent of income of equally-circumstanced taxpayers 
would not be determined by per pupil property cash values 
of school districts. The changes in correlation and re-
gression coefficient values under these two financing 
plans result from the increased level of state equali= 
zation aid to property-poor school districts. 
Analysis of horizontal tax burden distribution under 
the increased state support alternative indicates that, 
relative to the 9resent situation, the variations in pub-
lic education tao~ burdens among equally-circumstanced tax-
payers \'lOuld be relatively lower. (Figure 44) This re-
duction of horizontal tax burden inequities, however 
insignificant, remlts from the increased level of income 
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tax-based state funds to public education. Further in-
creases in the level of state support to school districts 
would further reduce the existing horizontal tax burden dis-
tribution inequities. Because of the increased level of 
state equalization aid, the inverse linear relationship be-
tween horizontal tax burden distribution and per pupil 
property cash values would become statistically insigni-
fic~lt. (Table XX and Figure 36) Therefore, under the 
L~creased state support alternative public education taxes 
as percent of income of equally-circumstanced taxpayers 
would not be determined by per pupil property cash values 
of school districts. 
Comparative analysis of the full state funding alter-
native (income and statewide property taxation option) indi-
cates that the horizontal tax burden distribution inequities 
are evident. Even though these horizontal tax burden inequi-
ties are insignificant, relative to the present situation, 
they would occur due to the state property tax refund cri-
terion and municipal overburden situation among the school 
districts. (Figure 38) 
The levels of none ducat ion property taxation vary 
considerably among school districts. This would result 
in different proportions of the property tax refund being 
applied as a credit toward statewide public education 
property taxation. Concurrently, depending upon the 
municipal overburden ratios of their respective school 
districts, equally-circumstanced taxpayers would be 
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burdened with unequal levels of public education taxation. 
The implication for the full state funding (income and state-
wide property taxation option) is that the state property 
tax refund distribution criterion, which does not use mun-
icipal overburden ratios as a factor, would cause definite 
horizontal public education tax burden distribution inequi-
ties for taxpayers with annual incomes below $15,000.00 
The comparative analysis of the horizontal tax burden 
distribution patterns under two of the full state funding al-
ternatives (income and statewide business property taxation 
option and income taxation only option) indicate that there 
would be no horizontal tax burden distribution inequity. 
Under both of these full state funding alternatives, public 
education tax burden distribution among equally-circumstanced 
taxpayers would be equal. (Figures 40, 42 and 44) 
4. Vertical Tax Burden Distribution 
The comparative analysis of vertical tax burden dis-
tribution is based on the differences in magnitude of 
the t~~ burden progressivities among school finance al-
ternatives considered by this study. As previously dis-
cussed, analysis indicates that under the present fin-
ancing scheme (1975-1976) taxpayers with relatively smaller 
incomes and larger families are burdened with greater public 
education taxes. The regression coefficient shows the 
vertical t~~ burden to be slightly regressiveo (Table 
XXI and Figures 16 and 45) This coefficient is not 
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TABLE XX 
STATIS~I'IGAL INDICATORS--INDEPENDENT VALUABLE: 
TAXPAYEP .. FEDERAL INCOliIE TAX RANKDTGS 
Public School 
Finance 
Alternatives 
Denendent Variable 
Vertical Tax Burden D~i-s~t-r7i'~o'u~t~io-n-
Present('75-'76) 
ReforD. 1:1i thin 
present 
a.Foundation Phase-
In Plan 
b.Local Guaranteed 
Yield PIan 
c.Total Tax Effort 
3qualization Plan 
d.Available Wealth 
Equalization Plan 
Increased State 
S"Lnroort 
.-
Full State~ding 
a.lncome and State-
\llide Pro:p. Taxation 
b.lncome ~~d State-
wide Business Prop. 
Taxation 
d.lncome Taxation 
Only 
(Public Education Tax As % of Income) 
r b 
-.08* -.006 
+.07* +.005 
+.15* +.010 
+.29* +.019 
+.05* +.003 
+.45 +.032 
+.91 +.110 
+.99 +.140 
+.99 +.170 
*Hot significant at the 0.05 significance level. 
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statistically signific~~t. ~urthermore, substantial 
variations in tax burdens among ta."'q)ayers vleakens the 
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plausibility of a proportional vertical tax burden dis-
tribution pattern. Therefore the vertical tax burden dis-
tribution under the present financing scheme is a no-pat-
tern distribution in terms of regressivity-progressivity 
continuum. 
The analysis of the relative changes in vertical tax 
burden distribution which the alternative school financing 
model \'lould bring indicates that all of the refc!.Tl wi thi:l 
the present system plans, except the total tax effort 
equalization, would bring no significant changes in the 
existing no-pattern vertical t~~ burden distribution. 
(Table XXI and Figures 10, 24 and 32) Under the total 
tax effort equalization plan the vertical tax burden dis-
tribution would become more progressive than the present 
situation. However, the vertical tax burden distribution 
indicated by the positive regression coefficient is not 
substantial enough to indicate a strong progressivity-
based public education financing system. (Figures 28 
and 45) 
Analysis of vertical tax burden distribution under 
increased state support indj.cates that, in comparison 
to the present situation, taxpayers with relatively larger 
incomes and smaller familie s 'Vlould be burdened \'lith greater 
public education taxes. The regression coefficient 
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indicates a change toward a more progressive vertical tax 
burden structure, affected by increased state support 
from 30 to 40 percent. Evidently a movement toward greater 
reliance on the ability-to-pay revenue sources to finance 
public schools by further increasing the level of state 
support to public schools ",ould increase the progressivity 
of the vertical t~~ burden distribution pattern. This 
finding would justify further increases in the level of 
state support to fine~ce public schools. (Table L{I and 
Figures 27 and 45) 
A comparative analysis of the vertical tax burden 
distribution patterns under the three full state funding 
alternatives indicates that, relative to the present fin-
ancing system ~~d all of the previously-presented alter-
natives, full state f1.mding alternatives '",ould best ac-
complish progressive vertical tax b~den distributions. 
(Table XXI and Figures 39, 41, 43 and 45) Under the in-
come and. state\'lide property ta:!:ation option of the full 
state funding alternative, a fairly strong progressive 
public education taxation would result. However, there 
are irregular data point distributions at the lower in-
come levels resulting from the renter/ovmer-based bias 
of state property tax refund criteria. (Figure 39) 
Furthermore, as indicated by the regression coefficient 
in Figure 39, the level of progressivity of this full 
state funding option, relative to other full state funding 
o]tio:'':G, ~'lould be lm'ler due to the regressive nature of 
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residential property taxation. The income and state\'ride 
business property taxation and the income taxation only 
:full state funding options exemplify that a greater equity-
based vertical tax burden distribution structure may re-
sult from the elimination of residential property tax-
ation for public education purposes. (Figures 41,43 and 
45) 
CHAPTER IX 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
It has been more than 40 years since Henry C. Morri-
son (1930) proposed that the financing of public schools 
in many states is not based on equity in tax burden dis-
tributions. Since then there have been many attempts to 
solve the problem of school district fiscal disparities. 
However, most of the research concentrated on formulating 
alternative school finance models based on school districts' 
fiscal behavior, but avoided analyzing the impacts of these 
models on the individual taxpayer-voter. The basic in-
tention of this dissertation research has been to con-
struct an analytic model to test the school finance al-
ternatives' impact on the individual taxpayer-voter from 
a tax burden redistribution perspective. 
The primary focus of this research has been the deve-
lopment of a policy analysis paradigm to test tax buxden 
distributive impacts of various school finance alternatives 
in the State of Oregon. A secondary intent has been the 
analysis of the 1975-1976 public education financing scheme 
from a school district profile perspective. The school dis-
trict profile and the tax burden distribution-related 
findings of this study elicit policy implications for state 
and local level policy developers and decision makers. 
The analysis of the present system emphasized cate-
gorization of the socia-economic and fiscal profiles of 
school districts. The property and income ,-;eal th of the 
school districts was presented as were school district 
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property tax rates and per pupil operational eA~enditures. 
The m~~icipal overburden issue was presented as an im-
portant school district profile category. In conjunction 
with the municipal overburden is~~e, school district 
teacher/student and enrollment ratios \'Iere put for.vard. 
The political support variable (measured in terms of "Yes-
No" ratios of the school district budget elections of 
1975) \'TaS presented &'1d tested against the fiscal var-
iable (per pupil state aid as percent of operational ex-
penditures). 
With the exception of per pupil property cash values 
and school district property tax rates* the school dis-
trict profile data was used in a non-compa-rative manner 
to indicate and analyze the statistical results of the 
stepwise multiple regression of the 1975-1976 school dis-
trict data. 
The school district property and income wealth-
related findings of this research support the previous 
studies (Sacks, 1973, Ladd, 1975 and Gatti, 1976) which 
found that the property wealth of school districts do 
not necessarily coincide \,Ii th the level of residential 
aggregate incomes. Since state aid to school districts 
*School district property cash values and property t~{ 
rates are used comparatively t~xough all of the financing 
alternatives except full state funding~ 
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is based on the property wealth of school districts, the 
ramifications of this situation would be state contribution, 
vis-a-vis aid distributive criteria, to the existing public 
school cost burden distribution inequities. (-Grubb, 
1971, and Muller, 1973) TlE major policy implication of 
this finding is that the state aid distributive criterion 
should be restructured with consideration given to school 
district income, as well as property, wealth. Such policy 
change would minimize the existing property wealth-based 
state aid distribution inequities. 
Analysis of the relationship between per pupil pro-
perty cash values and property tax rates of school dis-
tricts indicates that the higher the per pupil property 
''leal th of a school district, the lower would be the pro-
perty tax rate needed to finance public schools. F"urther-
more, this study strongly supports previous research (James, 
1966 and ~'leiss, 1970) lilhich concluded that the per pupil 
property wealth of a school district, as a variable, greatly 
contributes to the determination of the operational ex-
penditure levels of school districts. That is to say, the 
greater the per pupil property cash value of a school 
district, the greater l,'lOuld be the per pupil operational 
expenditures in that district. Despite the fact that both 
these variables (per pupil operational expenditures and 
property ta.x rates) are correlated with per pupil property 
cash values, there is no statistically significant 
relationship between per pupil operational e:A.-pendi tures 
&~d school district property tax rates. This indicates 
that the level of operational expenditures in a school 
district is not deteroined by the level of property tax 
rates. 
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A stepwise multiple regression anal:rsis of the muni-
cipal overburden situation in the sample school districts 
indicates that t"10 variables, the level of population 
per pupil and number of pupils per teacher, significantly 
correlated 'with the level of noneducation property tax-
ation. This finding has clear urban-rural locational con-
notations. Urban areas vlith relatively higher population 
densities and low-income population concentrations re~uire 
relatively higher tax efforts to finance education-related 
public services. Conse~u.ently, within the limitations 
of the property tax base, the range of property taxation 
for public schools in urban areas is rather limited. Thus 
the urban school district's capability to eA:ert heavier 
tax efforts to increase its education standard is con-
strained. This situation has been exemplified by the 
significant positive linear correlation between the muni-
cipal overburden indicator and the number of pupils per 
teacher. Therefore, in school districts where property 
ta."'{ation for public schools comprises a relatively lower 
percent of total property taxation in the district, the 
greater would be the number of pupils per teacher. 
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If one assumes that the variable (number of pupils 
per teacher) is an acceptable criter~on of quality of edu-
cation, this finding connotes that urban school districts 
with relatively higher municipal overburden, which also 
house a relatively greater student population with special 
education needs, would have to provide public educational 
services below the standards (measured in terms of pupil/ 
teacher ratios) of suburban and rural school districts. 
This argument, hO\rlever debatable, contains a policy sug-
gestion pertaining to the state aid distribution criterion. 
In addition to the aforementioned criterion of property 
and income measurement of school districts t \'leal th as a 
factor in distributing state aid to school districts, 
the inclusion of S}?ecial education need as a factor ".'!ould 
greatly contribute to the effort to minimize existing state 
aid distribution inequities.* 
To analyze the political support criterion tL~der 
school district profiles, the va.riable (percent voted. 
"Yes" in 1975 school district budget elections) 'l,'/8.S 
tested against the remaining school district profiles 
variables. The step"l}'ise regression indicates that the 
fiscal variable {per pupil state aid as percent of per 
*As indicated by the 1978 Legislative Revenue study, 
the special education needs of school districts vary sigr.i-
ficantly. It was suggested in a Legislative Revenue Office 
staff report ·to the Oregon Educational Coordinating Com-
~ission that, during the 1979 Legislative session, ccnsid-
eration be given to 'funding special education aB an ear-
marked cost in Basic School Support. ("Legislative Revenue 
Office, Elementary and Secondar;r ;:lchool Finance, 1979. II 
Legislative Issues, April, 1978 1 p.3) 
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pupil operational expenditures) is positively related 
to the political support variable. This would mean that 
the larger the portion of the school districts' operational 
expenditure budget from state aid, the greater the pro-
bability of budget approval by the voterse 
An intervening variable, the size of the budget, 
is definitely related to the level of per pupil expen-
ditures and state aid receipts of the school districts. 
The size of the budget presented for voter approval may 
directly influence the voter behavior. This may cauee 
the relati'onship bet'\'leen voter support C3.J."J.d the proportion 
of the expenditure from state aid to be significant. 
This conclusion supports the findings of Richard Lucier 
(1971) and B.F.Saalfeld (1972) who concluded that the 
higher the cost of public education i the higher the pro-
bability of its exceeding the preference function of the 
median voters. Such facts as the level of e~~enditures 
and state aid may not be knO'ffi to the voter so as to 
influence his/her decision. It may be more realistic to 
assume that per pupil expenditures and state aid affect 
the size of the budget to be approved by the voter. In-
creasing the level of state support to finance public schools 
would result in larger proportions of school districts' 
operational expenditures being provided from state sources. 
This in turn would result in relatively smaller school 
district budget increases to be approved by the voters. 
Consequently, this would increase the probability of 
voter approval ~ school district budget elections. A 
major policy implication of this finding is that further 
increasing the state support level of public education 
may result in a higher level of voter approval of school 
district budget increases.* 
Tax Burden Distribution--Policy Implications 
Prior to an analysis of the public education tax 
burden dist~ibutive as~ects of alternative models to 
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fin~~ce public schools in the State of Oregon, the inter-
governmental and multi-level financing features of the 
public education f1.1 . I.~ding system should be explained. 
Taxpayers in Oregon pay various taxes to different gov-
ernment and jurisdictional levels to finance public edu-
cation functions. This situation has certain implications 
over the level of tax burden on the local taxpaye::-, depend-
ing upon the level of state share in financing public schools. 
Presently it is evident that the state of Oregon's share 
in financing public schools and the relatively progressive 
state income tax schedules are not sufficient enough to 
override the regressive impacts of the local school dis-
trj ct property taxe s on the individual ta'}",'Payers. One 
implication clao.::'ly explained by William AJlderson is that 
*The actual testing of this will be possible after a few years of i..'D.plementation of the increased leyel of 
state support to public education, begi~~ing with the 
1973-1979 school year. 
if the state's share in financing public schools were 
increased, local ta:-:payers ,-/Ould not be so burdened. 
The fact is that increasing the state share 
might v/ell reduce local taw"'Ces, but that fact 
tells us nothing about overall (public edu-
cation) tax loads. Ta."{es paid locally might 
be reduced but taxes paid to the state might 
then be increased. Political rhet:oric some-
times generates the illusion that there is a 
mystical body of "other taxpayers" in the 
state "Tho would pick up burdens we cast off: 
the forlorn reality is that those other ta."'C-
~ayers are just ourselves in other ~tises. 
{*~derson, 1977, p.2) 
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Both the state government and the local school dis-
tricts share the res~onsibility to finance Oregons' pub-
lic schools. During the 1975-1976 school year the state 
contributed 30 percent and the school districts 70 percent 
of the total cost of public school operations. Effectiva 
during the 1978-1979 school year, the 1977 Leg~slature 
Lllcreased the state r s share to 40 percent. The 1979 
session of the Oregon State Legislature may consider 
further increasing the level of state support to public 
schools to 50 percent, as \'I"ell as increasL"'1g the leyel 
of state equalization grants. HO\'/ever, the solution 
to tax burden inequities, as ".'le11 as inequities in edu-
cational opportunity~ may not lie solely in the afore-
mentioned increases. It may be necessary to change the 
criterion whe:r'eby the state aid is distributed to the 
school districts. The study by Pierce, et aI, (1975) 
of the University of Oregon responded to that particular 
problem by designing four different state aid distribution 
257 
formulas based on school district property wealth and tax 
effort measurement criteria. These four school finance 
options l'lere employed by this study and identified as the 
re-form ~.'lithin the present system alternative. 
The major finding of the reform within the present 
system indicates that all of the options, to varying 
marginal degrees, tend to equalize the fiscal capacities 
of school districts. However, implementation of the options 
under the reform. \'li thin the present syster.:l al ternati ve 
would not alter the <,;xistinG tax bllrden distribution in-
equities. Under these fina.."'1ci:g.g options, as \'1811 as under 
the present financing forn, one's public education tax 
burden is determined by his/her residential loca~ion. 
r,:ore tha..."'1 the income or the property '-leal th of the indi-
vidual, t11e aggregate property \'lealth of the school dis-
trict determines his/her public education tax burden. 
Consequently, t;,/O equally-circumstanced families located 
in different school districts are not treated equally. 
Further:nore, faoilies with differential L"'1comes and pro-
perty wealth are not treated differentially to distribute 
the tax burden progressively. Conclusively, it is the 
final evaluation by this author that reforms \·rithin the 
present system options' marginal policies, aimed tm'lard 
fiscal equalization among school districts, are not ef-
fective measures to reduce the e:dst.ing tax burden distri-
bution inequities among L'1di vidual taxpayers. 
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The increased st~te support alternative developed 
by the Oregon state Legislature is based on increasing 
the stateVs share from 30 to 40 percent to support public 
schools. The Legislature identified the follm'ling pro-
blems as being the three main reasons to move to'.1ard a 
centralized school financing system: (1) inability of the 
present state support and equalization aid level to equalize 
the differences in fiscal capacities among school dis-
tricts; (2) growing problems with local school district 
special levy and budget elections; and (3) increased re-
liance on the local property tax as a main revenue source 
by local jurisdictions. To further alleviate these prob-
0'- - • 
lems, the 1979 state Legislature may consider increases 
in the level of state support. The question remains: 
'-lould further increase in the state support level entail 
increases in state ta.'"{es? Probably. Hmvever, since the 
L'Ylcrease in state support level is marginal, the state 
may be able to finance it through internal flUld real1o-
cations, provided there would be no property ta:~ limitation 
or reflliid measure in effect.* 
Presentl:l there is a well-prepared and v/ell-developed 
ta.:::payers I revolt aga i nst prop erty ta.:{ation. Actualization 
of a property tax limitation proposal in Oregon (Property 
*IIBased on existL"1g revenue and expenditure pro jections 
of the Executive Department, a 50 percent level of 3asic 
School 3u:p'oort cannot be achieved in 1979-1981 unless there 
is a substantial shifting of funds from other existing 
programs. II (state of Oregon Legislative Revenue Office, 
J.3!ril, 1978, p. 2 ) 
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Tax Limitations I,Ieasure #6*) would greatly curtail the 
local financing of public schools, especially 'I'lhen the 
local pr0gerty t~~ation is the primary means of raising 
funds for school districts. The state may have to increase 
its level of support to public education more than the 
50 percent level to be considered by the 1979 state Legis-
lature. The increase in state support needed to finance 
public schools adequately, resulting from the property 
tax limitation measlrre, may require, in the long run, 
greater state involvement in fm1ding public education. 
Due to the revenue formation procedures-related lioitations 
of I·leasure #6, and to a lesser degree of :Neasure ;Jl1, 
the financing of public schools may become an inco~e 
tax-based near-to-total state fu..11.ding system. V.Jhen this 
occurs, the degree to "Thich the resulting ta:{ burden dis-
tribution indicates increased equity (vertical or hori-
zontal) may depend on the structure of the state t~~ 
instrument employed to replace local property tax-based 
revenues. The findings of this study suggest that estab-
lishment of an income t~x-based full state funding school 
*Heasure i-f6--proposed constituti9nal amend."!lent limits 
ad valorem real property taxes to 1 ~-% ilfull cash, II defined 
as 1975 assessed value, or appraised value on later sale or 
ne\" construction. Allows maximTh"ll 2;6 cmnual inflation in-
crease. Requi:-8s two-thirds vote of each house for new or 
increased stat 2) ta::es; t~;,IO-thirds popule.r vote required fo:c 
special local taxes; prohibits ne~!i ad valorem, s2.les or 
t:cansaction taxes on real p::'operty. (Voters Pamphlet, 
state of Oregon, Gene;."'al Election Hovember 7, 1978, p. 37) 
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finance system ".'lould eliminate horizontal tax burden dis-
tribution inequities and establish a relatively progressive 
public education tax system. Since the political pos-
sibility of increasing the level of state income ta~ation 
or the establishment of new taxes vlOuld be greatly reduced 
by the adoption of Nee.sure if6, the State will have to re-
allocate funds from othe~ state public services and/or 
10\'ler existing educational standards to reduce the oper-
ational costs of public schools. 
Th2 adoption of r-:e2.::mre !.~6 or the counter :9roposal, 
Property Ta..~ Relief I·leasure #11,* coupled with an increase 
of state support to public schools to 50 percent by the 
1979 Legislature would create a school finance model 
which wou1d redu.ce the horizontal tax burden distribution 
ine~uities and increase the progressivity of the ve::ctical 
tax burden distribution structure. FindingiJ of this study 
evidence that increasing the level of state support and 
reducing the usage of local property taxes to finance 
public schools would result in a significant movement 
toward an equity-based school financing system. 
Regardless of which property ta..'C measu:r:-e (#6 or iJi 1 ) 
*Eeasure ·if11--iJronosed constitutional amendmer ... t to reduce 
tax payable b;;r homeo~mers by 1-;';~ up to $1,500.00. Provides 
comparable relief to renters. Limits state and local e}~en­
ditures. RequiTes tVlO-thirds legislative vote for certain 
tax measures. Hefunds remaining state surplus to i:'lcom.e 
ta.:::payers. Freezes assessed values for Ol1e ta:~ year. Pre-
serves referendum right on local government tax measures. 
(Vote3.. .. s ?anphlet, 2tate cf Oregon General Election, Nov-
embe= 7, 1978, p.66) 
might be approved by the voters in the November 1978 
election, the major findings of this study and their sig-
nificance thereupon would be a useful policy instrument 
for local and state public education policy developers 
and decision makers. The trend of public school finance 
in Oregon is toward centralization, whether it is based 
on ability-to-pay taxes or statewide property taxes. The 
choice of Oregon voters in the November election may de-
termine the type of revenue source to finance public 
schools as well as the magnitude of movement toward cen-
tralization of public school finance functions.* 
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The findings of this research coincide with Ronald 
Grieson's (1974) conclusion that any shift from local to 
statewide (property or non-property) taxes would definitely 
affect the distribution of the cost of public education. 
Furthermore, this study supports Donald Phares' (1973) 
conclusion that when the regressivity of the local sector 
is excluded, many state revenue systems would become 
relatively more progressive. Concurrently, by broadening 
the property tax base to encompass the state as a whole, 
as proposed in two of the full state funding models, 
*Eoth Measures #6 and #11 were defeated at the polls in 
the November 6, 1978 referendum. Although the measures were 
defeated the results of the referendum do not indicate tax-
payer-voter satisfaction with the present local property 
taxation system. The results of the election reveal that 
the voters want a property ta~ reform, but were not satis-
fied with the .proposed reforms. The responsibility of 
the 1979 state Legislature will be to design ~~ acceptable 
property tax package. 
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greater tax burden distribution equalization could be 
effected. Oregon, as well as other states, has in the 
past yielded the property tax base to local jurisdictions. 
It is within the state' s constitutional pm'lers to use 
the property tax base for public education finance pur-
poses.* However, the ongoing taxpayer dissatisfaction 
with property taxation may curtail the political feasibility 
of establishing statewide property as a tax base for pub-
lic education purposes. 
It is probable that increased reliance on the income-
. - . .'--
based state tax~tion to finance public schools will be 
the outcome of the recent taxpayer revolt against pro-
perty-based taxes. Within the parameters of this study, 
the resultant statewide ability-to··pay-based revenue 
structure would be considered the ideal public school 
system: centrally-financed and locally-administered.** 
Nonetheless, its implementation would result in changes 
in public education-related intergovernmental admlnistrative 
and fiscal responsibilities. 
Rather than concentrating on how to raise revenues, 
the school district administrators would be able to 
*Governor McCall's Property Tax Reform Plan of 1973 was 
based on this rationale. However, the state legislative power 
could not supe=cede voter referendum power when McCall's pro-
perty tax measure was presented for election approval. The 
measure was overwhelmingly rejected in the May 1973 election. 
**Henry C. Morrison suggests that the most efficient and 
equitable method to finance public education would be through 
a statewide income tax o (lYlorrison, 1930) 
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concentrate on efficient usage of a given set of revenues. 
Under the increased or full state funding alternatives, 
the nature of the local school district's autonomy may be 
improved. The full state funding alternative would in-
clude political access and control possibilities for the 
taxpayer-voter. It would allow individuals to participate 
directly in administrative decision-making processes at 
the school district level, and indirectly in the decisions 
of financing at the state legislative level. This may 
satisfy the objective of centralizing financing while pre-
serving decentralized administrative decision making. 
"There exists the possibility that local decision making 
could be diluted or impaired, although there is no reason 
why a high level of state funding is not compatible with 
substantial local control over such basic educational con-
cerns as curriculum, personnel, and the like." (Rossmiller, 
1973, pp.64-65) 
Constitutionally, public education is a state govern-
ment responsibility. Decentralization of this respon-
sibility by delegation of administrative as well as fin-
ancial authority to local school districts, with exter-
nalities over school district boundaries and nationwide 
ramifications,* is basically a matter of choice between 
*External to the individual student and his/her family 
are public education-related benefits to others in forms of 
positive effects on productivity, provisian of a minimum 
standard of citizenship and promotion of equality of op-
portunity. (Davis, 1970, p.78) 
political ideology and public responsibility. The pro-
blems inherent to financing public education may require 
concessions and compromises from both local autonomy sup-
porters and centralists by leaving the administra.tion 
of public schools to the local jurisdictions and central-
izing the financing of their functions, preferably at 
the state level. 
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The foregoing conclusions are not intended as an all-
inclusive treatment of political, legal and socio-economic 
details related to the problems of financing public schools. 
The primary effort and direction of this study and the 
conclusions thereupon have been the systematic analyses 
of tax burden distribution components of the alternatives 
to finance public schools, and the assessment of their 
comparative advantages and disadvantages. 
In summary, the major accomplishments and contri-
butions of this study are, first, the illustration and 
presentation of the present tax burden distribution L~­
equities in financing public education within and among 
school districts in the Portland metropolitan area; and, 
secondly, the provision of information and analysis re-
garding changes which may occur in the tax burden distri-
bution structure resulting from changes in the means by 
which public schools are financed in the state of Oregon. 
In accordan.ce \'1ith the primary objectives of this research, 
the information and the analyses presented may be used 
by decision makers in developing and formulating policies 
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to decrease the probable economic and political effects 
of different public school financing alternatives. Con-
currently, the results of this study provide the 'policy-
makers with a systematic policy guidance and direction 
specifically concerning the tax burden distributive 
functions of governments involved directly or indirectly 
with financing public educational goods and services. 
Relative to the importance given the criterion of equity 
in taxation, the significance of the results of this study 
is relevant and complementary to the current struggle 
to establish an equity-based public school financing 
system. 
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APPENDIX A 
Definitions and Formulas 
The following are definitions of certain school fin-
ance-related terminology used in this study. 
Per Puuil: resident-weighted pupil criterion based on dif-
ferential weights given to elementary and secondary school 
students. As used in the state aid formulas, under this 
system of weights an elementary school student is counted 
as 1.0 pupils whereas a secondary school student equals 
1.3 pupils to reflect the higher cost incurred in providing 
educational services to secondary level students. (state 
of Oregon Legislative Revenue Office, 1976, p.1) 
Property Cash Value Per Pupil: represents school districts' 
residential, commercial and industrial property wealth as 
measured by true cash values per pupil. 
state Aid Per Pupil: per pupil budgeted Basic School Sup-
port and special state supported educational program reve-
nues distributed to school districts. 
Egualization State Aid Per Pupil: per pupil state revenues 
distributed to school districts from the budgeted Basic 
School Support Funds, based on the level of per pupil 
property cash values of school districts. Equalization pay-
ments through state sources are designed to provide property 
wealth differentiation-based financial support to reach a 
standard per pupil expenditure level among school districts. 
School District Property Tax Rate: summed local, county and 
Intermediate Education District property tax rates indicating 
the total property tax rates per $1,000.00 of the re-
spective school districts' property cash values. 
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Total Operational Expenditures Per Pupil: per pupil an-
nual operational expenditures of school districts, includ-
ing net operating expenditures and transportation expen-
ditures. 
Foundation EaualizLTIE,j strayer-Haig): based on the as-
sumption that the :tate and local school districts will 
finance a minimum foundation program. of education by a 
partnership plan. Under this plan local districts make a 
required minimum local tax effort in proportion to their 
taxpaying ability. The state will proYide the difference 
between the cost of the guaranteed minimum program and the 
amount of funds per unit of need which are apportioned in 
inverse relation to the taxpaying ability per unit of need 
of local school districts. 
Power Equalizing (Benson-Coons): power equalization is a 
commitment by the state to the principle that the relation-
ship between effort and provision of every school district 
will be the same irrespective of wealth and that the dis-
trict is to determine the effort. Under power equalizing, 
the school district budget is locally determined; the state 
pays a proportion, inverse to the school district's wealth, 
of that budget. (Coons, 1970, pp. 163 and 202)~ 
The following are the formulas indicating the pro-
cedures of calculations for state property tax refund and 
state income tax payments. 
state Property Tax Refund Computations: 
(1) Homeowner 
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LProperty Tax - (Refund--varies with level of income17 
X (Percent for puplic education--varies with school 
district municipal overburden ratios) = Net property 
tax for public education. 
(2) Renter 
LRent X .117 = (Refund--varies with level of income) 
X (Percent for public education--varies with school 
district municipal overburden ratios) = Net property 
tax for public education. 
state Income Tax Payments Computations*: 
Income -- LrFamily Size X 750) + (13% of Income--
minimum 1050, maximum 1500) + (Federal Income Tax--
varies with income and family size17 = Taxable income 
X appropriate rate** = State Income Tax X percent for 
public education*** = Income Tax for public education. 
*Based on 1976 state Income Tax Rate Schedules. 
**See Appendix C for the appropriate tax rate schedules 
under various school financing alternatives. 
***School Finance Alternatives = the Present and the Re-
form Within the Present--33~2%; the Increased State Support--
44.3%; and the Full State Funding--62.3%. 
APPENDIX B 
Statistical Terminology* 
Pearson Product Moment Correlation (r): a ratio which ex-
presses the extent to which changes in one variable are 
accompanied by, as depend upon, changes in the second 
variable. 
- -in = 1 (Xi - X) (Yi - Y) 
r = ----------------------------------------------
The Coefficient of Determination (r2): the percentage held 
in common of the total variation of the two variables. 
The Slope of the Regression (b): the vertical distance of 
all data points are minimized through least squares re-
gression procedures (Regression Coefficient). 
i R 1 (Xi ~ X) (Yi - Y) 
b = --------------------------------------------
The Intercept of the Slope (a): the value at the point 
where the regression slope line crosses the vertical axis. 
Y - b x 
a = -----
N 
*Source: Nie, et a1 7 1975, pp. 276-300; and Jones, 1971, p~. 123-134 and 173-177. 
Significa~ce (F): measurement of risk and significance 
with N-2 degrees of freedom. 
F = 
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APPENDIX C 
Income Tax Rate Schedules 
state Annual Income 
° - ~p 1,000 
$ 1,000 - $ 2,000 
$ 2,000 - $ 4,000 
$ 4,000 - $ 6,000 
$ 6,000 - $ 8,000 
$ 8,000 $10,000 
$10,000 + 
o -~? 
$ 500 - $ 
$ 1 ,000 - ~~ 
~p 2,000 - ;G 
t:? 3,000 - $ 
$ 4,000 - ~~ 
$ 5,000 -
500 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
+ 
State _~~nual Income 
o 
$ 1,000 
- j? 1,000 
~p 2,000 
~ 4,000 
$ 6,000 
$ 8,000 
$10,000 
~~ 2,000 -
$ 4,000 -
:$ 6,000 -
;;p 8,000 -
$10,000 -
o - ~p 
$ 500 - :$ 
$ 1,000 ;$ 
o 2,000 - ~~ 
$ 3,000 $ 
$ 4,000 - ~~ $ 5,000 
+ 
500 
1,000 
2,000 
3.000 
4;000 
5,000 
+ 
Present (1975-1976); 
Reform Within the Present; 
Increased State Support 
Households 
4% 
$ 40 + 5% above ;:~ 1 ,000 
$ 90 -I- 6% above ~ 2,000 
$210 + 7% above :S 4,000 
$350 + 8% above $ 6,000 
$510 + 9% above $ 8,000 
(p690 1-'j 0% above $10,000 
Singles 
4% 
~$ .20 + 
'.1'. 45 
',y 
5% above 
6% above 
~105 (p175 
~3255 
$345 
+ 7% 
+ 8% 
+ 9% 
+10% 
above 
above 
above 
above 
~~ 500 
$ 1,000 
~~ 2,000 
;3 3,000 
:B 4,000 
$10,000 
Full State Funding: 
Income and Statewide 
Property Taxation* 
$ 40 
$ 90 
$230 
;~390 
;~590 
$830 
Households 
4% 
5 ~1 + 1'0 
+ '7% 
+ 8% 
+10% 
+12% 
+13% 
above 
above 
above 
above 
above 
above 
Singles 
4% 
$ 20 + 5% above 
$ 45 + 7% above 
$115 + 8% above 
$195 +10% above 
;$295 +12% above 
$415 +13% above 
$; 1,000 
~~ 2,000 
~? 4,000 
$ 6,000 
~p 8,000 
~~10,000 
$ 500 
;~ 1 ,000 
;~ 2,000 
8 3,000 
~ 4,000 
~~ 5,000 
*It is estimated that a 26% inc:rease in state income 
ta.."'C levels would balance the revenues lost from the reduced 
level of property taxation for public education. 
state _~~~ual Income 
o $ 1,000 
$ 1,000 ~ 2,000 
$ 2,000 - ~ 4,000 
$ 4,000 - $ 6,000 
$ 6,000 - $ 8,000 
~ 8,000 $10,000 
$10 p OOO + 
o 
-\ 5 a :w 0 
:5> 1,000 
~;; 2,000 -
;$ 3,000 
(~ 500 
$ 1,000 
~~ 2,000 
~;; 3,000 
~~ 4,000 
~$ 5,000 $ 4,000 
3 5,000 - + 
state FJillual Income 
a 
$ 1,000 
~S 2,000 
$ 4,000 
~~ 6,000 
- $ 1,000 
~~ 2,000 
- :'~ 4,000 
~~ 6,000 
(> 8,000 
;~1 0,000 ~ 8,000 
010,000 -
o - ~~ 
~~ 500 - $ 
$ 1 ,000 - ~? 
~~ 2,000 - S 
;$ 3,000 ~~ 
$ 4,000 - $ 
~~ 5,000 -
+ 
500 
1,000 
2,000 
3,000 
4,000 
5,000 
+ 
Full state Funding: 
Incow.e and State"t:i:ie Busi-
ness Property Taxation* 
$ 50 
$.120 
~~280 
$460 
-h -70 :;pb 
$910 
Households 
5% 
+ 7% above 
+ 8% above 
+ 9% above 
+11% above 
+12% above 
+13% above 
Singles 
$ 1,000 
~? 2,000 
G 4,000 
:~ 6,000 
$ 8,000 
~~1 0,000 
5% 
+ 7% 
+ 8% 
+ 9% 
+11 % 
+12% 
+13% 
abo·..,-e ~~ 500 
above ~p 1 ,000 
above $ 2,000 
above :3 3,000 
above ~:; 
above S 
4,000 
5,000 
Full state nL~ding: 
Income Taxation 
anI¥*"* 
Households 
6% 
~~ 60 + 8% above $ 1 ,000 
~p 140 +11 % above JP 2,000 
~~ 360 +13% above ::> 4,000 
$ 620 +15% above S 6,000 
~~ 920 +17% above ~~ 8,000 
$1260 +20% above $10,800 
$ 30 
(I. 70 
.t? 
~?180 
$310 
j~460 
$630 
c - 1 o..J~nR;~es 
6% 
+ 8% above 
+1·1 % above 
+13% above 
+15% above 
+17% above 
+20% above 
:;:; 500 
~~ 1 ,000 
~p 2,000 
;$ 3,000 
;3 4,000 
~~ 5,000 
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*It is estimated that a 35% increase in state income tax 
levels would balance the revenues lost from the elimination 
of residential property ta..."'mtion for public education. (Leg-
islative Revenue Office, 1976) 
**It is estimated that a 92% increase in state i..'1.come tax 
levels would balance the revenues lost from complete eli.:"11i-
nation of the property taxation for public education. 
APPENDIX ]) 
Representative Taxpayer Data Base 
Taxpayer category Property Status Federal Income Ta.."'\: 
Family Owner/ 
-
Payment as Percent 
Rank*' Income Size Renter Yalue** of' Income*** 
1 :~ 4,000 5 
° 
$23,700 
° 2 4,000 5 R 2,052+ 0 
3 4,000 4 0 22,600 
° 4 4,000 4 R 2,016+ 0 
5 4,000 3 0 21,300 
° 6 4,000 3 R 2,956+ 
° 7 4,000 2 
° 
20,000 2.20 
8 4,000 2 R 1,896+ 2.20 
9 8,000 5 
° 
28,600 4.37 
10 8,000 5 R 2,304+ 4.37 
11 8,000 4 
° 
25,600 5.89 
12 8,000 4 R 2,268+ 5.89 
13 4,000 1 
° 
15,200 6.37 
14 4,000 1 R 1 ,536+ 6 e 37 
15 8,000 3 
° 
25,600 7.49 
16 8,000 3 R 2,208+ 7.49 
17 12,000 5 
° 
33,000 8.89 
18 12,000 5 R 2,688+ 8,,89 
19 8,000 2 
° 
24,000 9.24 
20 8,000 2 R 2,148+ 9.24 
21 12,000 4 
° 
31,400 10.06 
22 12,000 4 R 2,628+ 10.06 
23 12,000 3 
° 
29,600 11.27 
24 12,000 3 R 2,556+ 11027 
25 18,000 5 
° 
42,700 12.19 
26 12,000 2 
° 
27,800 12.60 
27 12,000 2 R 2,472 + 12.60 
28 8,000 1 
° 
18,200 13.02 
29 8,000 1 R 1 ,752 + -13.02 
30 18,000 4 0 40,600 13.11 
31 18,000 .... 0 38,400 14.22 :J 
32 18,000 2 0 36,200 15.19 
33 12,000 1 0 21,100 16 e 07 
34 12,900 1 R 2,328+ 16.07 
35 25,000 5 0 65,900 16.64 
*Taxpayer Category rankings are based on federal income 
tax payments. 
**Taxpayer property statu.s values are updated to 1975 
from 1970 census information. (U.S. Department of Co~~erce, 
Bureau of the Censlls, 1971) 
***Rankings on equal payments are based on family size 
and/or property status. 
+Annual rent values 
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Ta.xpayer category Property status Federal Income T~~ 
Family O\vner/ Payment as Percent 
Rank Income Size Renter Value of Income 
36 ~~25 ,000 4 0 $62,700 16.85 
37 25,000 3 0 59,200 17.71 
38 25,000 2 
° 
55,700 18.67 
39 18,000 1 
° 
27,500 19.47 
40 35,000 5 0 88,200 21.07 
41 35,000 4 
° 
84,000 21.85 
42 35,000 3 
° 
79,200 22.68 
43 35,000 2 
° 
74,400 23.52 
44 25,000 1 
° 
42,200 23.88 
45 35,000 1 
° 
55.200 29.33 
